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AGENCY LAW
BARRIERS TO SUCCESSFUL ENVIRONMENTAL AND
NATURAL RESOURCES LITIGATION: TENTH CIRCUIT
APPROACHES TO STANDING AND AGENCY DISCRETION
INTRODUCTION
Environmental and natural resource plaintiffs that sue federal agen-
cies must overcome two barriers that might prevent a federal court from
addressing the merits of their arguments. One is the standing require-
ment, which assures that a proper plaintiff is before the court.1 The other
is agency discretion.2 Plaintiffs that sue federal agencies must survive a
court's tests regarding whether they should defer to the agency's deci-
sions regarding the merits.3 If the court decides the agency's approach is
in accordance with the law, the environmental plaintiff likely has pre-
pared its case in vain. Plaintiffs face a double-edged sword. They must
meet standing requirements to withstand one slice of the sword: a chance
for the court to dismiss the case. Plaintiffs then must withstand the sec-
ond swing: a court's attempt to defer to agency discretion, which could
effectively take the controversy away from the court.
These issues are especially important in the U.S. Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Due to its jurisdiction over six central and western
states-including tens of thousands of acres of federal land and a number
of important national parks, it hears many cases involving plaintiffs su-
ing federal agencies over public lands, natural resources, and other envi-
ronmental issues.4
The Tenth Circuit has decided over four hundred cases dealing with
standing or agency discretion.5 Usually, they involved local resource
1. Plater, et. al. Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, and Society, 398 (2nd ed.
1998).
2. Id. at 430. ("Deference to agencies' legal interpretations is most likely where a legislative
scheme seems highly technical, with a wide range of details delegated to the agency's special
expertise.").
3. Id.
4. The Tenth Circuit includes Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and
Wyoming. Yellowstone, Grand Tetons, Rocky Mountain, Zion and Canyonlands National Parks, as
well as many national monuments, fall within the jurisdiction.
5. Author's count. Approximately thirty cases were decided at least in part on standing or
agency discretion grounds during the survey period of September 1, 1999 to August 31, 2000. See,
e.g., Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 (Pg. 12, this paper for more
detail.)(Nonprofit organization, guide, and rock climbers challenged the National Park Service's
approval of Final Climbing Management Plan for Devils Tower National Monument in Wyoming.
The plaintiffs argued that climbing restrictions designed to reduce harm to Native American spiritual
practices violated the establishment clause of the Constitution. The court held that plaintiffs suffered
no injury in fact so lacked standing.); See also, Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102
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users and environmental organizations suing federal agencies over
6agency decisions about popular local issues. An understanding of the
way the court assessed some of these issues might encourage environ-
mental plaintiffs to reevaluate their cases to make sure they can effec-
tively meet standing requirements and resist deference to agency deci-
sion-making in the Tenth Circuit.
Three cases concerning high-profile environmental issues exemplify
these points. One case addresses standing and two cases address agency
discretion.8 First, a fairly typical standing case, Bishchoff v. Meyers,9 is
reviewed. It involves federal-land grazing permits. 10 The Tenth Circuit
ruled that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring suit." This case also
serves as an introduction to the next cases. The second case, Wyoming
Farm Bureau Fed. v. Babbitt,12 concerns a high-visibility endangered
species topic: a US Department of Interior decision concerning the fate
of endangered wolf reintroduction in Wyoming and Idaho, 13 an issue that
has drawn expansive media attention and has inspired challenges by en-
vironmentalists, ranchers and other private land owners alike. 14 The
plaintiffs argued that the U.S. Department of Interior abused its discre-
tion by creating a wolf-release plan in conflict with what they considered
guiding principles of the Endangered Species Act. 15  The court
16disagreed. The last case, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v.
Dabney,17 concerns the National Park Service's Backcountry Manage-
F.3d 445 (Environmental organization brought a NEPA action against Forest Service's challenging
its decision to allow summer use of a ski area in national forest. The Tenth Circuit held that the
organization had standing.); See also, Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287 (discretion of
agency regarding livestock grazing permits); Mt. Emmons Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1167
(unlawful use of agency discretion).
6. Id.
7. Bischoff v. Myers, 216 F.3d 1086 (Table) (10th Cir. 2000), Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed. v.
Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000), Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, - F.3d
(10th Cir. 2000).
8. Bischoffis a standing case. Babbitt and Dabney involve agency discretion.
9. Bischoff, 216 F.3d 1086.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224.
13. Id.
14. See National Public Radio, Wolves in Yellowstone, http://search.npr.org/cf
/cmn/cmnps05fm.cfm?SeglD=-69171; see also, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC
PARK PROFILES: YELLOWSTONE COUNTRY, 12, 44, 98-99, 182 (1997); for possible reintroductions
in Colorado, see Theo Stein, Wolf reintroduction roams closer to Colorado, Denver Post, February
17, 2001, at Al.
15. Babbitt, 199 F.3d. 1224; guiding principles such as an alleged requirement that introduced
wolves should not mix with wolves already present in the ecosystem (see discussion in this article
below, pp. 25-30).
16. Id.
17. Dabney, 222 F.3d 819.
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ment Plan for Canyonlands National Park.'8 Environmental plaintiffs
argued that the National Park Service abused its discretion by creating a
plan that would allow off-road vehicle use.' 9 This case was remanded for
clarification of the effects of such use.2°
I. STANDING
A. Background
1. Standing as defined by the US Supreme Court
A basic axiom of federal trial practice is that environmental plaintiffs
must meet the "threshold constitutional and statutory tests" of standing to
sue. 2  Fundamentally, Article III, Section Two of the Constitution re-
quires that there be a present (or live) "case" or "controversy. 22 Moreo-
ver, the plaintiff must show that the defendant caused his injury,23 and
that he has been injured "in fact," usually proven by demonstrated eco-
nomic injury. 24 Once injury in fact is established, plaintiffs also must
meet "prudential limitations" on standing, created by the Supreme Court
to allow for judicial discretion to restrict the kinds of parties that can




21. See PLATER supra note 1, at 398; standing in state court depends on state law.
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Various cases have dealt with this issue, but the first instance of
this doctrine occurred when President George Washington wanted the Supreme court's opinion on
the United States' neutrality regarding the war between England and France. The court firmly
rejected the offer, based on the Constitution's system of checks and balances requiring the Executive
Branch to make decisions. See HART AND WECHSLER, FEDERAL COURTS 92-93 (4th ed., 1996); see
also, Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83,
102 (1998).
23. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 93 S.Ct. 114 (1972); see also, Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975)("It is the
responsibility of the complaintant clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to
invoke judicial resolution of the dispute and the exercise of the court's remedial powers."); FW/PBS,
Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)(Plaintiffs must "allege ... facts essential to show
jurisdiction. If [they] fail to make the necessary allegations [they have] no standing.").
24. See PLATER supra note 1, at 400-01; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-1
(1992); for a good summary, see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Serv. (TOC),
Inc.., 120 S.Ct. 693, 704 (2000) ("A plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an 'injury in fact' that is
(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely as opposed to
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. An association has
standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when its members would otherwise have standing to
sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose, and neither
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit.").
25. See PLATER supra note 1, at 398-99; see also Japan Whaling Assoc. v. American
Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S.Ct. 2860 (1986).
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heard.26 Another prudential limitation is that the plaintiff must fall within
27the "zone of interest" of the statute being challenged. Also, a plaintiff
must show that his injuries will be 'cured' by a favorable court decision,
a requirement called redressability. 28 Also, many statutes authorize judi-
cial review only if certain requirements are met.29 For instance, the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act allows standing for "persons adversely af-
fected or aggrieved ... within the meaning of the relevant statute"3° and
when agency action is considered "final.'
Environmental cases provide the backbone of the Supreme Court's
efforts to refine standing requirements during the last thirty years.32 Si-
erra Club v. Morton,33 a quintessential environmental standing case,
proved plaintiffs do not necessarily need economic injury to meet the
requirements of injury in fact.34 The Sierra Club hoped to enforce federal
conservation laws that allegedly would prevent the Walt Disney corpo-
ration from developing a ski resort on national forest lands in the Cali-
fornia Sierras.35 Yet, the plaintiffs did not claim any individual injuries
that would satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. They claimed only a
general interest in environmental protection. 36 For example, the Sierra
Club did not assert that any of its members camped or hiked in the na-
tional forest or otherwise personally benefited from use of the resource.37
As a result, the US Supreme Court dismissed the organization's suit for
lack of standing, 38 but ruled that if it had been shown that any member of
26. Except, for example, when an environmental organization plaintiff alleges injuries to its
members. See, e.g., PLATER supra note 1, at 398-99; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
27. See Bennett v. Spear, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (1997); for detailed description, see this article
below; see also, Assoc. of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
28. PLATER supra note 1, at 398-99; see also Bennett, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (1997); see also,
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw (TOC), Inc., 120 S.Ct. 693 (2000).
29. PLATER supra note 1, at 399 ("like 'aggrieved' under §313(b) of the Federal Power Act
... or special citizen-enforcement authorizations for 'any person' who files a 60-day notice (included
in many environmental statutes ... they are far more liberal than the Art. Ill. 'injury' requirement,
and override prudential limitations.")); see also, Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 727.
30. PLATER supra note 1, at 399 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
32. As discussed next; A related issue is whether a claim is "ripe" for review; Abbott Lab v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967)(The purpose of the ripeness requirement "is to prevent the
courts, though avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial
interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete
way by the challenging parties."); Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)("A claim is not
ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or
indeed may not occur at all.").
33. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 729-730.
36. Id. at 731.
37. Id. at 735.
38. Id. at 741.
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the environmental group had suffered an aesthetic injury, that would
have satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement.39 Such aesthetic injuries are
non-economic. They occur when a plaintiff cannot enjoy a resource
through use or appreciation of it because the resource itself has been de-
graded. 4° Two conditions must be met: the plaintiff used a resource and it
was devalued by the defendant's actions.4 '
U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP) 42 broadened the aesthetic injury requirement even further while
expanding opportunities for a plaintiff to meet causation requirements as
well. A group of Washington, D.C. law students sued the Interstate
Commerce Commission over decisions to assess low transport tariffs on
raw materials transported by rail.43 The plaintiffs alleged such low tariffs
discourage recycled-material use." The Supreme Court granted standing
even though the injury to the students was not "direct and perceptible.
', 5
The court described the long line of causation from the agency's rate
decision to an eventual increase in non-recycled garbage along hiking
trails in national parks in the Washington area, and found it met the cau-
sation requirement.
46
Despite the liberalization of standing requirements in Sierra Club
and SCRAP, two cases decided by the Supreme court in the early 1990s,
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation47 (Lujan I) and Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife48 (Lujan II), raised the standing barrier for environmental
plaintiffs. They required that plaintiffs' injuries be real, not speculative.49
In Lujan I, the National Wildlife Federation challenged the federal gov-
ernment's potential parceling-out of public land for mining and
logging.50 The Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of standing
because the two alleged injuries were not sufficiently concrete. 5' Two
members of the National Wildlife Federation claimed that they recreated
in the vicinity of the lands at issue, but the plaintiff did not live there or
actually recreated there.52 Justice Scalia wrote that these were merely
39. Sierra Club, 406 U.S. 727 at 738-740.
40. See id.
41. Sierra Club, 406 U.S. 727 at 738-740.
42. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S.
669 (1973).
43. Id. at 669-670.
44. Id. at 670.
45. Id. at 689.
46. Id. at 687-690.
47. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation (Lujan 1), 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
48. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Lujan 1), 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
49. Id. at 560-561.
50. Lujan 1, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
51. id. at 899-900.
52. Id. at 871-872.
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generalized grievances-plaintiffs were angry about something that did
not directly affect them-and not injuries in fact.53
In Lujan H,54 Defenders of Wildlife challenged a Reagan Admini-
stration regulation under which that the Endangered Species Act only
applies to government agency projects in the United States, not around
the world. The plaintiff offered affidavits of two of its members.56 One
had visited Egypt and fell in love with the endangered Nile crocodile,
though she did not witness the animal.57 The other visited Sri Lanka and
similarly came back to the United States with great affection for endan-
gered leopard and elephant species, though she had not personally wit-
nessed them. 58 Both were afraid that an Egyptian water-development
project connected with the Aswan High Dam would destroy the crea-
tures' habitats, and consequently the animals.5 9 Defenders of Wildlife
argued that the dam was to be completed in part with U.S. government
(USAID) money, thereby forcing Endangered Species Act
consideration. 60 The organization claimed its two members would like to
go back to see the crocodiles again, but did not know when. 61 Justice
Scalia wrote that standing did not exist because the injury alleged was
not actual or imminent in the near, concrete future, despite the fact that
the plaintiffs sued under the Endangered Species Act's citizen-suit provi-
sion:
62
It is clear that a person who observes or works with a particular ani-
mal threatened by a federal decision is facing perceptible harm, since
the very subject of his interest will no longer exist. It is even plausi-
ble-though it goes to the outermost limits of plausibility-to think
53. Id. at 886.
54. Lujan 11, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); see also, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, n.3 (1992) (Seventeen days after Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Lujan II, he
made a comment in footnote three that clarified a determining factor in Lujan I. That is, specific
facts must be shown by sworn testimony at the summary judgment stage of trial. He wrote that
"Lujan II involved the establishment of injury-in-fact at the summary judgment stage, [and] required
specific facts to be added by swom testimony; had the same challenge to a generalized allegation of
injury-in-fact been made at a pleading stage, it would have been unsuccessful.").
55. Id.; regulation applied to ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
56. Lujan 11, 504 U.S. at 563.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 563-564.
59. Id. at 563.
60. Id. at 562-563; ESA § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)(All federal agencies are required "to seek
to conserve endangered species and threatened species .... [And,] each federal agency shall, in
consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary [of Interior], insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification
of habitat of such species."
61. Lujan H, 504 U.S. at 563-564.
62. Id. at 566-567; ESA § 1 (g) (16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(g)). Perhaps if the members had
purchased airline tickets to go back, that would be enough.
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that a person who observes or works with animals of a particular spe-
cies in the very area of the world where that species is threatened by a
federal decision is facing such harm, since some animals that might
have been the subject of his interest will no longer exist.... It goes
beyond that limit, however, and into pure speculation and fantasy, to
say that anyone who observes or works with an endangered species,
anywhere in the world, is appreciably harmed by a single project af-
fecting some portion of that species with which he has not more spe-
cific connection."
63
Notwithstanding his decisions in Lujan I and II, Justice Scalia ef-
fectively lowered the standing barrier (albeit for plaintiffs who were not
environmental groups) by allowing ranchers not interested in preserving
endangered species to use the Endangered Species Act's citizen-suit pro-
vision in Bennett v. Spear.64 The case involved two ranchers who feared
a loss of their water supply because river water was withheld from irri-
gation due to the presence of an endangered fish.65 The district court held
that the ranchers were not parties who fell within the zone of interest of
the act-they opposed species protection rather than supported it.66 Jus-
tice Scalia allowed them standing, though, holding that under the citizen-
suit provision of the act, which expands the zone of interest, any person
could file suit.
67
One of the most important recent environmental cases involving
standing is Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environ. Serv.68 The
plaintiff environmental groups, Friends of the Earth, Citizens Local En-
vironmental Action Network and the Sierra Club, sued Laidlaw under the
citizen-suit provision of the Clean Water Act. 69 The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendant did not comply with its wastewater treatment plant Na-
tional Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit, and discharged
mercury and other toxics exceeding permit limits into South Carolina's
North Tyger River.70 Before the plaintiffs filed suit, the South Carolina
Deptartment. of Health and Environmental Control settled with Laidlaw
over the same permit violations for $100,000.
71
The Supreme Court ruled that plaintiff-appellants had standing to
sue the defendant chemical company because the group's members suf-
fered injuries that were related to recreational use of the polluted river,
63. Lujan 11, 504 U.S. 555, 566-7. (1992).
64. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (If plaintiff cannot meet Endagnered Species Act
notice requirements, it may still bring an Endangered Species Act claim under the APA or NEPA).
65. Id. at 157.
66. Id. at 155.
67. Id. at 162-164.
68. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Serv. (TOC), Inc., 120 S.Ct. 693,
704-7 (2000).
69. Id. at 696: Clean Water Act citizen-suit provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
70. Friends of the Earth. 120 S.Ct. 693.696 (2000); Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. §1342(a)(1).
71. Friends of the Earth, 120 S.Ct. 693696 (2000).
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and the "aesthetic and recreational value" of the river was lessened by
72defendant's mercury contamination. More importantly, perhaps, the
court held that the plaintiffs had standing because civil penalties levied
on the defendant (as opposed to more traditional damages paid directly to
plaintiffs) redressed plaintiffs injuries by deterring the defendant from
polluting.73
Here is a summary of important environmental standing highlights.
If there is a present controversy and the defendant-a polluter or gov-
ernment agency, for example-has caused the environmental plaintiff's
injury, a plaintiff interest group whose members used a resource that was
devalued by defendant's actions has injury-in-fact standing, even if aes-
thetic and recreational values are lessened.74 Yet, generalized grievances
are not enough for injury in fact 75 and the injury must be actual or immi-
nent. 76 Furthermore, plaintiffs must fall within the zone of interest of
applicable statutes.77 Last, fines imposed on parties devaluing the re-
source might meet the redressability requirement.78
2. Pre-survey Period Tenth Circuit Standing Cases
The Tenth Circuit has decided a number of environmental standing
cases in recent years. In Park Lake Resources Ltd. Liability Co. v. U.S.
79Dept. of Agriculture, mining groups sued the U.S. Forest Service over
its designation of land as a research natural area.80 The district court af-
firmed the land designation, and the plaintiff appealed. 81 The Court of
Appeals held, in part, that the agency's designation was not final agency
action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and therefore the
82suit was not ready (ripe) for review.
Similarly, in Colorado Farm Bureau v. U.S. Forest Service,83 trade
groups sued state and federal agencies, asserting that the agencies' in-
volvement in a Colorado Lynx reintroduction plan violated the APA.
84
72. Id. at 704-705 (Injuries included forgoing fishing, picknicking, bird watching, walking,
wading, boating, driving, swimming and camping in and near polluted river.).
73. Id. at 706.
74. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) and Friends of the Earth, 120 S.Ct. 693 (2000).
75. Lujan 1, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990).
76. Lujan 11, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992).
77. Bennett, 520 U.S. 154, 162-164 (1997).
78. Friends of the Earth at 706-707.
79. Park Lake Resources Ltd. Liability Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 197 F.3d 448 (10th
Cir. 1999).
80. Id. at 449.
81. Id. at 448.
82. Id. at 450-452; see 5 U.S.C.A. § 704 (An important requirement for review of agency
action is that the action be final. Only then is it ripe for review).





The district court dismissed the case, and the groups appealed. 85 The
Court of Appeals held that the groups did not have APA standing be-
cause the agency's action-involvement with the Lynx introduction
86plan-was not final. Because APA standing was not established, the
87
court did not assess whether the groups had Article III standing.
In Baca v. King,88 a federal public-lands grazing-lease, case, the
Tenth Circuit put forth what it considered the minimum constitutional
standing requirements. 89 To satisfy the redressability requirement for
constitutional standing, the court wrote, the plaintiff must show at least a
'substantial likelihood' that the relief requested will redress the injury
claimed. 90 There, standing did not exist because "the loss of the possibil-
ity of obtaining a federal lease is not redressable by a favorable decision
[of the court] 1 The court continued: "No court has the power to order
the BLM [Bureau of Land Management] or the Department of Interior to
grant Mr. Baca another grazing lease, because the very determination of
whether to renew grazing permits and whether public lands should even
be designated for grazing purposes are matters completely within the
Secretary of Interior's discretion.
', 92
Tenth Circuit cases have often involved injury in fact.93 For example,
a nonprofit organization, a climbing guide, and rock climbers sued the
National Park Service (NPS) over approval of its Final Cimbing Man-
agement Plan for Devils Tower National Monument in Bear Lodge Mul-
tiple Use Association v. Babbitt.94 They argued that climbing limitations
designed to reflect Native American spiritual beliefs violated the estab-
lishment clause of the U.S. Constitution. 95 The Wyoming district court
allowed adoption of the plan, and the plaintiffs appealed.96 The Court of
Appeals held that the plaintiffs did not suffer injury in fact so lacked
85. Id. at 1171.
86. Id. at 1174.
87. Id. at 1173.
88. Baca v. King, 92 F.3d 1031 (10th Cir. 1996).
89. Id. at 1305 (citing Lujan 1) "[They] require ... (1) that the plaintiff "suffered an 'injury in
fact'-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
Iactual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical'; (2) that the injury is "'fairly ... trace [able] to
the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some
third party not before the court' "; and (3) that it is "likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that
the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision."'
90. Id. at 1306.
91. Id. (quoting Mount Evans co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444, 1451 (10th Cir., 1994) (citing
Ash Creek Mining Co. v. Lujan, 969 F.2d 868, 870-871, 875 (10th Cir., 1992))). In both of those
cases, the court held that plaintiffs could not sue to make the court force an agency to do something.
92. Id.
93. See following discussion.
94. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999).
95. Id. at 815.
96. Id. at 814.
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97 98standing.97 In Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, an environ-
mental group challenged a U.S. Forest Service decision to allow summer
use of a National Forest ski area, alleging that the agency did not follow
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements. 9 The New
Mexico district court granted summary judgment for the ski operator
intervenor, and the plaintiffs appealed.' The Court of Appeals held that
the organization had standing to challenge the agency's discretion under
NEPA.1
0'
Furthermore, in Wind River Multiple Use Advocates v. Espy,102 an
environmental group challenged a U.S. Forest Service decision to adopt
the Bridger-Teton National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan,
which would allow timber management unfavorable to the group. 103 The
Wyoming district court found that Wind River lacked standing because
the group did not show injury in fact or that any injury would be re-
dressed by a decision in its favor. 04 As an alternative, the district court
held that the plaintiff could not win on the merits as a matter of law. 105
"Specifically, the district court held that Wind River had failed to create
a material fact issue with respect to whether the Forest Service decision
to adopt annual timber harvests below levels authorized by federal law
was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act,"
held the Tenth Circuit.1°6 The plaintiff appealed the decision concerning
its lack of standing but did not challenge the ruling on the merits. Be-
cause the group did not challenge the merits ruling, the Court of Appeals
affirmed. 107 Finally, Ash Creek Min. Co. v. Lujan108 concerned a land-
owner's suit against the Department of Interior over the agency's plan to
exchange coal lands in the state. 1°9 The Wyoming district court dismissed
for lack of standing and the Court of Appeals held that the injury was not
redressable.'°
97. Id. at 822.
98. Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445 (10th Cir. 1996).
99. Id. at 446.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 452.







108. Ash Creek Mining Co. v. Lujan, 969 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1992).
109. Id. at 870-87 1.
110. Id. at 872-876.
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B. Tenth Circuit: Standing
1. Bischoff v. Myers
I I
In Bischoff v. Myers,1 2 a very brief, unpublished case, the Tenth Cir-
cuit ruled on redressabilty while highlighting agency discretion. 1 13 The
case involved a land transaction and grazing permit transfer. 1 4 The seller
wanted the court to review a Forest Service refusal to reissue their graz-
ing permits to them after the buyer of their land defaulted and quit-
claimed the land back to them. 15 The Forest Service determined that the
buyer remained the permittee.1 6 Forest Service rules require that when
land and livestock on it subject to grazing permits is sold, the buyer may
obtain grazing permits for the property if the seller surrenders his permit
to the Service in favor of the buyer. 1
7
The Tenth Circuit found that the Bischoffs lacked standing to bring
the action: "The injury they allege, the loss of their grazing leases, is not
redressable in court because a court may not order the agency to perform
what is a purely discretionary act."' 18 The court wrote that its conclusion
was required by Baca v. King, 19 and Federal Lands Legal Consortium v.
United States,120 under which the decision to issue a grazing permit is
completely within Department of Interior discretion. 21 In doing so, the
court connected redressability, a fundamental standing requirement, to
agency discretion. 122
2. Analysis
While Bischoff was decided on redressability grounds, 123 the case is
unlike others in which redressability concerns the basic premise that a
plaintiffs injury must be cured in some legitimate way by a court deci-
111. Bischoff v. Myers, 216 F.3d 1086 (Table)(10th Cir. 2000).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1086.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Bischoff, 216 F.3d at 1086.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Baca, 92 F.3d at 1035-37 (plaintiff lacked standing because court could not order
government to renew grazing lease; no "court has the power to order the BLM or Department of
Interior to grant ...another grazing lease, because the very determination of whether to renew
granzing permits and whether public lands should even be designated for grazing purposes are
matters completely within the Secretary of Interior's discretion."); see also, McDonald v. Clark, 771
F.2d 560, 463 (Secretary of Interior has broad discretion in mineral leasing.)
120. 195 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 1999)(Secretary of Agriculture has discretion to issue or deny a
grazing permit.)
121. Id. at 1198.
122. Bischoff, 216 F.3d 1086.
123. Id.
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sion in plaintiff's favor. 24 Here, the court did not have the ability to act
in plaintiff s favor because the plaintiffs wanted something that the court
simply could not give them: reissued grazing permits.125 Only the
agency, within its expertise and discretion, could issue them.126 The court
was completely unable to provide such relief because purely discretion-
ary agency decisions preclude the court's intervention. 127 In effect, the
Bischoffs could appeal to Forest Service decision-makers, but beyond
that, they lacked options for relief. This is an explicit example of how
standing issues are connected to discretion. More often, as mentioned
above in the double-edged sword analogy, 128 a plaintiff might meet
standing requirements such as injury in fact only to lose on appeal be-
cause the Tenth Circuit defers to the agency's discretion to make the
decision in the way it sees fit. The next two cases address this issue.
II. AGENCY DISCRETION
A. Background
Agency discretion cases arise when groups challenge the authority
under which an agency makes decisions.' Usually an agency's action or
inaction is challenged as being in conflict with the agency's mandates,
typically statutes passed by Congress. 130 Agencies typically have wide-
ranging discretion over a variety of issues under their control,'13 but
might abuse it by going beyond mandated boundaries. 32 Such abuse
might result in environmentally or otherwise unfavorable policies or
conditions that plaintiffs seek to-change. 133 Controversies especially arise
when agency decisions are not clearly out of line with the intent of Con-
gress, but might go against that intent.1
34
B. Discretion Under Chevron and the APA
In discretion cases, courts assess whether they should defer to the
decision-making power of the agency, often relying on the 1984 Su-
preme Court case Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense
Council.135 There, the Court found that the Environmental Protection
124. See standing discussion, supra.
125. Bischoff, 216 F.3d at 1086.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. In the introduction to this paper, page 1.
129. See PLATER supra note 1, at 378-83.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 379.
132. Id. at 380 (Courts analyze such decisions in part by looking at Congressional intent.).
133. See See PLATER supra note 1, at 381.
134. Id. at 378-379.
135. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See also, United States v.
Mead Corp. 121 S.Ct. 2164 (2001). This case may become extremely important to practitioners and
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Agency's decision to define an air pollution "source" as a "bubble" was
within the "reasonable construction" of the statutory term "source" in the
Clean Air Act. 36 In doing so, the Court created a two-part conjunctive
test that provides a "reasonable construction" analysis.
37
The Court held, first, that if the intent of Congress is clear regarding
the statutory language designed to guide the agency, that intent rules the
agency's decision.' Second, if Congressional intent is not clear, the
court must review the agency's decision with deference, and uphold it if
it is based on a "permissible construction of the statute."'' 39 The agency's
interpretation does not have to be the only permissible construction or
the result the court would have reached.' 4° Furthermore, "when a chal-
lenge to agency construction of a [statute] really centers on the wisdom
of the agency's policy,'
' 4' that challenge must fail.1
42
The Court held that federal judges who do not have a public con-
stituency for whom they work must respect the policy choices of agen-
cies that do have a constituency. 43 "[If] Congress has explicitly left a gap
for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the
agency.
Another test used by courts reviewing agency decisions is found in
the Administrative Procedure Act. 145 The statute, a general operating law
controlling federal governmental agencies, 146 provides that the court
courts concerned with the Chevron analysis. The decision was rendered slightly before the final edit
of this paper. As of October 2001, no other decision has followed Mead's holding, so it is unlcear
how far the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling will extend. The Court held that a U.S. Customs Service
tariff classification ruling was not entitled to Chevron deference or any lesser deference. The Court
held:
Administrative implementation of a particlular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to
make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority. Delegation of such authority
may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's power to engage in adjudication or
notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of comparable
congressional intent. The Customs ruling at issue here fials to qualify.
As this ruling stands, environmental and natural resources plaintiffs should examine all
administrative rulings that appear to fallunder the guise of informal rulemaking or adjudication to
find out whether Chevron applies.
136. Id. at 865; See generally, Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-767 1.
137. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843.
138. Id. at 842.
139. Id. at 843.
140. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, n. 11.
141. Id. at 865.
142. Id.
143 Id.
144. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-4.
145. Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706.
146. PLATER supra note 1. at Statutory Capsule Appendix, 51 ("The APA is the basic format
statute for federal agencies' procedures for making law that affects persons outside the agencies
(Title 5), and judicial review thereof (Title 7).").
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must inquire as to whether an agency acted within the scope of its
authority, 47 complied with proscribed procedures, 148 or acted arbitrarily
and capriciously and thus, abused its discretion. 49 Title 7 of the Act
"creates a 'generous review provision' that should be given 'a hospitable
reception' in the reviewing courts."'
150
C. Pre-survey Period Tenth Circuit Discretion Cases
Tenth Circuit environmental cases often hinge on agency
discretion.' 51 Most often, the court has found that agencies have acted
within their discretion.' 52 In Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, 53 a company
that operated a forest service concession facility and a county that col-
lected sales taxes from it wanted the court to review the Forest Service's
decision not to rebuild the facility after it burned down. 154 The court held
that the Forest Service's decision was not arbitrary or capricious. 155 In
another case, non rofit and livestock organizations in Public Lands
Council v. Babbitt 56 challenged Department of Interior regulations re-
garding public-land livestock grazing. 157 The Court of Appeals held that
the Secretary of Interior did not exceed his authority in approving three
regulations, but one regulation which allowed permits for the use of pub-
lic lands for conservation instead of livestock grazing was not authorized
by statute. 1
58
Similarly, in Delgado v. Department of Interior,59 the agency had
discretion (and the court commented on one approach to Chevron analy-
sis). Delgado sued the department over a land-use lease and argued that
the agency was required to cancel it when a violation of any of the rele-
vant lease regulations occurred. 160 Delgado outlined the language of the
guiding regulation: "A lease will be canceled by the Secretary ... if at any
time the Secretary is satisfied that the provisions of the lease or of any
147.. 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also, Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973).
148. Id.
149. Id.; see Motor Vehicle Mfrs Assoc. v. State Farm, 103 S.Ct. 2856 (1983) (limits a court's
review under APA's "arbitrary and capricious" test).
150. PLATER supra note 1, at Statutory Capsule Appendix. 51 (citing Abbott Lab v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136 (1967)).
151. See the Tenth Circuit standing cases review, supra. Many of the plaintiffs sought review
of agency discretion.
152. As the following cases express.
153. Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444 (10th Cir. 1994).
154. Id. at 1447.
155. Id. at 1455.
156. Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 1999).
157. Id. at 1289.
158. Id. at 1309.
159. Delgado v. Dept. of Interior, 153 F.3d 726 (Table) (10th Cir. 1998) (All page numbers are
expressed as single numerals because this is a table case.).
160. Id. at 3-4.
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regulations . . . have been violated," and argued that Chevron analysis
should be the basis for the review. 6 1 The court held Chevron inapplica-
ble, writing that it only applies when regulations are challenged because
they are allegedly inconsistent with a ruling statute.' 62 "When interpret-
ing its own regulation," the court wrote, "an agency is entitled to exercise
even broader discretion than it may under the second prong of
Chevron."'163 Delgado also claimed that the agency decision was arbitrary
and capricious.164 "Our review under this standard is narrow, and we may
not substitute our judgment for that of the agency," the court wrote. 
65
The court concluded that the agency did not abuse its discretion. 
66
In Biodiversity Legal Foundation v. Babbitt,167 the court again de-
ferred to the agency. 68 There, an environmental group sued the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service to enforce an Endangered Species Act (ESA) dead-
line to list an endangered grouse. 169 The Colorado district court granted
summary judgment for defendants and the plaintiff appealed. 70 The
Court of Appeals decided that the agency's use of listing priority guid-
ance did not violate the Act's requirement that a 90-day deadline be
achieved "to the maximum extent practicable.,
7'
The court wrote, "At the outset, we note 'Congress delegated broad
administrative and interpretive powers to the Secretary' when it enacted
the ESA. 17 Although the Service 'must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress,' courts must defer to the Service's inter-
pretation of the ESA if Congressional intent is ambiguous or nonexistent
and the Service's construction of the statute is a permissible one. 173 A
challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision must fail if,
in light of Congress's ambiguity or silence, the agency's action 'is a rea-
sonable choice.""
174
161. Id. at 4-5.
162. Id. at 5.
163. Id. (citing Valley Camp, 24 F.3d at 1267).
164. Delgado. 153 F.3d at 726, 6.
165. Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983); Also, "[T]he agency need only demonstrate that it considered relevant factors and
alternatives after a full ventilation of issues and that the choice it made was reasonable based on that
consideration." (citing Lodge Tower Condo. Ass'n v. Lodge Properties, Inc., 85 F.3d 476, 477 (10th
Cir. 1996) (quoting Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444, 1453 (10th Cir. 1994)).
166. Delgado, 153 F.3d at 726, 7.
167. Biodiversity Legal Foundation v. Babbitt, 146 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1998).
168. Id. at 1257.
169. Id. at 1250.
170. Id. at 1252.
171. Id.
172. Biodiversity, 146 F.3d. at 1253 (citing Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities
for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995)).
173. Biodiversity. 146 F.3d at 1253 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
174. Biodiversitv. 146 F.3d at 1253 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866).
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In Maier v. U.S. E.P.A., 75 environmental groups challenged the En-
vironmental Protection Agency's (EPA) decision not to include nitroge-
nous biochemical oxygen demand (NOD) controls for publicly-owned
treatment works wastewater in its definition of "secondary treatment" in
Clean Water Act regulations. 76 The Court of Appeals found in part that
EPA's decision to refuse to include the NOD controls and instead limit
NOD with yermits was within the agency's discretion under the Clean
Water Act.
Furthermore, in Sierra Club v. U.S. E.P.A.,178 environmental groups
sought judicial review of the EPA's decision "to exempt counties from
selected Clean Air Act (CAA) ozone nonattainment area requirements
without first formally redesignating counties as attainment areas."' 79 The
Court of Appeals held in part that EPA's interpretation of the CAA provi-
sions in such a way was within its discretion and not contrary to the
Act. 180
The Tenth Circuit does not always rule for the agency.' 81 In Mt. Em-
mons Min. Co. v. Babbitt,'82 a mining company sued the Department of
Interior to make the agency continue processing the company's mining
patents application. 83 The Colorado district court granted summary
judgment for the agency and the plaintiff appealed. 84 The Court of Ap-
peals held that the agency's discontinuance of application processing was
an "unlawful withholding of agency action."'
' 85
As the cases below further exemplify, arbitrary decision making, de-
cisions without statutory authority, and agency discretion are factors that
often govern the court's assessment of other controversial environmental
issues.
D. Discretion Cases from Other Circuits
Other circuits have dealt with similar environmental cases in which
agency discretion was the lynch-pin issue. 186 For example, in SW Ctr.For Biological Diversity v. Babbitt,'87 plaintiffs alleged that a goshawk
175. Maier v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 114 F.3d 1032 (10th Cir. 1997).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1045.
178. Sierra Club v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 99 F.3d 1551 (10th Cir. 1996).
179. Id. at 1553.
180. Id. at 1558.
181. As described in the next example.
182. Mt. Evans Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 1997).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1168.
185. Id.
186. As the following cases indicate.
187. SW Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Babbit, 215 F.3d 58 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
[Vol. 78:2
AGENCY LAW
should be listed under the Endangered Species Act. The district court
remanded instructions to the Fish and Wildlife Service to census the
hawks.' 88 The D.C. Circuit held that Endangered Species Act require-
ments mandating the service to use "best results" in its decision making
does not require it to do surveys, but rather gives the agency discretion to
decide what is best. 89 Similarly, in Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal,190
plaintiffs tried to enjoin the construction of a new school on potential
habitat of an endangered owl. 19 1 The appeals court held that evidence,
analyzed by the agency, showed construction would not take the owl,
and deferred to that decision.1
92
In Shenandoah Ecosystem Def. Group v. U.S.F.S.,' 93 plaintiffs
wanted to stop proposed logging because an endangered salamander
lived on national forest land targeted for timber cutting. 94 The court of
appeals held that there was no evidence that the agency's use of discre-
tion was arbitrary or capricious.1
95
In Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,19 6 en-
vironmental groups sued the Corps under the Clean Water Act and the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), challenging a decision to
give a developer a permit to fill wetlands and mitigate the fill by creating
an artificial wetland system. 197 The Central California district court
granted summary judgment to the groups on their NEPA claims, disal-
lowed the permit, and enjoined the developer from further
construction.'" On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the Corps' finding
of no significant impact (FONSI) was within its discretion, and not arbi-
trary and capricious. 199 Similarly, in Central and SouthWest Services,
Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., '00 environmental and industry groups requested re-
view of the Environmental Protection Agency's final rule regulating
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). 20 1 The Fifth Circuit held that the rule
202was not arbitrary and capricious.
188. Id. at 59.
189. Id. at 59-61.
190. Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2000).
191. Id. at 922.
192. Id.
193. Shenandoah Ecosystem Def. Group v. U.S.F.S., 194 F.3d 1305 (Table) (4th Cir. 1999).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 222 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.
2000).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1110.
199. Id. at 1122.
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Moreover, in Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory
Com'n,2 3 a radioactive waste disposal facility requested review of a Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission refusal to grant the plaintiff a hearing and
intervention in proceedings to license a third party. 204 The D.C. Court of
Appeals held that the agency's interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act
to prevent intervention was reasonable. °5 In Defenders of Wildlife v.
Browner, °6 environmental groups requested review of an EPA decision
to issue National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permits to
municipalities without numeric limits to satisfy state water-quality stan-
dards. The Ninth Cicruit held in part that the EPA had discretion to
208require that such municipalities comply with state standards.
In contrast, in Sokol v. Kennedy,2°9 adjacent landowner plaintiffs
challenged boundaries set by the National Park Service when it desig-
nated a scenic river.2'0 The Eighth Circuit held that the agency failed to
follow the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, and that the agency's decision
211was not within its discretion.
E. Tenth Circuit
1. Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation v. Babbitt
212
In Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation v. Babbitt,21 3 plaintiff ranchers
and environmentalists challenged a Department of Interior decision to
engineer final rules and a plan that would control the reintroduction of an
experimental population of gray wolves into Yellowstone National Park
and central Idaho pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA).214 The
plaintiffs argued that the agency abused its discretion in making the rules
because the Department did not follow statutory requirements of the
ESA.21 5 Throughout its opinion, the Tenth Circuit consistently deferred
to the agency's interpretation of the ESA and supported the agency's
decisions notwithstanding their controversial nature.21 6 The court used
203. Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Com'n, 194 F.3d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
204. Id. at 73-74.
205. Id. at 78.
206. Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 191 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1999).
207. Id. at 1161.
208. Id. at 1166-67.
209. Sokol v. Kennedy, 210 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2000).
210. Id. at 877.
211. Id.
212. Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000).
213. Id.
214. Id.; Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1529.
215. Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n, 199 F.3d. at 1224.
216. Babbitt, 199 F.3d, at 1228, 1239.
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the classic Chevron and APA tests to pin down the agency's decisions,
analyze them, and affirm them.217
The plaintiffs argued that if reintroduced wolves were allowed to
combine with wild ones, ranchers (and others) would not be able to
identify which wolves have full protected status and which do not under
the ESA. 218 Therefore, under the reintroduction rules which would allow
219such mingling, some wolves could be shot and killed if the animals
become a nuisance. Yet, ranchers would not know which ones have pro-
tected status, so risk prosecution for shooting the wrong wolf.220 Also,
some environmentalists argued that all wolves, reintroduced or not,
should be fully protected.
22 1
The Department of Interior established rules for the reintroduction
based primarily on ESA Section 10j. 222 Even though a naturally occur-
ring colony of Montana wolves exists that could infiltrate the experi-
mental population,223 the plan allowed the "taking" (killing) of any
wolves if found in the act of killing or wounding livestock, even though
on at least a superficial level this seemed to go against the usual ESA
224restrictions on takings.
The main question before the court was whether the Department of
Interior abused its discretion by allowin5 the experimental population to
incorporate naturally occurring wolves. The plaintiffs argued that the
ESA requires experimental populations to be wholly separate from natu-
ral ones, and that naturally occurring wolves as a result of the rules do
not have full protection under the ESA.226 The plaintiffs also argued that
the Department Interior abused its discretion by going against ESA Sec-
tion 10(j). 227 They argued that since individual, native wolves could enter
the experimental population areas, this was an overlap of experimental
and current-range wolf populations, prohibited by 10(j)'s requirement
that experimental populations be completely separate geographically
from nonexperimental populations.228
217. Id. at 1230-1231.
218. Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 987 F.Supp. 1349, 1361 (1999).
219. See discussion, supra p. 25 -2 7 .
220. Id.
221. See generally, Babbitt, 987 F.Supp. 1348 (1999).
222. ESA Section 10(j), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j).
223. Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1229.
224. Id.; see generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (one typically cannot kill an endangered
species).
225. Babbitt, 199 F.3d, 1224, 1230 ("The crux of this case, and hence this opinion, is the
validity of the final rules governing the introduction of a nonessential experimental population of
gray wolves in the entirety of Yellowstone and in central Idaho.").
226. Id. at 1232.
227. Id.; see discussion of section 10(j), pages 26-7.
228. Id.
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The Administrative Procedure Act and Chevron229 governed the
court's review of whether the agency stayed within the bounds of its dis-
cretion dictated by Congress in the ESA.230 The court held that it "will
set aside the Agencies' factual determinations only if they are unsup-
ported by substantial evidence" that the agency did not meet the Act's
231requirements.
Applying Chevron, the court stated it would give "strict effect to the
unambiguous intent of Congress if Congress has clearly spoken to the
issue before us. '232 However, the court determined that if Congress was
"silent on the issue and has delegated authority over the subject matter to
the Agencies, [we will defer] to the Agency's construction unless, in the
context of the Act, the Department's construction is unreasonable or im-
permissible.
' 233
The court went on to consider the language of the statute in light of
the policy and object of the law. 234 It found that Congress enacted the law
generally to "provide for the conservation, protection, restoration, and
,,235propagation of species of fish, wildlife, and plants facing extinction.
The court then set forth the relevant portions of the ESA, sections
4(f), 7(a)(1) and 100). 23 6 The court wrote that section 4(f) directs the
Secretary of Interior "to develop and implement recovery plans for the
'conservation and survival' of listed species 'unless he finds that such a
plan will not promote the conservation of the species.' ' 237 In addition,
the court wrote, section 7(a)(1) authorizes the Secretary to 'live' trap and
'transplant' (reintroduce) rare species, if necessary, to bring an endan-
gered or threatened species to the point at which the protective measures
of the ESA are no longer necessary. 2 38
229. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
230. Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1231 ("Our review of the rules and record is governed by the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. Essentially, we must determine whether the
Agencies: (1) acted within the scope of their authority, (2) complied with prescribed procedures, and
(3) took action that was neither arbitrary and capricious, nor an abuse of discretion. (citing
Olenhouse, 42 F.3d at 1574.) Within this context, we will set aside the Agencies' factual
determinations only if they are unsupported by substantial evidence. 'The substantial-evidence
standard does not allow a court to displace the [Agencies'] choice between two fairly conflicting
views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been
before it de novo.' (citing Trimmer v. United States Dep't of Labor, 174 F.3d 1098, 1102 (10th
Cir.1999) (quotation marks and citations omitted))".
231. Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1231.
232. Id.
233. Id. (citing Hoyl v. Babbitt, 129 F.3d 1377, 1387 (10th Cir.1997) (citing Chevron, 467
U.S. 837 (1984)).
234. Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1231-32.
235. Id.
236. Id.; 16 U.S.C. §§1533(f), 1536(a)(1), and 1539(j), respectively.




The court then d~fined the Congressional intent of the ESA.239 It
concluded that Congress enacted section 10(j) to counter agency frustra-
tion over political opposition to reintroductions that were thought to con-
flict with human activity. 240 The court wrote that Section 10(j) gives the
Secretary of Interior authority to release any population of endangered
species outside its current range as long as "the Secretary determines that
such release will further the conservation of such species. 24' Yet, the
court found that an experimental population must be "separate geo-
graphically from non-experimental populations of the same species.,
242
Also, the court held, the agency must determine "whether or not such
population is essential to the continued existence" of an endangered or
243threatened species.
The court further detailed the Congressional intent behind section
100):
Congress hoped the provisions of section 10) would mitigate indus-
try's fears that experimental populations would halt development
projects, and with the clarification of the legal responsibilities incum-
bent with the experimental populations, actually encourage private
parties to host such populations on their lands. 244 Congress purposely
designed section 10() to provide the Secretary flexibility and discre-
tion in managing the reintroduction of endangered species. By regu-
lation, the Secretary can identify experimental populations, determine
whether such populations are essential or nonessential, and, consis-
tent with that determination, provide control mechanisms (i.e., con-
trolled takings) where the Act would not otherwise permit the exer-
cise of such control measures against listed species.
The court did not agree with the plaintiffs that the agency abused its
discretion in designing a reintroduction plan in which native and reintro-
duced wolves may co-mingle. 246 The court stressed that the ESA does not
define the phrase "wholly separate geographically from nonexperimental
populations," so does not provide an answer to "whether a reintroduced
population of animals must be separate from every naturally occurring
individual animal. '247
239. Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1232.
240. Id.
241. 16 USC §1539(j)(2)(A).
242. 16 USC §1539(j)(2).
243. 16 USC §1539(j)(2)(B).
244. Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1232 (citing H.R.Rep. No 97-567, at 8 (1982), reprinted in 1982
USCCAN 2807, 2808, 2817; see also 16 USC Section 15396)).
245. Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1233.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1234.
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Due to the fact that the statute was unclear the court deferred to the
248Department of Interior's interpretation. The court held that the agency
defines "population" as "a group of fish or wildlife ... in common spa-
tial arrangement that interbreeds when mature., 249 Furthermore, the court
held, "a 'geographic separation' is any area outside the area in which a
particular population sustains itself., 250 Therefore, the court found that
there was no conflict between the agency's interpretation and Congress'
intent of section 100), because "the paramount objective of the Endan-
gered Species Act [is] to conserve species, not just individual
animals.",251 The court bolstered its reasoning by noting that some endan-
gered species lose protected status when they move across state or inter-
252national borders.2
Next, the court held that the Department of Interior does not have to
give full ESA protection to any naturally occurring wolf found within the
253experimental areas. It wrote that the district court's finding that the
final reintroduction rules constituted a "de facto delisting" of naturally
254occurring lone wolves and denied ESA protection to such wolves and
their offspring was erroneous.255 The Tenth Circuit held that the district
court erroneously limited the administrative discretion that Congress put
in section 100), "ignore[d] biological reality," and issued an opinion that
256did not fit with the larger purpose of the ESA.
In upholding the Department of Interior's interpretation of the ESA,
the Tenth Circuit defined the contours of the Department's discretion
regarding its reintroduction plan. 25 It wrote that the Secretary of Interior
could define an experimental population to include "imported wolves"
and "lone dispersers," because the agency decided this was the best way
to recover the species, and nothing in the ESA prevented it.258 In par-
ticular, the court wrote that Section 10(j)'s language requiring geo-
graphical separation between experimental, released populations and
native ones allows for agency discretion.25 9 Furthermore, such language,
the court wrote, does not restrict the agency's discretion to define a
248. Id.
249. 50 CFR Section 17.3.
250. Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1234 (citing Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 987 F.Supp. at
1373).
251. Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1235.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1236 (citing the district court); "De facto delisting" means the wolf
effectively would be taken off the endangered list and lack protection of the Endangered Species
Act.







population that may include wolves from other geographically separate
populations. 260 "Such a narrow interpretation is not supported by the pro-
vision or the Endangered Species Act read as a whole," the court
wrote.26'
Moreover, the court stated that Congressional intent gave the
agency wide flexibility.2 62 Congress gave the agency authority to define
an experimental population "'on the basis of location, migration pattern,
or any other criteria that would provide notices as to which populations.
. . are experimental. ' ' ' 63 So, the court said, Section 10(j) really protects
the agency's authority "to designate when and where an experimental
population may be established," instead of limiting the agency's flexibil-
ity.26
In further support of its decision to allow agency discretion, the
court declared that the restrictive interpretation of the ESA sought by the
plaintiffs could undermine the Department of Interior's ability to deal
265with biological reality. That in turn, the court wrote, could undermine
species recovery.266 Moreover, the court held that a subspecies of the
wolf that the plaintiffs claimed exists does not, based on the Depart-
ment's research.267 The court applied the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard of review, 268 and deferred to the agency's discretion. 269 Finally, the
260. Id.
261. Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1237.
262. Id.
263. Id. (citing H.r. Conf. Rep. No. 97-835, 97th Congl, 2d Sess. at 34 (1982)).
264. Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1237 ("While the protection of individual animals is one obvious
means of achieving that goal, it is not the only means. It is not difficult to imagine that sound
population management practices tailored to the biological circumstances of a particular species
could facilitate a more effective and efficient species-wide recovery, even if the process renders
some individual animals more vulnerable. However, neither Congress nor this court are equipped to
make that type of species management decision. Recognizing that fact, Congress left such decisions
to the Department. We conclude the Department reasonably exercised its management authority
under section 10(j) in defining the experimental wolf population by location.").
265. Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1236-37 (citing 59 Fed.Reg. at 60256. 60261) ("(1) There were no
reproducing wolf pairs and no pack activity within the designated experimental areas. (2) wolves can
and do roam for hundreds of miles, and (3) it would be virtually impossible to preclude naturally
occurring individual gray wolves from intermingling with the experimental population.... The
Secretary intentionally identified the experimental population as all wolves found within the
experimental areas, including imported wolves and any lone dispersers and their offspring. The
Department determined it could best manage the wolf reintroduction program to achieve species
recovery in this manner. We find nothing in the Act that invalidates this approach by requiring the
protection of individuals to the exclusion or detriment of overall species recovery, or otherwise
limiting the Department's flexibility and discretion to define and manage an experimental population
pursuant to section 10(j).").
266. Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1236.
267. Id. at 1239.
268. See discussion, supra. of Administrative Procedure Act.
269. Id. (citing Trimmer, 174 F.3d at 1102; National Cattlemen's Ass'n v. EPA, 773 F.2d 268,
271 (10th Cir.1985) ("Applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, we cannot displace
the Defendants' choice between two fairly conflicting views, and must defer to the agencies' view on
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court held that as long as the agency "took a 'hard look"' at the environ-
mental consequences of the wolf reintroduction, it would not second-
270guess the agency's environmental impact statement under NEPA.
In conclusion, the Tenth Circuit in classic deference mode held that
the Department of Interior had discretion to create its controversial wolf
reintroduction plan despite its controversial nature because there was no
Congressional intent otherwise.27'
2. Analysis
Administrative agencies have the requisite resources, grounded in
the specialized expertise of their employees, to make final decisions re-
garding day-to-day issues.:- The Department of Interior and its subordi-
nate agencies like the Fish and Wildlife Service are certainly
examples.273 In contrast, few, if any, Congresspersons have the knowl-
edge, skill or experience to understand the technical, biological and eco-
logical framework of decisions as critical as whether and how to reintro-
274duce wolves into the northern Rockies. Furthermore, political motiva-
275tions that might underlie such decision making likely would be a force
preventing those in Congress from making unbiased, scientifically ob-
jective judgments without regard to influences such as economics, which
are not supposed to be taken into account under ESA Section 10(j).
2 76
The ESA, like many statutes passed by Congress, gives agencies di-
rection and only provides a framework for guidance. 27 7 Agencies are left
to put the substantive meat on the bones of the statute. When a deci-
sion to list an endangered species under the statute is made, a public
scientific matters within their realm of expertise. Because this is a scientific matter within the
Agencies' expertise, and because there is ample evidence in the administrative record to support the
Defendants' position, we uphold their subspecies conclusions.").
270. Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1240.
271. Id.
272. See PLATER supra note 1, at 378. ("Agencies are just that: agents. Their only reason for
existence, since they are not provided for in the federal Constitution or most state constitutions, is
that the constitutionally created branches of government had too much detailed work to do than they
could conveniently do themselves. [They] accordingly delegated some of their powers to standing
agents in order to spread the workload and drudgery of performing investigations, day-to-day
oversight, and hands-on administrative tasks of running a society.").
273. As agencies of the executive branch.
274. Because few lawmakers are trained experts in those fields.
275. For example, Western, states-rights, frontier-minded Congresspersons interested in
protecting ranchers in their states might favor a policy that would limit Endangered Species Act
protections for the wolves, while more liberal environmentally minded Congresspersons might
prefer stronger restrictions.
276. See ESA, Section 10(j), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j).




comment period is required before the final listing.279 Yet, if concerned
groups like the plaintiffs in Babbitt cannot change an agency's mind
through commentary and persuasion, they must file suit.
Babbitt arguably is legally and socially important.28° One commen-
281tator provided a context for its importance. Scott Youngblood wrote,
"the district court's [ruling] basically states that if naturally occurring...
wolves are mixed with reintroduced ...wolves, which are called ex-
perimental-nonessential wolves, the reintroduced or experimen-
tal-nonessential wolves must be removed. 282 He continued: "Ranchers
who are allowed to kill nonessential wolves under certain
283circumstances will not be able to tell the difference between endan-
gered and nonessential wolves. Thus, ranchers will not be able to deter-
mine whether they are allowed to kill a particular wolf. Such a ruling by
a federal district court is contrary to the Congressional intent set forth in
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA)." 284 Youngblood went on to
say that, "a dispute over an erroneous interpretation of a statutory defini-
tion is not a basis for condemning an animal to death., 285 Even some of
those generally opposed to wolf reintroduction agree that the Department
of Interior plan might work.286 Youngblood quotes Senator James
McClure of Idaho, who opposed reintroductions but recognized "'that a
narrowly restrictive reintroduction would be less bad for the livestock
industry than an unrestricted wave of natural immigration. ' '' 287 Young-
blood also quotes biologists and wolf experts who agree flexible man-
288agement plans are needed for reintroduction.
If management plans (or other kinds of plans) require flexibility,
and agencies are given court-backed discretion to use or create that flexi-
bility, what can opponents of the plan do if they disagree with a decision
made pursuant to this discretion? Opponents of any agency decision-
regarding management plans or other issues--confront the same
279. See ESA, Section 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5)(B-E).
280. See National Public Radio, Wolves in Yellowstone, http://search.npr.org/cf
/cmn/cmnps05fm.cfm?SeglD=69171; see also, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC
PARK PROFILES: YELLOWSTONE COUNTRY, 12, 44, 98-99, 182 (1997); for possible reintroductions
in Colorado, see Theo Stein, Wolf reintroduction roams closer to Colorado, Denver Post, February
17, 2001, at Al.
281. Scott Youngblood, Wildlife Restoration Projects: Hope for Life or a Death Sentence? A
Look at the Reintroduction of Wolves to the Northern Rocky Mountains. 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 1045.
282. Id. at 1047.
283. Id. at 1047, 1047 n. 13 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(i)(3) (1998) ("Authorizing the killing of
wolves under various circumstances such as seeing a wolf attacking livestock on private land, or if
carrying a permit, when seeing a wolf attacking livestock on public lands if there are six or more
breeding pairs of wolves in the area.").
284. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
285. Youngblood supra note 281, at 1047.
286. Id. at 1062.
287. Id. at 1066 (quoting Thomas McNamee, The Return of the Wolf to Yellowstone 31, 33
(1997)).
288. Youngblood supra note 1, at 1066.
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garding management plans or other issues-confront the same question.
They might be better prepared to challenge agencies if they conduct
some straightforward research and test the agency decision themselves
before setting foot into a courtroom.
First, potential plaintiffs should apply the APA's "arbitrary and ca-
pricious" test,289 and the Chevron test 29° to the opposed agency
decision.29 1 Well-prepared plaintiffs should try to predict the Tenth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of the challenged decision, using the court's inter-
pretations of prior, similar decisions under the tests. In analyzing the
decisions under the tests, potential plaintiffs should read the entire statute
in question with particular focus on the Congressional intent that suppos-
edly gives the agency authority and discretion.
29As the court did in Wyoming Farm Bureau, 92 plaintiffs could find
the appropriate House or Senate reports and dissect them carefully to
assess the actual intent of Congress. For example, the intent of the ESA
arguably is to promote the reintroduction of endangered species so that
293the ESA does not have to be used anymore. In other words, protecting
endangered species today allows populations of those species to grow so
that they are no longer endangered.
In that light, when the Wyoming Farm Bureau court held that Sec-
tion 10(j)'s 'wholly separate geographically' 294 language did not force
the agency to define a population that may not include wolves from other
geographically separate populations, the court was doing what Chevron
295requires. Even though 10(j) clearly states a preference for "wholly
separate" populations, the court, looking at the entirety of the statute,
allowed the Department of Interior's interpretation to gloss the statutory
language.296 The judges concluded that biological reality (the fact that
native wolves and experimental ones might mix, thereby making all of
them subject to takings by ranchers, etc.) was the best guiding principle.
The Deptartment of Interior should, therefore, be able to release wolves
in a way would advance the ESA's fundamental purpose of helping more
individuals (not just single ones who risk being shot by ranchers), there-
fore the species itself, to survive. At the end of the day, the court empha-
289. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
290. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-844.
291. Moreover, before going to court, plaintiffs should explore every option available to
influence the agency's decision, including use of the popular media to draw support for their cause,
and emphatic lobbying of the agency.
292. Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224 (2000).
293. Id. (As the Babbitt court stated in its analysis.).
294. Babbitt, 199 F.3d at 1232.
295. Chevron analysis allows such permissible construction of the statute. See Chevron, 467
U.S. at 842-43.
296. Babbitt, 987 F. Supp. at 1371.
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sized the importance of fundamental propositions about species recovery
that underlie the ESA over the specific statutory language.
Further inquiry into the Tenth Circuit's holdings could lead some
potential plaintiffs to conclude that the Tenth Circuit often emphasizes
agency discretion found in Congressional intent, even when that intent is
not totally clear. For example, if plaintiffs were interested in a grazing
permits issue, they could evaluate the Tenth Circuit's preference for def-
erence to agency decisions, highlighted by a case like Public Lands v.
Babbitt.297 Alisha Molyneux, who commented on the court's grazing
permits trend, wrote, "The court recognized that the judiciary should
defer to an agency's decisions concerning how the agency interprets
statutory commands. A court is not to substitute its judgment for the
policies and decisions effected by an agency. Because the TGA [grazing
act] authorizes the Secretary's discretion in issuing grazing permits, the
Secretary's authority in making such decisions has been greatl increased
by the Tenth Circuit's reading of both Chevron and the TGA.
In conclusion, when confronting a potential court decision that
might favor agency discretion, plaintiffs can take prophylactic measures
to assure that they use the same guidelines the court does to assess
whether agency thinking should prevail. By staying a step ahead of the
court, plaintiffs might well avoid a courtroom loss that could have been
foreseen.
3. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney
299
In Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney,300 four-wheel-drive
proponents who wanted continued access to a back country road chal-
lenged portions of the National Park Service's Backcountry Management
Plan (BMP) for Canyonlands National Park in Southeastern Utah. 301 The
297. 167 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 1999).
298. Alisha Molyneux, Public Lands Council v. Babbitt: Tenth Circuit Decides that the Taylor
Grazing Act "Breathes Discretion at Every Pore " 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 132.
299. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 222 F.3d 819 (10th Cir. 2000).
300. Id.
301. Id. at 823; The relevant portion of the BMP (Canyonlands National Park and Orange
Cliffs Unit of Glen Canyon National Recreation Area, Backcountry Management Plan, at 13
(January 6, 1995)): "Salt Creek and Horse Canyon four-wheel drive roads in the Needles District
will remain open to vehicular traffic, but travel will be by backcountry use permit only. A locked
gate at the north end of the road (the location of the current gate) will control access. Day use
permits for Salt Creek and Horse Canyon will be limited to ten (10) permits for private motor
vehicles (one vehicle per permit), two (2) permits for commercial motor vehicle tours (one vehicle
per permit), one (1) or more permits for up to seven (7) private or commercial bicyclists, one (1) or
more permits for up to seven (7) pack or saddle stock .... All permits are available through the
advance reservation system. Unreserved permits or cancellations will be available to walk-in
visitors."; For a good overview of increased off-road vehicle use on public lands in the West, see
Penelope Purdy, Our scarred land: monitoring ORVs not an easy job, Denver Post, February 11,
2001 at GI.
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plan closed a one-half mile segment of the Salt Creek Road to four-
wheel-drive traffic.3 °2
The National Park Service (NPS) claimed the BMP's goal was to
balance recreation and protection of park resources as a response to in-
creased visitation and the resulting impacts on resources in the park.
303
Before the district court trial, the NPS interpreted its controlling statutory
mandate304 that the agency must prevent "significant, permanent impair-
ment" of resoifrces.3°5 During litigation, though, the agency advanced
draft policies that stated an even more restrictive interpretation of the
National Park Service Organic Act of 1916 (Organic Act), 3°6 legislation
that describes the focus, priorities and goals of the agency.30 7 Manage-
ment of Can onlands National Park is controlled in part by its enabling
legislation.
The district court found that the Organic Act and Canyonlands ena-
bling legislation did not allow the NPS to authorize activities that "per-
manently impair park resources," and that such impairment would occur
if motorized vehicle use were allowed on the road. 9 The court then en-
310joined the NPS from allowing such use. Interestingly, the NPS did not
appeal.3 1 Instead, intervenor Utah Shared Access appealed, arguing that
the BMP312 did not violate the NPS's Organic Act,313 and that the district
302. Dabney, 222 F.3d at 823.
303. Id. at 822.
304. The National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. § 1.
305. Dabney, 222 F.3d at 825.
306. id. at 827.
307. Id. at 824.; see U.S.C. § 1 ("The service thus established shall promote and regulate the
use of the Federal areas known as national parks... by such means and measures as conform to the
fundamental purpose of the said parks ... which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural
and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such
manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.");
see also, 16 U.S.C. § la-I ("The authorization of activities shall be construed and the protection,
management, and administration of these areas shall be conducted in light of the high public value
and integrity of the National Park System and shall not be exercised in derogation of the values and
purposes for which these various areas have been established, except as may have been or shall be
directly and specifically provided by Congress.").
308. Dabney, 222 F.3d at 823; see 16 U.S.C. § 271 ("In order to preserve an area in the State
of Utah possessing superlative scenic, scientific, and archeologic features for the inspiration, benefit,
and use of the public, there is hereby established the Canyonlands National Park .... ; see also 16
U.S.C. § 271(d)(Canyonlands must be managed in accordance with the purposes of the Organic
Act.).
309. Dabney, 222 F.3d at 822 (citing Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 7
F.Supp.2d 1205 (D.Utah 1998).
310. Dabney, 222 F.3d at 822.
311. Id.
312. Dabney at 823; see Canyonlands National Park and Orange Cliffs Unit of Glen Canyon
National Recreation Area, Backcountry Management Plan, at 13 (January 6, 1995) ("Salt Creek and
Horse Canyon four-wheel drive roads in the Needles District will remain open to vehicular traffic,
but travel will be by backcountry use permit only. A locked gate at the north end of the road (the
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court abused its discretion by enjoining the BMP's implementation.
3 4
The agency nonetheless submitted a brief to the appeals court "to advise
the court as to the Department's view as to the proper legal construction
of the [Organic] Act."
3 15
Two questions arose on appeal.316 One was whether the district
court's finding that the BMP violated the Organic Act was correct under
Chevron.317 The other was whether the NPS's draft backcountry policies
(those regarding whether to allow off-road vehicle use) submitted to the
court were sufficiently formal to require Chevron deference to the
agency's conclusions. 318 First, the court looked to the Administrative
Procedure Act for guidance, and wrote:3 19 "Informal agency action must
be set aside if it fails to meet statutory, procedural or constitutional re-
quirements or if it was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law. 32 °
Next, the Tenth Circuit utilized the two-part conjunctive Chevron
test to analyze the NPS's interpretation of the Organic Act and Canyon-
lands enabling legislation. 32 The court outlined the two steps in Chev-
ron, and ruled that the district court erred in resolving the issue under the
first inquiry alone, which requires adherence to the intent of Congress if
that intent is clear.322
The court found the Congressional intent unclear.323 The Tenth Cir-
cuit stated that the Organic Act neither defines the word "unimpaired" or
the phrase "unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations" in the
Act. Therefore, because the Congressional intent was unclear, it also
was unclear how the "duration and severity of the impairment are to be
location of the current gate) will control access. Day use permits for Salt Creek and Horse Canyon
will be limited to ten (10) permits for private motor vehicles (one vehicle per permit), two (2)
permits for commercial motor vehicle tours (one vehicle per permit), one (1) or more permits for up
to seven (7) private or commercial bicyclists, one (1) or more permits for up to seven (7) pack or
saddle stock . . . . All permits are available through the advance reservation system. Unreserved
permits or cancellations will be available to walk-in visitors.").
313. Dabney at 824.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 822.
316. Id. at 825.
317. Id. at 826.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 824 (quoting Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560 (10th Cir. 1994),
and the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)).
321. Dabney, 222 F.3d at 825 ("On appeal, Utah Shared Access argues that the district court
erred in resolving the issue under the first Chevron inquiry. Utah Shared 'Access argues that the
district court should have reached the second Chevron inquiry because of ambiguities inherent in the
relevant statutes and their application to the issue of vehicular access. We agree.").
322. Dabney at 825-26.
323. Id. at 826.
324. id.; see Organic Act text, note 262.
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evaluated or weighed against the other value of public use of the
park. 325
Instead, the court ruled, the district court should have gone on to the
second inquiry, whether agency interpretation is based on an acceptable
interpretation of the statute in question when the intent of Congress is
326missing or unclear. The court applied Chevron's step two, whether the
Department of Interior's answer was based on "permissible construction
of the statute. 327
The court analyzed the agency's brief, its oral argument, and its sup-
plemental Draft Policies, all of which outlined the agency's position on
the Organic Act. 328 The court found that the NPS's philosophical position
in these documents differed from the position the agency adopted before
the district court, so concluded that "there is currently no valid agency
position worthy of deference.
' 329
The court stated that although an agency can change its position on
the meaning of a statute and still receive Chevron deference, a position
taken while the litigation is ongoing is not worthy of deference. 330 The
court held that the agency's policies were only in draft form and were not
finalized or adopted by the agency, so deserved neither Chevron defer-
ence nor any lesser deference.
Next, the court cited provisions of the Organic Act and the Canyon-
lands enabling legislation in order to compare them to the NPS's inter-
332pretation. The Organic Act describes the NPS's purpose: "... to con-
serve the scenery and natural and historic objects and the wild life therein
and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future genera-
tions. ' ' 333 Further, the Organic Act prohibits "authorization of activities
that derogate park values: 'The authorization of activities ... shall not be
exercised in derogation of the values and purposes for which these vari-
ous areas have been established, except as may have been or shall be
directly and specifically provided by Congress."' 334 The Canyonlands
enabling legislation states that Canyonlands was created done in part to
"preserve an area ... possessing superlative scenic, scientific, and arche-
325. Dabney, 222 F.3d at 826.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 827 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
328. Dabney, 222 F.3d at 827-28.
329. Id. at 828.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Dabney, 222 F.3d at 824-26.




ologic features for inspiration, benefit and use of the public.... 335 In
contrast, the NPS's BMP, designed with agency discretion, allowed per-
mitted vehicle traffic in the backcountry.33 Such traffic arguabley could
limit the public's enjoyment of the area and undermine the Canyonlands'
preservation
The court reversed the district court's finding, and remanded the case
so that the parties' conflicting views regarding the amount of permanent
impairment the BMP would cause could be decided.337 Also, it instructed
the lower court to review the NPS's finding of 'temporary impairment'
3 38
from vehicle use.
The court held that, "on remand, the district court should not limit its
analysis under step two of Chevron to whether the evidence demonstrates
significant, permanent impairment.339 Rather, it should assess whether
the evidence demonstrates the level of impairment prohibited by the [Or-
ganic] Act."34 Also, if the district court found that the agency has for-
malized and adopted its view on the Organic Act, the agency's decision
deserved Chevron testing.34'
In conclusion, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the BMP, created by the
agency under its discretion, was not "clearly contrary" to the Organic
Act, but remand was needed to find out if the interpretation was reason-
able.342
4. Analysis
In assessing how an agency like the Park Service should interpret its
own guiding Organic Act or other controlling legislation, a plaintiff
should consider general trends in how courts and agencies have inter-
preted such legislation. University of Denver College of Law Professor
Fred Cheever wrote: "The National Park Service Organic Act of 1916
declares that the purpose of the national parks is to 'conserve' scenery,
'natural and historic objects' and 'wild life' and provide for their enjoy-
ment 'by such means' as to leave them 'unimpaired for the enjoyment of
future generations.' [But,] Congress did not specify by what means the
335. Id.






342. Dabney, 222 F.3d at 829.
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Park Service was to 'conserve' 'unimpaired' the national parks while
providing for their 'enjoyment.'
343
Congress' failure to provide further guidance has left the door open
for natural resources and environmental groups, agencies and the courts
to do battle over the true meaning of legislation that controls agency ac-
tion. Ecologically, economically or politically minded parties trans-
formed into visionary plaintiffs might recognize opportunities to shape
agency policy lurking in the mucky Congress-speak of statutory lan-
guage.
Congress passes a vaguely worded guiding statutes in reliance on
trust in agencies. Cheever claimed that one reason agency discretion is so
bountiful is that mandates originally granted to agencies like the US For-
est Service and the US Park Service were so broad they lacked sub-
stance.344 "Paradoxical mandates were a particularly useful form of leg-
islative carte blanche. They appear to have substance because they speak
of general values in mandatory terms. However, they do not significantly
constrain agency action. Almost anything can be justified between the
two poles of 'use' and 'preservation,' extensive clearcuts and swank ho-
tels as well as limitations on rafting access and livestock trains., 345 "The
resolution of the paradox required balancing, and balancing traditionally
fell within the expert agencies' discretion." 346 Cheever described ways in
which "paradoxical agency mandates. [have been] used to challenge
agency action in court. 3 4 7 He wrote that, "the effect of paradoxical man-
dates reaches beyond cases in which the language of the statutes are at
issue and color a range of legal disputes about the balance between 4res-
ervation and use," citing the Endangered Species Act as an example.
In particular, Cheever suggested a "gap" between what an agency
does and what environmental plaintiffs think the agency should do.
349
343. Fredrico Cheever, The United States Forest Service and National Park Service:
Paradoxical Mandates, Powerful Founders, and the Rise and Fall of Agency Discretion, 74 DENY.
U. L. REV. 625,629.
344. Id. at 638.
345. Id.; see generally, Robin Winks, The National Park Service Act of 1916: A Contradictory
Mandate? 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 575 (1997).
346. Cheever supra note 343, at 638.
347. Id. at 641.
348. Id. at 642-3. ("Efforts to enforce the act-- mostly in the form of federal court cases
brought by environmental groups--have severely curtailed agency discretion in the Forest Service's
two most valuable timber producing regions: the forests of the southeast-home of the Red-
Cockaded Woodpecker --and the forests of the Northwest, home of the Northern Spotted Owl and
various runs of protected salmon. Forest Service timber production has dropped precipitously in
recent years and not as a result of agency decisions.").
349. Cheever at 643; See also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (Chevron's "gap"; "[If] Congress
has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the
agency."); see also William J. Lockhart, New Nonimpairment Policy Projected for the National Park
System, Environmental Law Reporter, September, 2000 ("It is critical for the NPS to recognize that
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Dabney provides a good example. The NPS in their BMP allowed lim-
ited back-country vehicle use. The Organic Act and Canyonlands ena-
bling legislation do not mention backcountry vehicle use, but do mention
more general principles like preserving park resources and preventing
their derogation.35 ° Clearly, conceptual or philosophical differences exist
between the NPS's notion of limited vehicular traffic and its association
with resource preservation and preservation and management vision that
absolutely prohibits such traffic for fear of the detrimental effects it
might cause. Any number of arguments could be made as to how motor-
ized vehicles simply do not fit under the generalized principles or ideals
of the guiding statutes.
Nonetheless, Cheever wrote that when groups bring Organic Act
claims against the NPS, the Service usually wins. As an example, he
cited Wilkins v. Lujan,352 in which a federal district court used Organic
Act language to demonstrate that the NPS had made a "clear error of
judgment" in creating a plan to remove wild horses from the Ozark Na-
tional Scenic Riverway. The Eighth Circuit reversed, using Organic
Act language regarding removal of "detrimental" animals to support Park
Service discretion.354 Nonetheless, the lone dissenter said, "I am
hard-pressed to find a clearer example of arbitrary and capricious agency
action. 3 55 "While a victory for the Park Service," Cheever wrote, "the
decision demonstrates the willingness of judges at both the district and
its policies regarding impairments caused by activities approved within the parks will almost
certainly also set the bottom line for all protection that may ultimately be established to address
impairments from external activities. For this reason, there is a great deal for advocates of park
protection to cheer in the proposed draft of the new NPS Management Policies. If applied
straightforwardly with a minimum of politically driven compromises, the policies should generate a
new regime of more reliable protection against impairments generated by developments and uses
within the parks. By the same token, however, if the NPS yields in the adoption or application of
these new policies to the inevitable political demands for a freer 'discretionary' hand to 'balance'
resource protection against the tourism goals of local promoters, damage to the future of our parks
will come not just from the occasional concessions to internal park developments. Policies that
permit continued compromise of the NPS' own protective obligations are also virtually certain to
invite qualifications or limits that will compromise efforts to address external threats. In short, if the
NPS does not set and enforce high standards for control of activities it permits within the parks, it is
difficult to imagine any significant success in controlling the increasing threat from activities outside
the parks. For this among other reasons, it is especially important to ensure that the standard
established for in-park activities is as rigorous as the dictionary definitions of 'impairment'
permit.").
350. See notes supra 307-8, 312.
351. Id. at 643.
352. Id., citing Wilkins v. Lujan, 798 F.Supp. 557 (E.D. Mo. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Wilkins v.
Secretary of Interior, 995 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1993).
353. Cheever supra note 343, at 643.
354. Id. at 643-4.
355. Id. at 644.
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circuit level to question Park Service decisions about what 'preservation'
means."
356
Cheever highlighted some cases in which the Park Service has won
on its interpretations of its Organic Act, concluding that some of the
opinions "[spoke] directly to the balance between use and preservation
and the discretion of the Park Service to strike that balance. Snowmobil-
ers and hikers, like the environmental groups and local and state gov-
ernments that batter the Forest Service, have the power to use the Park
Service's ambiguous mandate against it, projecting their values-preser-
vation (in the case of the hikers) or motorized use (in the case of the
snowmobilers)-on Congress' ambiguous language. 357 In conclusion,
Cheever wrote that, "it would be useful to have agency mission state-
ments that were more than mirrors, reflecting back the values of each
interest group on itself. A clearer mission statement, conveying the same
message to all interested parties, would not guarantee enhanced agency
stature and discretion, but would at least make it possible. 358
This could save precious litigation time and costs because everyone
would be clear about what Congress meant for agencies. On the other
hand, clearer mission statements would deny plaintiffs opportunities to
exploit the "gaps" between unclear guiding statutory language and agen-
cies' actual decisions. If the NPS's Organic Act clearly allowed some-
thing as controversial as four-wheel-drive activity as in Dabney,359 plain-
tiffs who opposed the plan would lose because the court would have to
go no further than step one of the Chevron test.360 Moreover, depending
on the political composition of the Congress in power at the time, a less-
confusing mission statement might be passed, but a "clearer" version of
the NPS's mission statement might vary widely from the arguably pro-
conservation notions upon which the National Park Service was origi-
nally founded. If such a statement were so clear as to force absolute ad-
herence by the NPS, natural resources and environmental groups would
be left to wait for a new Congress to change the statute. Again, under
Chevron,361 the agency would be forced to follow the bottom-line intent
of Congress, regardless of whether any particular group of legislators
were able to fashion reasonably preservationist guidance.
The implications of such 'micromanagement' by Congress take on
even more ominous tones. In Dabney, for example, if Congress had de-
cided whether four-wheel-drive use should be allowed in the Canyon-
356. Id.
357. Cheever supra note 343, at 645.
358. Id. at 646.
359. As in the previous discussion of Dabney, supra.
360. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; If Congressional intent is clear, that is generally the bottom
line.
361. As previously discussed.
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lands back country, Congress would be doing the jobs agencies were
created to do. The NPS depends on its rangers, biologists, statisticians,
geologists, engineers and other experts who work on location, collect and
analyze data, and provide the basis for scientifically sound policies that
balance conservation and recreation in highly informed ways. If Con-
gress tried to accomplish such a balancing, the result would likely be
sub-standard in quality because Congress does not have the resources
required to responsibly grapple with such minutia.
A case decided in February, 2001 by the U.S. Supreme Court di-
rectly addressed this issue.36 2 It had the potential to redefine the funda-
mental constructs of agency discretion. In November, 2000, the Court
heard arguments in Browner v. American Trucking Association,36 3 a case
in which the D.C. Court of Appeals stuck down strict Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) limits on smog and soot, regulated under the
Clean Air Act. 364 The main issue was "whether the EPA's loose con-
struction of the Clean Air Act rendered the law an unconstitutional dele-
gation of its legislative power."
365
The EPA must follow and apply the Clean Air Act, 366 which re-
quires the agency to set national air-quality standards "to protect and
,0367enhance the quality of the nation's air resources. At the same time,
the act requires the agency to base its decisions on the latest scientific
knowledge about air pollution.368 Since the EPA set new, stricter guide-
lines for limiting smog and soot, it was sued by the trucking industry.369
The D.C. Circuit agreed that the agency did construe the law too loosely,
thereby abusing its discretion.37°
The Court also decided whether the EPA should do a cost-benefit
analysis when deciding air quality standards. 371 Responding to a cross-
petition filed by the plaintiffs, the Supreme court agreed to consider
362. Browner v. American Trucking Ass'n (this has since become Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
363. Id.
364. Steve France, Air of Authority, A.B.A. J., 33, November 2000; See generally, Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-767 1.
365. See France supra note 364, at 33.
366. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (b).
367. id.
368. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671.
369. See generally, Browner v. American Trucking Ass'n; Steve France, Air of Authority,
ABA Journal, page 33, November 2000; Associated Press, Justices Study Clean-Air Rules Case,
http://www.nytimes.comlaponline/nationallAP-Scotus-Clean-Air.html. ("Some observers believe
that if the Supreme court decided the EPA took too much of Congress' power when it set the clean-
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overruling Lead Industries Assoc. v. EPA,372 which held that EPA cannot
do a cost-benefit analysis when setting clean air standards absent Con-
gressional language telling it to do so.
37
The Supreme Court did not overturn the case. If it had, it might have
upheld a long-forgotten principle that a D.C. Circuit judge unearthed, the
nondelegation doctrine.?74 It tests agency discretion as whether the
agency has demonstrated an "intelligible principle" required by the
guiding law in making a decision.375 If the Supreme Court had decided to
overturn the case, Congress may have had to give agencies much more
specific instructions, thereby limiting agency discretion. Also, the Court
could have decided to limit agencies' broad discretionary power even
though Congress assigned them only vague mandates (like 'protect the
public health') through statutes.
376
Fortunately for those in favor of agency discretion, a unanimous
Supreme Court upheld the EPA's use of discretion to set the stricter pol-
lution guidelines, and decided that the agency does not need to undertake
cost-benefit analysis when creating the guidelines. 377 Redefinition of
agency discretion on a grand scale now must wait for another day in
court or in the Capitol building.
In conclusion, while agencies generally have discretion to make
day-to-day decisions based on their areas of expertise, plaintiffs can ex-
ploit differences between the often vague language of Congress ex-
pressed in statutes that guide the agencies and the agencies' interpreta-
tion of those statutes. By keeping in mind the kinds of tests courts use to
assess whether decisions are allowed under the agency's discretion,
plaintiffs can more effectively hold agencies to statutory standards.
372. Id.; 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
373. Id.
374. See France supra note 364, at 33.
375. Id.
376. Associated Press, Justices Study Clean-Air Rules Case,
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Scotus-Clean-Air.html. ("Some observers believe
that if the Supreme Court decided the EPA took too much of Congress' power when it set the clean-
air rules, it could affect the regulatory power of other federal agencies with broad Congressional
mandates.").
377. Theo Stein, Clean Air Challenge Rejected, Denver Post, February 28, 2001, at A 1; Robert
Greenberger, Supreme Court Upholds EPA's Authority to Set Standards Under the Clean Air Act,
Wall Street Journal, February 28, 2001 at A2 ("The court held unanimously that the EPA can't
consider compliance costs when setting clean-air standards. The court also overturned an appeals
court ruling that the EPA usurped Congress' authority in interpreting the 1970 Clean Air Act. The
implications of the decision go far beyond clean-air standards. A ruling for the American Trucking
Associations, Inc. . . . would have cleared the way for other legal challenges that could have




Environmental and natural resources plaintiffs must be certain that
they meet standing requirements. Standing is an easy step to overlook
when preparing a case that otherwise seems solid. Many requirements,
including injury in fact, zone of interest, and redressability, seem on a
superficial level easy to meet. Many times they are not. The Tenth Cir-
cuit has many avenues by which it might find that the wrong plaintiff has
appeared in its hallowed halls. Such a finding results in quick dismissal
of an oft-surprised plaintiff.
Once standing is met, the prospect of a Tenth Circuit decision that
bows to agency discretion looms. There are a number of avenues by
which plaintiffs can prepare for the court's tendency toward such a deci-
sion. In effect, plaintiffs should put themselves in the place of the court,
assess through the tests provided by the Administrative Procedure Act
and Chevron how the court might balance factors in the case, then base
their strategies on a prediction of the court's approach.
In approaching any case in which agency discretion is at issue,
plaintiffs should pay special attention to the overall scope and intent of
statutes guiding the agency, especially its controlling legislation. Typi-
cally, Congress writes instructions for agencies using a broad pen. There-
fore, agencies must make specific, on-the-ground decisions that are
based on the broad principles of the statute, but are often arguably dis-
cretionary in detail. Plaintiffs can take advantage of the difference be-
tween broad, general Congressional intent and specific agency action,
and argue that the agencies' decisions did not fall fairly within the scope
of the guiding principles. Moreover, plaintiffs should pay special atten-
tion to the ways the Tenth Circuit or other courts typically address
standing or discretion issues. Finally, plaintiffs must pay attention to
cases like American Trucking that potentially could undermine agency
discretion. Through deliberate and intensive analysis of these points,
environmental and natural resource plaintiffs might better avoid a court's





THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON STATE
REGULATIONS OF THE INTERNET: ACLU V. JOHNSON1
INTRODUCTION
What is the Internet? Who controls the World Wide Web? Where
are the boundaries in Cyberspace? These are all questions without clear
answers. The government has tried to come to terms with a phenomenon
that is understood by few and utilized by many. Researchers and scholars
alike have attempted to measure the impact of the Internet on society
with varying degrees of success. The results of the many attempts to
measure the Internet have been unclear simply because there is no accu-
rate way to test the results. Yet, some statistics regarding the impact of
the Internet are indeed impressive. For example, one survey estimated
that U.S. consumers spent approximately $8.2 billion on online pur-
chases during the 1998 holiday season.2 The same survey estimated that
there were 57,037,000 Internet users as of May 1998.3 Without doubt this
number will have significantly increased by the time this comment is
published. The fact remains that the Internet is a medium of both com-
merce and communication with unknown potential and impact on human
society. But with this unique growth comes unique challenges. Nowhere
have these challenges been more controversial or more publicly debated
than in the American judicial system. Within the last decade, American
courts wrestled with the Internet on several occasions. The judicial in-
quiries primarily focused on the constraints the Constitution imposes on
the Internet. These challenges primarily addressed two constitutional
concerns: First Amendment guarantees of free speech and the Commerce
Clause.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently
delivered an opinion on the issue of regulating the dissemination of in-
formation over the Internet. In ACLU v. Johnson,4 the court considered
the constitutional validity of a New Mexico statute.5 This decision was
one of first impression to the Tenth Circuit. The plaintiffs challenged the
New Mexico statute on both First Amendment and Commerce Clause
grounds.6 The court reached its decision to invalidate the New Mexico
1. 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999).
2. World Wide Web User Statistics, available at
http://www.why-not.com/company/stats.htm (last visited March 1. 2000).
3. Id.
4. 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999).
5. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2 (1999) (preliminarily enjoined from enforcement at ACLU
v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1164 (1999)).
6. 194 F.3d at 1152 (10th Cir. 1999).
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statute by relying heavil4 upon a recent United States Supreme Court
decision, Reno v. ACLU. The primary challenge to the statute in John-
son alleged that the New Mexico statute placed an unconstitutional bur-
den on the First Amendment's free speech guarantees. 8 The Tenth Circuit
focused primarily on the First Amendment issue in invalidating the stat-
ute. Therefore, the primary concern of this comment is to examine the
First Amendment implications of the Johnson decision by the Tenth Cir-
cuit.
Part I of this comment provides a brief historical context within
which the Court recently decided ACLU v. Johnson.9 Part II examines the
ramifications of the decision with respect to First Amendment guarantees
and future regulation of information distributed over the internet. Part III
discusses the application of the Commerce Clause in the context of
regulating information distributed over the internet. Finally, Part IV
analyzes the future implications of Johnson and relevant United States
Supreme Court decisions.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The recent Tenth Circuit decision in ACLU v. Johnson ° arose in the
context of the explosive growth of the internet both as a means of com-
munication and as an instrument of commerce. The phenomenal growth
of the Internet attracted the attention of concerned state and federal leg-
islators. Accordingly, the internet also produced constitutional challenges
as a by-product of its unprecedented growth."1 In reaching its decision in
Johnson, the Tenth Circuit relied heavily upon the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Reno v. ACLU (hereinafter "Reno I1").12 This
7. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
8. 194 F.3d at 1153 (10th Cir. 1999).
9. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
10. 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999).
11. See Reno v. ACLU ("Reno 1"), 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996)(preliminarily enjoining
the enforcement of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a), (b)); Reno v.
ACLU ("Reno H"), 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (affirming the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in granting a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a), (b) (1999)); ACLU v. Reno ("Reno
III"), 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (affirming a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement
of the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(1999)); ACLU v. Reno ("Reno IV"),
217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000)(affirming the District Court in Reno II/);United States v. Playboy
Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (U.S. 2000); PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 108 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D.
Va. 2000) (granting a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-391
(Mich. Supp. 1999) (amended 2000)); Cyberspace Comm., Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D.
Mich. 1999) (granting preliminary injunction against the enforcement of Michigan law, Pub. Act No.
33 (1999), amending Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.671); Hatch v. Superior Ct., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453
(Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2000) (upholding California law regulating the Internet as Constitutional as
applied).
12. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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case struck down a portion of a federal statute 13 that sought to regulate
the dissemination of materials deemed harmful to minors over the Inter-
net. 14 The Court held that the federal statute was unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad and that the statute violated the First Amendment guaran-
tee of freedom of speech. 15 Since Reno H played a prominent role in the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Johnson, Reno II deserves closer examina-
tion.
The Telecommunications Act of 199616 promoted the primary Con-
gressional goal to "reduce regulation and encourage the rapid deploy-
ment of new telecommunications technologies."' This Act contains
seven titles, one of which (Title V) is known as the "Communications
Decency Act of 1996" (hereinafter CDA). 18 On February 8, 1996, twenty
plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania against the Attorney General of the United
States and the Department of Justice. 19 The plaintiffs included the
American Civil Liberties Union (hereinafter ACLU), Human Rights
Watch, Electronic Privacy Information Center and other such potentially
effected parties. 20 These plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of
§§223(a)(1) and 233(d) of the CDA.2' The District Court entered a tem-
porary restraining order against the enforcement of §223(a)(1)(B)(ii).
22
13. The Court struck down a portion of the Communications Decency Act of 1 996, located at
47 U.S.C. § 223(a) and 223(d). Section 223(a) stated in pertinent part: "(a) Whoever-(1) in
interstate or foreign communications--(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly-
(I) makes, creates, or solicits, and (ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request,
suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the
recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such
communication placed the call or initiated the communication; (2) knowingly permits any
telecommunications facility under his control to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1)
with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both." Section 223(d) stated in pertinent part: "(d) Whoever-(1) in interstate or
foreign communications knowingly-(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific
person or persons under 18 years of age, or (B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a
manner available to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal,
image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless
of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the communication, or (2) knowingly
permits any telecommunications facility under such person's control to be used for an activity
prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under Title
18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
14. Reno, 521 U.S. at 857.
15. Id.
16. PUB. L. 104-104, 110 STAT. 56.
17. Reno, 521 U.S. at 857 (citing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110
Stat. at 56).
18. Id.
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Twenty-seven additional plaintiffs also challenging the provisions of the
CDA subsequently filed a second suit.23 The two suits were consolidated
and evidentiary hearings were held before a three-judge panel. 24 Fol-
lowing these hearings, each judge issued a separate opinion, unani-
mously holding that the CDA was likely unconstitutional and granting an
injunction against its enforcement.25 The government appealed this deci-
sion directly to the United States Supreme Court by invoking §561 of the
CDA.26
On appeal, the government argued that the District Court erred in
finding that the CDA violated both the First and Fifth Amendment of the
27Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's holding
on First Amendment grounds without addressing the Fifth Amendment
contentions. 28 The government relied upon Ginsburg v. New York, 2 9 FCC
30 31v. Pacifica Foundation, and Renton v. Playtime Theatres to argue that
the challenged provisions of the CDA were constitutional. 3' The Su-
preme Court distinguished each of these decisions from the present sce-
nario in Reno /.33
Ginsburg v. New York upheld the constitutionality of a New York
statute that prohibited the selling of material that was considered obscene
for minors to persons less than seventeen years of age.34 The case in-
volved the criminal prosecution of a storeowner who sold two "girlie"
magazines to a sixteen-year-old boy.35 The Supreme Court reasoned that
obscene materials are not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech.36 However, under the Court's rationale, the "girlie" magazines
involved in Ginsburg were not obscene for adults.37 The statute in ques-
tion did not restrain the defendant from selling such items to persons
seventeen years or older.38 The statute merely required that such material
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 862-64. Chief Judge Sloviter concluded that the terms of the CDA were overbroad
and could not reasonably be read narrowly. 929 F. Supp. at 853-55. Judge Buckwalter concluded
that terms "indecent", "patently offensive", and "in context" in § 223(d)(1) were unconstitutionally
vague. 929 F. Supp. at 863-65. Judge Dalzell concluded that the CDA would "abridge significant
protected speech." 929 F. Supp. at 867-79.
26. Id. at 864.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
30. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
31. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
32. Reno, 521 U.S. at 864.
33. Id.
34. Ginsburg, 390 U.S. at 633.
35. Id. at 631.
36. Id. at 635 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
37. Id. at 634 (citing Redrup v. State of New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
38. /d at 634-35.
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not be sold to persons under age seventeen. 39 The Court concluded that
the state had an interest in protecting the well being of its children, that
the materials in question could reasonably be held to impair the ethical
and moral development of minors.40 Ultimately, the Court held that the
statute did not violate any constitutional guarantees.4 '
The Reno H Court found several significant facts that differentiated
the instant situation from the facts found in Ginsburg. First, the Ginsburg
statute did not prohibit the sale of "girlie" magazines to parents who
wished to provide the magazines to their children.42 However, under the
CDA, neither parental consent nor parental participation would avoid the
criminal sanctions.4 Second, the Ginsburg statute applied exclusively to
commercial transactions44 while the CDA contained no limitations on the
type of speech to which it applied.45 Third, the Ginsburg statute defined
materials that were harmful to minors as those "utterly without redeem-
ing social importance for minors." 6 In Reno II, however, the CDA pro-
vided no such requirement. 47 Finally, the Ginsburg statute defined mi-
nors as under age seventeen while the CDA defined minors as those un-
der age eighteen.48 The Reno 1I Court felt that this additional year might
be significant in regulating access to indecent materials.
49
The government also relied upon Federal Communications Com-
mission v. Pacifica Foundation50 (hereinafter Pacifica) on appeal in
Reno I. In Pacifica, the Court upheld a declaratory order of the Federal
Communications Commission (hereinafter FCC), which concluded that
an afternoon radio broadcast of a comedic monologue was indecent.
5'
The Pacifica Court held that the ease of access by children to the broad-
cast "coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsburg justified special
treatment of indecent broadcasting." 2 The Reno II Court distinguished
the Pacifica holding on several grounds. First, the FCC, an agency that
regularly regulates radio transmissions, issued the order in Pacifica.
53
Further, the FCC regulation concerned a specific broadcast with respect
to when, rather then whether, it would be permissible to broadcast such a
39. Id.
40. Id. at 641-45.
41. Id.
42. Reno, 521 U.S. at 865 (citing Ginsburg, 390 U.S. at 639).
43. Id. at 865.
44. Id. (citing Ginsburg, 390 U.S. at 647).
45. Id.
46. Id. (citing Ginsburg. 390 U.S. at 646).
47. Id. (citing CDA § 223(a)(1); § 223(d)).
48. Id. at 865-66.
49. id. at 866.
50. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
51. Reno, 521 U.S. at 866 (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 730).
52. Id. at 866-67 (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-750).
53. Id. at 867.
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program via radio transmission.54 In contrast, the CDA prohibitions did
not provide for particular times when the dissemination of indecent mate-
rial would be accepted and the CDA prohibitions are not subject to any
government agency control. 5 Second, the Commission's "order was not
punitive," while the CDA is punitive in nature.56 Finally, the Commis-
sion's order applied to radio broadcast, a medium of communication that
historically limited First Amendment protections.57 In contrast, the Inter-
net has no such history of regulation.58 Further, the Reno H Court noted
that the risk of accidental encounter of indecent material by minors is
much more remote on the internet in comparison to radio broadcast due
to a series of affirmative steps that are required to access materials on the
internet. 59 In light of these factual differences, the Court held that
Pacifica was not directly applicable to the facts of Reno 11.60
Finally, the government in Reno H relied on Renton v. Playtime
61 6Theatres, Inc. to argue that the CDA was constitutionally sound.62 The
Renton Court upheld a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult theaters in
63residential neighborhoods. The Court upheld this ordinance because its
focus was not the offensive nature of the theaters themselves, but rather
the "secondary effects" such as crime and deteriorating property values.
64
The Reno I Court held that the CDA was not a similar type of "time,
place, and manner regulation" as was the ordinance in Renton.65 Rather,
the Court held that the CDA was a "content-based, blanket restriction on
speech, and as such cannot be 'properly analyzed as a form of time,
place, and manner regulation.' 66 Therefore, the Reno II Court held that
all three of the government's key precedents were inapposite to the facts
before it on appeal.67
After reviewing the government's key cases, the Reno H Court con-
sidered the proper standard of scrutiny to apply in content-based regula-
tion of the internet. The Court noted that "each medium of expression...
may present its own problems., 68 Additionally, the Court agreed with the




57. Id. (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 868.
61. 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (hereinafter Renton).
62. Reno, 521 U.S. at 864.
63. Id.
64. Renton, 475 U.S. at 49.
65. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868.
66. Id. (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 46).
67. Id.
68. Id. (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975)).
[Vol. 78:2
COMPUTER LAW
'invade' an individual's home or appear on one's computer screen un-
bidden., 69 Thus, the Court recognized the unique characteristics of the
internet as a medium of expression. This unique nature became the cor-
nerstone of the Court's analysis and conclusion.
First, the Court considered the claim that the challenged provisions
of the CDA were unconstitutionally vague and a violation of the First
Amendment. Specifically, the Court addressed the statutory term "inde-
cent ' 70 and the statutory, phrase "in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards,
sexual or excretory activities or organs.",71 The Court reasoned that the
lack of definition of these terms would "provoke uncertainty among
speakers about how the two standards relate to each other .... 72 The
effect of the ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding these terms, in com-
bination with the potential criminal consequences that would result from
a violation, lead the Court to conclude that this ambiguous legislation
was a content-based regulation that would have an "obvious chilling ef-
fect on free speech. 73 The government countered by arguing that the
CDA was no more vague than the obscenity standard provided in Miller
v. California.
74
In Miller v. California,75 the Court set forth a test for obscenity,
which still controls today. The Miller test provides that:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a pat-
ently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the appli-
cable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks se-
rious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
76
The government asserted that because the CDA's term "patently offen-
sive" is one part of the Miller test, the CDA could not be unconstitu-
tional.77 However, the Court found this argument unpersuasive because
the Miller test contains a crucial requirement that the CDA did not re-
quire. The Miller test requires that the proscribed materials be "specifi-
cally defined by the applicable state law.",78 The Court reasoned that this
requirement would reduce the vagueness found in the "patently offen-
69. Id. at 869 (quoting Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at 844 (finding 88)).
70. As used in 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a).
71. As used in 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d).
72. Id. at 871.
73. Id. at 872.
74. Reno, 521 U.S. at 872 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
75. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
76. Reno, 521 U.S. at 872 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 24).
77. Id. at 873.
78. Id. (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 24).
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sive" standard of the CDA.7 9 Yet such a requirement is not contained in
the text of the CDA. Therefore, the Court found the CDA to be inher-
ently vague while the Miller test provided adequate protections aqainst
vague definitions of proscribed speech in content-based regulations.
The Reno H Court also briefly considered the other two prongs of
the Miller test. The Court first addressed the requirement that the mate-
rial lack "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value., 82 The
Court noted that in prior applications of this prong of the Miller test, the
requirement is "not judged by contemporary community standards.,
83
Thus, this "societal value" requirement allows courts to set forth a na-
tional standard for a "socially redeeming value. 84 The Reno H Court
took notice that the CDA could not simultaneously adhere to the Miller
test requirement of applying the "community standards" test as a ques-
tion of fact, left to a)ury, and also provide a uniform national standard of
content regulation. As the Court noted in Miller, the determination of
"what appeals to the 'prurient interest' or is 'patently offensive' are es-
sentially questions of fact, and our Nation is simply too big and too di-
verse for this Court to reasonably expect that such standards could be
,86articulated for all 50 states in a single formulation." Yet, while the
CDA was under Committee consideration in the Senate, the conference
reports assert that the "CDA was intended 'to establish a uniform na-
tional standard of content regulation."' 87 The Reno II Court concluded
that the CDA clearly contrasted with the test set forth in Miller, and as a
result, it "presents a greater threat of censoring speech that in fact, falls
outside the statute's scope. '' 88 Thus, the CDA was held to be an over-
inclusive restriction of speech based upon content.
89
In construing the CDA as an over-inclusive, content-based restric-
tion, the Reno H Court moved to consider the necessary standard of re-
view arising from a challenge to the First Amendment.9" Precedent
clearly dictated the rule that in the consideration of free speech rights of
adults, "sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 874.
82. Id. at 873 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 24).
83. Id. (quoting Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497. 500 (1987)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 873, n.39.
86. Id. (quoting Miller. 413 U.S. 15, 30).
87. Id. at n. 39. (quoting S. Conf. Rep. No. 104-230, p. 189, 191 (1996), 142 Cong. Rec.
H 1145, HI 165-H1166 (Feb. 1, 1996)).
88. Id. at 874.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 874-75.
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by the First Amendment." 9' The government asserted that it held a le-
gitimate state interest in protecting children from indecent material by
92the enactment of the CDA. However, under a strict scrutiny test the
Court noted that the "burden placed upon adult speech is unacceptable if
less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the
legitimate state purpose that the statute was enacted to serve., 93 The
Court did not explicitly consider whether or not the asserted govern-
mental interest in protecting minor children was indeed a legitimate state
interest; rather, it merely assumed that such an interest was legitimate
and moved to consider the effects of the statute itself on adult speech.94
In evaluating the effects of the CDA, the Court acknowledged that
despite its prior recognition of a governmental interest in protecting chil-
dren from harmful materials, 95 such an interest "does not justify an un-
necessarily broad suppression of speech addressed by adults . . . the
Government may not 'reduc[e] the adult population ... to ... only what
is fit for children.' ' '96 The mere fact that the stated purpose of the CDA
was to protect children was not conclusive with respect to its Constitu-
tional validity; rather, the Court recognized that its role in such situations
was to "make sure that Congress has designed its statute to accomplish
its purpose 'without imposing an unnecessarily great restriction on
speech.' 97 The Court agreed with the District Court's factual analysis,
which suggested that the over-breath of the CDA would curtail the abil-
ity of adults to communicate over the internet. 98 The District Court noted
that at the time of trial, no technology existed to provide an effective
method for a sender of information to assure that only adults accessed
that information.99 Additionally, the requirement of such age verification
systems would be "prohibitively expensive for non-commercial as well
some commercial speakers" to implement and utilize. 100
In the final weighing of the prohibitive effects of the CDA on adult
speech against the state's interest in protecting children, the Reno II
Court ultimately held the challenged terms of the CDA to be facially
91. Id. at 874 (quoting Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126(1989)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See generally Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State's Interest in
Protecting Children from Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427 (discussing the need for the
Supreme Court to more fully consider the asserted government interests in cases involving the
regulation of the content of speech, where the protection of children is the stated purpose of the law).
95. Reno, 521 U.S. at 875 (citing Ginsburg, 390 U.S. at 639; Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749).
96. Id. (quoting Denver Area Ed. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 759
(1996)).
97. Id. at 876 (quoting Denver Area Ed., 518 U.S. at 741).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 876.
100. Id. at 877.
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over-broad, imposing an undue restriction on the content of speech.' 10 In
the concluding words of the Court, "government regulation of the con-
tent of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas
than to encourage it. The interests in encouraging freedom of expression
in a democratic society outweigh any theoretical but unproven benefit of
censorship."
' 10 2
Since the delivery of the Reno H decision, several other federal
courts considered similar challenges to state statutes that had substan-
tially similar language and goals. 103 The recent Tenth Circuit decision in
ACLU v. Johnson'°4 is one such case.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT GUARANTEES
A. ACLU v. Johnson
1. Facts
The plaintiffs in ACLU v. Johnson'0 5 consisted of a large group of
individuals affected by a New Mexico statute 0 6 that sought to regulate
the dissemination of information to minors over the internet. The plain-
tiffs included the ACLU, Feminist.com, Full Circle Books, OBGYN.net,
Santa Fe Online and several others.10 7 The defendants were Gary John-
son, the Governor of New Mexico, and Patricia A. Madrid, the Attorney
General of New Mexico.'
0 8
The statute in question sought to criminalize the computerized dis-
semination of materials harmful to minors.' °9 This statute stated in rele-
vant part:
Dissemination of material that is harmful to a minor by computer
consists of the use of a computer communications system that allows
the input, output, examination or transfer of computer data or com-
puter programs from one computer to another, to knowingly and in-
tentionally initiate or engage in communication with a person under
eighteen years of age when such communication in whole or in part
depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual intercourse or any other
101. Id.
102. Id. at 885.
103. See cases, supra note 11.
104. 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999).
105. Id.
106. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2 (1999).
107. ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1149.
108. Id.
109. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2 (1999).
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sexual conduct. Whoever commits dissemination of material that is
harmful to a minor by computer is guilty of a misdemeanor.
110
The plaintiffs based their initial challenge in the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico on the grounds that the criminal
statute regulating the content of material on the Internet violated the
First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments as well as the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution."' The plaintiffs sought a pre-
liminary and permanent injunction against the enforcement of the statute
in question.'12 The District Court addressed the preliminary issues of
standing, the bar against such a suit provided in the Eleventh Amend-
ment, and the necessity for the court to abstain from granting an injunc-
tion until the New Mexico Supreme Court had an opportunity to interpret
the language of the statute. 3The District Court held that the plaintiffs
had proper standing to bring this suit, the Eleventh Amendment did not
bar this suit, and the issue was ripe for judicial review. The District Court
granted the plaintiffs' motion for a relimnary injunction, therein pro-
hibitinf enforcement of the statute." P4The defendants appealed this deci-
sion.
The decision by the Tenth Circuit considered the appeal brought by
the defendants.1 6 The defendants argued on appeal that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to bring this suit; that the court erred in determining that
the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge; that
the court erroneously held that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable
harm unless the injunction was issued; and that the court reached various
other erroneous legal conclusions." 7 The Tenth Circuit ultimately af-
firmed the District Court's decision to grant the preliminary injunction." 18
2. Standing
The Court of Appeals first addressed the defendants' challenge to the
plaintiffs' standing. The court noted that "standing is a threshold
110. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2 (A) (1999).
111. ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1026 (D.N.M. 1998). The First Amendment states
in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... " The Fifth
Amendment states in relevant part: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 states in relevant part: "...
[NIor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law .... "
Article II, Section 8, Paragraph 1,3 states in relevant part: "The Congress shall have Power ... 3. To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States ... 
112. Id.




117. Id. at 1153-54.
118. Id. at 1163.
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issue,"'' 9 and in order to establish standing, the plaintiffs "must have
suffered an 'injury in fact.' " 20 Thus, in order to demonstrate that they
suffered an "injury in fact" the plaintiffs had to show "an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."' 12' The defendants
argued that because the statute had not been enforced, the plaintiffs
lacked standing.122 In fact, the statute in question was not effective at the
time the plaintiffs brought the suit. 123 Thus, the defendants argued that
the plaintiffs had not suffered any "real and concrete threat of prosecu-
,,124 125tion from law enforcement authorities. The court disagreed.
The Tenth Circuit's reasoning on this issue relied heavily upon Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife. 126 In Lujan, the Court stated that "[n]o one
should have to go through being arrested for a felony, publicly shamed,
and pay for a defense only to have a court find that the newly enacted
statute is unconstitutional. This can, and should, be determined before
such injury occurs."'' 27 Additionally, the instant court reasoned that the
issue in this case was ripe for review.128 The court stated, "if a threatened
injury is sufficiently 'imminent' to establish standing, the constitutional
requirements of the ripeness doctrine will necessarily be satisfied."'
' 29
Further the court recognized that "customary ripeness analysis ... is...
relaxed somewhat . . . where a facial challenge implicating First
Amendment values, is brought." 30 Thus, the court reasoned, "in that
situation, 'reasonable predictability of enforcement or threats of en-
forcement, without more, have sometimes been enough to ripen a
claim."" 131 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the District Court's holding
119. Id. at 1154 (citing Keys v. School Dist. No. 1, 119F.3d 1437, 1445 (10th Cir. 1997)).
120. Id. (citing Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1572 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,560 (1992)).
121. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
122. Id.
123. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2 (effective date July 1, 1998). The U.S. District Court for
the District of New Mexico issued its decision granting plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of this statute on June 24, 1998. 4. F.Supp. 2d at 1024 (D.N.M.
1998). Thus, the injunction was granted prior to the date that the statute in question was to become
effective.
124. ACLU, 194 F. 3d at 1154 (citing Defendants' brief at 43).
125. Id.
126. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
127. ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1154 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2).
128. Id. at 1155.
129. Id. at 1155 (quoting Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423,
1428 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
130. Id. (quoting New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th
Cir. 1995)).
131. Id. (citing Gonzales, 64 F.3d at 1499 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Martin Tractor Co. v.
Federal Election Comm'n, 627 F.2d 375, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1980))).
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The District Court held that the New Mexico statute in question vio-
lated the First and Fourteenth Amendments "because it effectively bans
speech that is constitutionally protected for adults;" it does not "directly
and materially advance a compelling governmental interest;" it is not
"the least restrictive means of serving its stated interest;" it "interferes
with the rights of minors to access and view material that to them is pro-
tected by the First Amendment;" it is "substantially overbroad;" and it
"prevents people from communicating and accessing information
anonymously." The defendants challenged these findings on appeal by
arguing that the statute "can and must be read narrowly, and so nar-
rowed, the statue is constitutional under the authority of Ginsburg v. New
York. ,134 The court ultimately rejected the defendants' argument and
affirmed the findings of the lower court on this issue. 135 In reaching its
conclusion, the Tenth Circuit relied heavily upon the recent decision of
Reno v. ACLU (Reno II).1
36
The United States Supreme Court stated that the government may
"regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to
promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to
further the articulated interest."'1 37 Further, the Court noted that "sexual
expression which is indecent but is not obscene is protected by the First
Amendment." 138 Thus, the Court held that although a "compelling" gov-
ernmental interest existed in "protecting the physical and psychological
well-being of minors;" nevertheless, the means chosen by the govern-
ment must be "carefully tailored" to meet that end. 139 The Court applied
this same standard of "strict scrutiny" to the content-based regulation
found in Reno v. ACLU (Reno H).14°
In Reno H, the Supreme Court held that portions of the Communica-
tions Decency Act (CDA) 14 1 violated the First Amendment.142 The Reno
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1156.
134. ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1156 (citing Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)).
135. Id.
136. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
137. Johnson, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (quoting Sable Communications Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 126 (1989)). This is essentially a "strict scrutiny" test utilized where fundamental rights are
implicated.
138. Id. (quoting Sable Comm., 492 U.S. at 126 (1989)).
139. Id. (quoting Sable Comm., 492 U.S. at 126 (1989)).
140. Id. (discussing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 870). See discussion of Reno H, 521 U.S. 844
(1997), infra Part 1.
141. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1), (d) (2000).
142. ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1156.
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H Court concluded that "given the size of the potential audience for most
messages... the sender must be charged with knowing that one or more
minors will likely view it.",143 Additionally, the Court viewed the poten-
tial costs to the many non-commercial users of the internet to verify the
age of its viewers would be prohibitive of speech. 144 Thus, the Court held
that the CDA placed too heavy a burden on the exercise of protected
speech and therefore the challenged provisions were unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad.
145
The Tenth Circuit Johnson decision followed essentially the same
rationale in determining that the New Mexico statute in question was
also unconstitutionally vague and broad. In Johnson, the court noted that
the similarity between the CDA discussed in Reno H and the New Mex-
ico statute currently in question compelled the same result. 146 In Johnson,
as in Reno H, the government argued that the statute in question could
and should be construed narrowly. 147 The government in Johnson argued
that the statute would only apply in situations where an adult sender of a
message "knowingly and intentionally" sends a harmful message directly
to a minor. 48 Therefore, the statute would not apply to chat rooms or
other situations where both adults and children were involved simultane-
ously. 149 The government, like in Reno H, attempted to liken the scenario
here to the one faced in Ginsburg v. New York. 150 Both the Reno H and
Johnson courts determined the situation in Ginsburg to be factually dif-
ferent from the regulations presented in both cases.
15'
In Ginsburg, the Court addressed the sale of sexually explicit materi-
als in a face-to-face situation.15 2 In contrast, both the Reno II and John-
son situations involved the dissemination of sexually explicit materials
over the Internet. The Johnson court agreed with the Reno H Court that
the regulation of information being disseminated over the internet intro-
duced new problems that more fully, and consequently unduly, restricted
the freedom of speech and expression.153 The Johnson court noted that
the unique nature of the internet does not allow for accurate, in person
age verification prior to the dissemination of sexually explicit
materials.1 54 Similarly, as noted by the Supreme Court in Reno H, the
143. Reno IA 521 U.S. at 876.
144. Id. at 876-77.
145. Id. at 885-86.




150. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).






Johnson court recognized that "[t]he Internet does not distinguish be-
tween minors and adults in their audience. To comply with the Act, a
communicant must speak only in language suitable for children."' 55 The
chilling effect on the otherwise protected adult speech by both the CDA
in Reno H and the New Mexico statute in Johnson, coupled with the in-
ability of internet information providers to perform physical age verifi-
cation, led the Johnson court to conclude that Ginsburg did not apply to
content based restrictions of information disseminated via the internet.1
56
Finally, the government in Johnson argued that the defenses explic-
itly provided in the New Mexico statute in question allowed for a narrow
reading, thereby saving an otherwise invalid unconstitutional
provision. 157 The court disagreed. 58 The defense to which the govern-
ment referred provided a "good faith" defense. 159 This "good faith" de-
fense essentially allowed parties who disseminated harmful information
over the internet to plead an affirmative defense that they took reason-
able steps to restrict access to the information by minors. 160 In Johnson,
the court concluded that these defenses did "not salvage an otherwise
unconstitutionally broad statute." 16' This holding was similar to the Su-
preme Court decision with respect to comparable statutory defenses en-
countered in Reno/H162 and by the district court in Cyberspace Commu-
nications, Inc. 163 Thus, the statutory defenses for "good faith" efforts by
155. Id. (citing Cyberspace Comm., Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 747 (E.D. Mich.
1999)).
156. Id. at 1160.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1152.
160. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-37-3.2(C) (1999). This portion of the statute stated in relevant part:
(C) In a prosecution for dissemination of material that is harmful to a minor by computer,
it is a defense that the defendant has: (1) in good faith taken reasonable, effective and
appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to
indecent materials on computer, including any method that is feasible with available
technology; (2) restricted access to indecent materials by requiring the use of a verified
credit card, debit account, adult access code or adult personal identification number; or
(3) in good faith established a mechanism such as labeling, segregation or other means
that enables the indecent material to be automatically blocked or screened by software or
other capability reasonably available to persons who wish to effect such blocking or
screening and the defendant has not otheiwise solicited a minor not subject to such
screening or blocking capabilities to access the indecent material or to circumvent the
screening or blocking.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-37-3.2(C).
161. Johnson, 194 F.3d. at 1160.
162. Id. (citing Reno, 521 U.S. at 882).
163. Id. (citing Cyberspace Comm. Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 751). In Cyberspace Comm. Inc.,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, addressed a
challenge to an amendment to a Michigan statute (Pub. Act No. 33 (1999), amending Mich. Comp.
Laws § 722.671 et seq.). Cyberspace Comm. Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d at 740. This amendment
prohibited the use of computers or the Internet to disseminate sexually explicit materials to minors.
Id. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of this amendment,
arguing that it violated the First Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
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defendants have not been held to provide adequate protections against
the otherwise unconstitutional restraint placed upon protected speech in
any statutes attempting to regulate the dissemination of indecent materi-
als to minors via the internet.
III. COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Johnson court next considered the effects of the New Mexico
statute on the Commerce Clause. 64 The defendants argued that the New
Mexico statute in question sought to regulate merely intrastate activities;
and therefore, the statute did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause
of the Constitution. 165 Again, the court returned to the unique nature of
the internet in its analysis. The court noted that the geographic limita-
tions placed upon states' jurisdictional limits in the field of commercial
regulation do not easily apply to commerce via the internet.166 The court
stated that given the lack of geographic limitations on the internet, it is
impossible to regulate only those communications that occur within the
geographic borders of a single state. 167 The statute "cannot effectively be
limited to purely intrastate communications over the internet because no
such communications exist." 68 As a result, any state statute, including
the one in question in Johnson, regulates conduct outside the state; and
therefore, violates the Commerce Clause limitations of the United States
Constitution. Thus, the Johnson court held that the New Mexico statute
"represents an attempt to regulate interstate conduct occurring outside
New Mexico's borders, and is accordingly a per se violation of the
Commerce Clause."
169
Second, the Johnson court considered the burden placed upon inter-
state commerce in comparison to the local benefit.' 70 The defendants
argued that the state of New Mexico held a significant interest in pro-
tecting minors from sexually explicit materials.171 The court noted that
the local benefits to New Mexico were insubstantial.172 If the court were
to read the statute as the defendants proposed, then this statute would
affect only one-on-one communications between a New Mexico sender
The District Court held that the amendments, if enforced against the plaintiffs, would indeed violate
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at
753. Thus, the court granted a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the amendments
against the plaintiffs. Id. at 754.
164. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1160.
165. Id. at 1161.
166. Id.
167. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1160. (citing Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp 160, 168-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
168. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1160. (citing Am. Libraries Ass'n, 969 F.Supp at 171).






and a New Mexico recipient whom the sender knew to be a minor.'73
Additionally, given the fact that this statute could not affect materials
sent from international sources, the court reasoned that this statute would
"almost certainly fail to accomplish the government's interest in shield-
ing children from pornography on the Internet."' 74 Accordingly, the court
held that these "limited local benefits '[are] an extreme burden on inter-
state commerce.' Thus, section 30-37-3.2(A) constitutes an invalid indi-
rect regulation on interstate commerce."
75
Finally, on the issue of Commerce Clause violation, the Johnson
court considered the District Court's holding that the New Mexico statute
unconstitutionally imposes inconsistent regulations on the internet .
76
The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court's holding that the stat-
ute did indeed impose inconsistent regulation on the internet, and that
"the Internet, like . . . rail and highway traffic . . . requires a cohesive
national scheme of regulation so that users are reasonably able to deter-
mine their obligations."' 177 Thus, the Court held that the statute violated
the Commerce Clause limitations on state actions and was invalid. 178
A. Conclusion
In sum, the Court of Appeals held the New Mexico statute in ques-
tion was unconstitutional, invalid and unenforceable against the plain-
tiffs. 179 The Court noted that its discussion of the Commerce Clause
challenges was unnecessary, but nonetheless instructive and important. 8
As a result of its holding, the Court of Appeals granted the plaintiffs'
requested injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the New Mexico
statute.18
1. Post-Johnson Decisions
Since the Johnson decision from the Tenth Circuit was issued on
November 2, 1999, there have been some new developments in this area
of Constitutional Law. On October 21, 1998, Congress enacted the Child
Online Protection Act (COPA) into law. 1 2 COPA attempted to "'ad-
dress[] the specific concerns raised by the Supreme Court' in invalidating
the Communications Decency Act (CDA)."'' 8 3 The Supreme Court in
173. Id. at 1162.
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp. 160, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
176. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1162.
177. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1162. (quoting American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 182).
178. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1163.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1160.
181. Id. at 1164.
182. ACLU v. Reno (Reno IV), 217 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2000).
183. Id. at 167 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-775 at 12(1998).
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Reno H, discussed above, previously invalidated the CDA.184 In compari-
son to the CDA, COPA specifically addressed the dissemination of mate-
rial to minors over the internet by commercial persons and /or entities.1
85
In enacting COPA, Congress attempted to cure some of the key defects
of the CDA, as highlighted in Reno I. COPA sought to provide the ex-
plicit definitions of the statute's crucial terms. 86 Such explicitly defined
terms had the intended effect of limiting the scope of affected materials
to the World Wide Web and not the more general internet;187 limiting the
scope of application to solely "commercial purposes;"' 88 and limiting the
scope to only material deemed "harmful to minors.' ' 89 The phrase
"harmful to minors" was defined in the text of COPA and consequently
raised some constitutional issues in the judicial considerations that fol-
lowed the statute's enactment. Congress defined "harmful to minors"
with a three-part analysis, which must be found before liability may at-
tach under COPA.' 9° The statute further defines a "minor" as a person
under the age of seventeen. 91 Finally, COPA provided some affirmative
defenses for commercial entities accused of violating the statute. 92 De-
184. See Reno I1, 521 U.S. at 885.
185. COPA, 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1)(1998): "Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the
character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web,
makes any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that includes
any material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more
than 6 months, or both."
186. See Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 167 (discussing the text of COPA).
187. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at n.4 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(1)). "COPA defines the clause 'by
means of the World Wide Web' as the 'placement of material in a computer server-based file archive
so that it is publicly accessible, over the Internet, using hypertext transfer protocol or any successor
protocol."'
188. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at n.5 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 232 1(e)(2)(A)). "COPA defines the clause
'commercial purposes' as those individuals or entities that are 'engaged in the business of making
such communications."'
189. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at n.5 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(B)). "COPA defines a person
'engaged in the business' as one who makes a communication, or offers to make a communication,
by means of the World Wide Web, that includes any material that is harmful to minors, devotes time,
attention, or labor to such activities, as a regular course of such person's trade or business, with the
objective of earning a profit as a result of such activities (although it is not necessary that the person
make a profit or that the making or offering to make such communications be the person's sole or
principle business or source of income)."
190. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 168. The three-part test stated:
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking
the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is
designed to pander to, the prurient interest; (B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a
manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or
sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition
of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and (C) taken as a whole, lacks serious,
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.
47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6).
191. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(7).
192. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 168 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)). The affirmative defenses
provided that if a commercial entity "restricted access by minors to material that is harmful to
minors" through the use of a "credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal
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spite the attempts by Congress to conform COPA to meet the problems
raised in Reno H, a suit was filed seeking a preliminary injunction
against the enforcement of this second congressional attempt to regulate
information disseminated over the internet.
On October 22, 1998 the plaintiffs' 93 filed an action in the Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking a prelimi-
nary injunction against the enforcement of COPA. 94 The plaintiffs
claimed that COPA was invalid on its face and as applied to them under
the First Amendment by burdening speech which is protected for adults;
that it violated the First Amendment rights of minors; and that it is un-
constitutionally vague under the First and Fifth Amendments. 95 The
District Court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits
of their Constitutional claims and granted their request for a preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of COPA. 9 6 The government ap-
pealed this ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.197
The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's granting of the pre-
liminary injunction. 98 In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals
relied heavily upon the findings of fact made by the lower court and it
reviewed the District Court's conclusions of law under a de novo stan-
dard. 199 The four elements necessary for a preliminary injunction to be
warranted include: (1) the reasonable probability of success; (2) whether
the movant will be irreparably harmed by denial of the relief; (3) whether
granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the non-
moving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in
the public interest.2° Clearly, the first of these three elements attracted
most of the court's attention in its decision.
First, the court noted that the District Court was correct in finding
that since COPA was a content based restriction on speech, it was "pre-
sumptively invalid and subject to strict scrutiny analysis. ' 2° 1 As a result
of the necessary strict scrutiny analysis the government was required to
identification number.. .a digital certificate that verifies age.. or by any other reasonable measures
that are feasible under available technology" then no liability will attach.
193. The list of plaintiffs is too lengthy for full presentation here; the plaintiffs were essentially
those that filed suit in Reno 11, which include the American Civil Liberties Union; Androgyny Books
d/b/a A Different Light Bookstores; American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression; and
Artnet Worldwide Corp.
194. ACLU v. Reno (Reno 111), 31 F. Supp.2d 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1999). COPA was to
become effective on November 29, 1998. Id.
195. Reno III, 31 F. Supp.2d at 477.
196. Id.
197. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 165.
198. Id. at 181.
199. Id. at 172.
200. Id. (quoting Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999).
201. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 173 (quoting Reno 1II, 31 F. Supp.2d at 493).
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"establish that the challenged statute is narrowly tailored to meet a com-
pelling state interest, and that it seeks to protect its interest in a manner
that is the least restrictive of protected speech. 2 °2 Further, the court
noted that the Supreme Court has recognized each medium of expression
may present unique justifications for government regulation.20 3 Yet the
Third Circuit differentiated the Internet from other forms of media that
were historically subject to government regulations.2 4 Unlike other
regulated mediums, the Internet did not have a history of regulation nor
did it have a limited number of frequencies.20 5 Thus, the standard of re-
view for content-based regulation of speech via the Internet presented the
Court with a unique and continually developing area of Constitutional
Law.
The intrinsic characteristics of the Internet presented the revised
"contemporary community standards" test provided in COPA with some
unique challenges. Congress attempted to revise the test from the CDA
(overturned in Reno II) in COPA by adding that "the average person,
applying contemporary community standards' would find the work taken
as a whole, [to appeal] to the prurient interest."206 It was this revised test
that the court found to be in conflict with the inherent nature of the Inter-
net. The court noted that the Internet is not geographically limited;201 that
information is instantaneously available on the Internet as soon as it is
published;20 8 and that current technology prevents Web publishers from
circumventing particular jurisdictions or limiting their site's content
"from entering any [specific] geographic community.' '2°9 As a result of
these unique characteristics of the Internet, the court concluded that
COPA's adoption of the Miller "contemporary community standards"
test would have an overbroad effect. 210 The court determined this over-
broad effect would restrict the constitutionally protected speech of adults
to the most stringent standards of the least liberal communities, therein
211
depriving adults of free access to protected forms of speech. Such a
stringent limitation to the lowest common denominator has consistently
202. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 173 (citing Schaumbern v. Citizens for a Bctter Env't, 444 U.S. 620,
637 (1980)). The Court noted that this approach was recently confirmed in United States v. Playboy
Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 2000 WL 646196 (U.S. 2000) (discussing the "bleeding" of cable
transmissions and holding § 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 unconstitutional as
violative of the First Amendment).
203. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at n.18.
204. Id.
205. Id. (quoting Reno I1, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)).
206. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 174.
207. Id. at 175 (quoting Reno 111, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 482-92).
208. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 175 (citing American Libraries, 969 F. Supp. at 166; Reno 111, 31 F.
Supp. 2d at 483).
209. Id. (quoting Reno II, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 484).




been held to be in violation of the First Amendment in all the preceding
Reno decisions.
Finally, the court considered whether COPA was "readily suscepti-
ble" to a narrowing construction that would make it constitutional.212
Courts generally recognized two methods of narrowing an otherwise
unconstitutionally broad statute: (1) by "assigning a narrow meaning to
the language of the statute or; (2) deleting that portion of the statute that
is unconstitutional, while preserving the remainder of the statute
intact. 213 The court attempted both approaches at the behest of the gov-
ernment. First, the court concluded that in previous applications of the
Miller "contemporary community standards" test, it was applied on a
geographic basis, and therefore could not be read narrowly to present an
"adult" rather than a geographic standard in this instance. Second, the
court concluded that by striking the contemporary community standards
test from COPA would have the effect of rendering the rest of the statute
215virtually meaningless. The test was held to be an "integral part of the
statute, permeating and influencing the whole of the statute" and thus, its
216removal would not salvage the constitutional remnants. 6 Therefore, the
court concluded that COPA was not susceptible to a narrow reading and
accordingly it was deemed likely that the plaintiffs would succeed on
their constitutional challenge to COPA.217
The Third Circuit briefly addressed the remaining two prongs of the
preliminary injunction test. First, the court noted that "in a First Amend-
ment challenge, a plaintiff who meets the first prong of the test ... will
almost certainly meet the second, since irreparable injury normally arises
out of the deprivation of speech rights."' 8 Therefore, the court concluded
that the second prong was likely met in this situation. 2 19 Finally, in ap-
plying the balancing test required by the third prong, the court concluded
that the threats of COPA on constraining constitutionally protected
speech far outweighed the damage that would be caused by the denial of
220the requested injunction. While the court concluded that the District
Court properly granted the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction
212. Id. (quoting Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)).
213. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 177 (citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 502
(1985)).
214. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 178. The Court noted that prior decisions have recognized that the
nation is simply too large and too diverse for a common standard of "obscene" or "indecent"
materials to be adequately defined at a national level. In fact, it was this rationale that lead the Court
to develop the "contemporary community standard" in the Miller decision (which was based on
geographic notions of "community"). Id. (discussing Miller, 413 U.S. at 30, 33).
215. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 179.
216. id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 180 (quoting Reno 1 929 F. Supp. 824, 826).
219. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 180.
220. Id
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prohibiting the enforcement of COPA, this conclusion was not the end of
the court's decision.
The final paragraph of the Reno IV decision provides some intrigu-
ing dicta concerning the future of this area of the law. The Court stated:
"we . . . express our confidence and firm conviction that developing
technology will soon render the 'community standards' challenge moot,
thereby making congressional regulation to protect minors from harmful
materials on the Web constitutionally practicable. 2 21 This statement,
which has been reiterated by several of the Reno courts in a variety of
ways, points to technology as the key solution to Congress' ability to
regulate information sent to minors over the Internet. These technologi-
cal advancements must be able to adequately protect children from mate-
rial obscene to them, while not placing an undue burden on adult speech
not encompassed by the obscenity standards for children in the relevant
community. Beyond this, it is unclear what these advancements will en-
tail or to what extent they will be required. In the final analysis, the four
Reno decisions coupled with the Johnson decision blaze an ambiguous
trail for both legislators and parents wishing to protect their children
from the perceived dangers of the World Wide Web.
IV. ANALYSIS
The ramifications of the Johnson decision will be felt both inside of
and outside of the Tenth Circuit. Internet business growth rates suggest
that dissemination of information via the Internet is the way the world
will operate in the 21s" Century. As a result, regulation of how informa-
tion is transmitted over the Internet is a crucial topic facing the legal pro-
fession today. Encompassed in any discussion of regulation of the Inter-
net are two broad constitutional issues: First Amendment Rights of indi-
viduals and Commerce Clause limits on state powers. The Tenth Circuit
decision in Johnson was one of first impression for the Circuit, but the
decision also followed the Supreme Court's guidance in Reno v. ACLU.
Additionally, other federal courts appear to be in general agreement with
both Reno and Johnson.22 2 The effect of the Tenth Circuit ruling in John-son is twofold.
First, courts have clearly taken notice of the unusual nature of the
Internet and have consistently pointed to several unique characteristics of
the Internet that effectuate key differences from other mediums of ex-
pression. For example, in Reno IV, the Third Circuit reviewed the differ-
ences between broadcast media, such as television or radio, and the
221. Id. at 181.
222. See generally Cyberspace Comm. Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Mich. 1999);




Internet.223 As a result of its non-geographic structure, the Internet is a
unique target of government regulation.224 The question of the Internet's
international character has yet to be adequately addressed by the Ameri-
can courts. However, due to its inherently national character, courts ap-
pear to agree that there must be uniform regulation of the Internet, at the
national, as opposed to the state level. The balance between regulating
the Internet and the continued protection of constitutional rights is an
omnipresent challenge to the Congress and the courts. The Johnson deci-
sion and other similar decisions addressed only the surface of potential
conflicts between the regulation of the Internet and the protection of con-
stitutional guarantees. Nevertheless, these preliminary decisions laid an
important foundation upon which future courts will build a body of
Internet regulation.
Second, the Johnson decision affects the balance of power between
the states and the federal government. The age-old debate of states'
rights versus national rights is inherent in the American system of Feder-
alism. Nonetheless, the potential power that the Internet may soon wield
in the stream of commerce and communication is a source of potential
conflict between the states and the federal government. State legislatures
will certainly want to gain a voice in the development of the Internet to
bring the prosperity of the Internet within the state. However, as the
courts have suggested, there is a need to regulate the Internet on a na-
tional level.
Regulation at the state level would compromise the success of the
Internet. A lack of national uniformity in regulating the Internet would
likely result in an inability of the Internet to offer the benefits of simulta-
neous, instantaneous communications and commerce as it currently aims
to achieve. Regulation on a state-by-state basis would most likely create
a patchwork regulatory system. Such a patchwork system would impede
the ability of many Internet services to function in a profitable manner.
For example, if New Mexico and Colorado both passed regulations on
the dissemination of materials to minors via the Internet; but New Mex-
ico banned all indecent material, while Colorado imposed a less restric-
tive regulation, how would a company wishing to do business via the
Internet in both states act? The company would be forced either to make
its entire Internet materials conform to the New Mexico statute, or to
choose to avoid doing business in New Mexico altogether.
In contrast, if the Federal government enacted a single, uniform
regulation such patchwork regulation would not be of concern to the
business wishing to carry on business nationwide via the Internet. The
business would be able to access consumers nation-wide without the risk
of violating 50 different statutory schemes. Clearly such uniform regula-
223. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 168-69.
224. Id. at 169.
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tion would provide the greatest benefit to the continued growth of the
Internet as a means of commercial activity in the United States.
The central issue remains to what extent does the holding in John-
son and other similar decisions have on the future of Internet regula-
tions? The final answer remains to be determined. The only certainty in
this field is that attempts to regulate the Internet will continue and the
tension between government action and parental choice will likely de-
volve into a moot discussion when technology catches Constitutional
theory. Parental control still remains the best and most likely source of
protecting minors from indecent materials, however defined. Until such
time as technology offers controls that conform to the constraints of the
Constitution, parents must take the lead in assuring that the Internet is a
safe place for children to roam.
CONCLUSION
The Internet is clearly a revolutionary new medium of expression.
The opportunity for persons to exchange ideas worldwide with the in-
stant click of a mouse is truly unique. The Internet provides for greater
communication among people on an infinite range of subjects. This free-
dom of expression has never before been provided with such a powerful
tool. Yet with this advantage comes concern, specifically related to mi-
nors accessing materials that are not appropriate for children. This con-
cern has prompted government intervention and regulation. It is this
regulation that strikes at the very core of what it means to be "Ameri-
can." The Constitution seeks to protect expression, not simply because it
is a noble concept, but more precisely because it is the freedom of ex-
pression that drives democracy. Free expression among citizens is the
most essential ingredient of a functional and successful democratic soci-
ety. Thus, it is the opinion of this author that the courts have so far been
correct in holding the governmental regulations invalid as violating the
most basic principles of the Constitution. Further, it is clear that with the
continued growth of technology, parents will be better equipped to pre-
vent their children from accessing material that the parent deems harm-
ful. Removing the power of a parent and placing it in the hands of gov-
ernment is at a minimum troublesome, and the worst, Orwellian. Clearly,
the duty to regulate the dissemination of information to minors over the





THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS
AND AGE AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF USING
JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS TO ENHANCE ADULT
SENTENCES
INTRODUCTION
The same justice systems served juveniles and adults until the late
nineteenth century when society decided to protect child offenders' inno-
cence.' The decision to protect juvenile delinquents was based on the
premise that juvenile delinquents could be rehabilitated.2 The fundamen-
tal objective of the juvenile justice system was not to determine the guilt
or innocence of the juvenile, but rather to examine how the juvenile be-
came whom he or she is and what can be done in the best interest of the
child and the state to save him.3 Recently, however, public perceptions of
increasing crime rates and the belief that rehabilitation-based treatment
was neither efficient nor deserved influenced the juvenile justice system
to treat "delinquents less as misguided but redeemable individuals and
more as a faceless army of pint-sized criminals.",4 For instance, "in the
last four years, "there have been a total of six mass killings by juve-
niles."' Throughout the last decade alone, "the number of juveniles
committing murder, rape, robbery, and assault has increased by 93 per-
cent."6 However, in the last decade, fear of rising juvenile crime has pro-
1. Randi-Lynn Smallheer, Sentence Blending and The Promise of Rehabilitation: Bringing
the Juvenile Justice System Full Circle, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 259, 264 (2000). Individuals became
more concerned with protecting young offenders rather than punishing them. Id. This shift in
thinking was based on the belief that the "child's poor living environment, rather than willful
behavior, caused juvenile delinquency." Id.
2. See Danielle R. Oddo, Removing ConfidentialitY Protections and the "Get Tough"
Rhetoric. What Has Gone Wrong With the Juvenile Justice System?, 18 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
105, 107 (1998). The commission of crimes by children was not the result of a decision by a morally
responsible individual; "rather it was a type of youthful illness which could be treated and the child
rehabilitated." Id. at 107.
3. Id.
4. Lara A. Bazelon, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy is the Preadolescent's
Best Defense in the Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159, 166-69, 175 (2000) (noting that "harsh
conditions and lack of services characteristic if youth prisons will not provide preadolescent
children, who are at a formative stage in their moral and cognitive development, with the educational
and therapeutic services necessary to lead law-abiding and productive lives upon release.").
5. Jennifer A. Chin, Baby-Face Killers: A C' v for Uniform Treatment for Youths Who
Murder, From Trial to Sentencing, 8 J.L. & POL'Y 287, 302 (1999). Because of this increase, or
perception of an increase, in violent crimes committed by juveniles, some critics argue for tougher
sanctions on juvenile murders. Id. at 302. But how should the juvenile justice system treat juveniles
who commit violent crimes but not murder'? This is an issue addresses by the Tenth Circuit in
Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 1999). See infra, notes 72-109.
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duced a wave of legislation affecting juveniles which has stated that
"children who commit serious crimes should be treated virtually the
same as adults."7 Also, when a case stays in juvenile court, the records of
the proceeding can be disclosed to public officials conducting criminal
8investigations.
Through an analysis of the Tenth Circuit's treatment of juvenile law
and sentencing law, this survey will discuss the sentencing of juveniles
with a focus on juveniles' constitutional rights. This survey will also
discuss the use of juvenile records in the sentencing of adult criminals.
Part I discusses Hawkins v. Hargett9 and the Eighth Amendment propor-
tionality test and its application to juveniles sentenced as adult criminals.
Part II examines United States v. McKissick ° and the use of juvenile
records in the sentencing of adult criminals. This survey evaluates the
recent trend in treating juveniles as adults and the future of the juvenile
justice system and juveniles' constitutional rights. This survey does not
reflect the entire body of juvenile law."
6. Charles J. Aron and Michael S.C. Hurley, Juvenile Justice at the Crossroads, Champion,
June 1998, at 1.
7. See Gregory Loken and David Rosettenstein. The Juvenile Justice System Counter-
Reformation: Children and Adolescents as Adult Criminals. 18 QLR 351, 352 (1999). The "get
tough" legislation falls into three main categories: transferring more juveniles to the adult criminal
justice system, "increasing the severity of juvenile sentences, and reducing the protections of
juvenile confidentiality." Oddo, supra note 2, at 113. Laws allowing for the transfer of juveniles to
adult courts expose the juvenile to longer incarceration periods with an emphasis on retribution. Id.
Measures have also been taken to increase juvenile sentences for both maximum and minimum
sentences. Id. at 114. Moreover, many states replaced "traditional confidentiality protections with
open proceedings and records." Id. at 115. Some of the changes caused by these new confidentiality
provisions may include: open proceedings to the public, some access to juvenile records, the release
of the juvenile's name and/or picture to the media or general public, and the use of the juvenile's
record in adult sentencing procedures. Id. at 116. See, e.g., Or. Laws ch. 422, sec. 48, codified at
Org. Rev. Stat. Sec. 161.290 (1997) (eliminating completely the defense of "incapacity due to
immaturity" for all persons age twelve or older); Kann. Stat. Ann. §§ 38-1602a(a), 1636(a)(1) (West
1998)(making children as young as ten years old subject to discretionary waiver to adult court for
any criminal offense); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-124(c-e) (1997)(allowing for the disclosure of the
records of juvenile court proceedings to public officials, to the victim, and to "any person who has a
legitimate interest in the information.") For a discussion about the transfer process See infra note 43.
8. Loken and Rosettenstein, supra note 7, at 352.
9. 200 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 1999).
10. 204 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2000).
11. This survey addresses decisions about the Eighth Amendment and its application to the
sentencing of juveniles and the use of prior juvenile adjudications to enhance adult sentences
rendered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit between September 1, 1999
and August 31, 2000.
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I. SENTENCING OF JUVENILES AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
PROPORTIONALITY TEST
A. History of the Juvenile Court System
Until recently, society treated juvenile offenders with rehabilitation
rather than severe punishment." Underlying that trend is the theory that
because children are of a tender age, less culpable, and able to change for
the better.' 3 The juvenile justice system began as part of "the efforts of
[p]rogressive reformers at the turn of the century."' 4 The reformers an-
ticipated a system that recognized the belief that children were different
from adults and needed protection and nurturing rather than absolute
accountability. 5 Thus, the juvenile justice system operated under the
idea that the state would act as parens patriae of the child and use its
judgment to do what is in the best interest of the child.'
6
1. Emergence of Juvenile's Rights
The juvenile justice system originally focused on rehabilitating chil-
dren because of the belief that children were responsive to treatment and
that treatment was essential.' 7 Based on these principles, juvenile court
proceedings were informal with the fatherly like judge, the friendly pro-
bation officer, and the juvenile and his parents having a conference to
12. Chin supra note 5. at 297. It was thought that a separate juvenile justice system
emphasizing rehabilitation would be more beneficial to the child and society. Id. The proceedings in
this system were less adversarial. Id. Juveniles were not offenders, but respondents, and attorney's
did not file charges, but instead filed petitions. Id. These systems were based on the assumption that
children were not criminally responsible for their behavior, and thus, could not be punished like
adult criminals. Id. at 298.
13. Id. at 295-296.
14. Martin L. Forst and Martha-Elin Blomquist. Cracking Down on Juveniles. Changing the
Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB POL'Y 323, 324 (1991). Some
commentators suggest that this system developed in response to the shift from a rural society to a
urban society which led to accompanying problems of modernization and immigration. See also
Deborah L. Mills, United States v. Johnson: Acknowledging the Shift in the Juvenile Court System
from Rehabilitation to Punishment, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 903, 906 (1996). In an attempt to address
these problems, the Progressive reformers offered solutions to incorporating the changes in basic
family structure, family functions, and conceptions in childhood and social control. Id. at 907.
15. Forst & Blomquist, supra note 10, at 324. Essential to the reformers beliefs was the
assumption that children were not completely developed physically nor mentally and thus required
time to complete their "cognitive, social, and moral development before being expected to shoulder
the burden of adulthood." Id. "Juveniles were adjudicated 'delinquent' rather than found 'guilty,'
and a conviction did not send them to jail. Overall, the goal was to provide juveniles with services to
encourage rehabilitation and supervision to help them stay on the right path." Oddo, supra note 2, at
107.
16. Sarah M. Coupet, What to do with the Sheep in Wolf's Clothing: The Role of Rhetoric and
Reality about Youth Offenders in the Constructive Dismantling of the Juvenile Justice System. 148
U. P.A. L. REV. 1303, 1308 (2000). The concept of parens patriae refers to the role of the state as the
custodian of persons who suffer from some form of legal disability; it is this concept that "provides
the basis for state laws that protect rather than punish citizens." Id.
17. Oddo, supra note 2, at 107.
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discuss what would be in the child's best interest.18 But as the number of
juvenile offenders increased, providing individualized treatment was not
feasible or realistic.' 9 Eventually, lawyers, social workers, and child ad-
vocates raised concerns that the juvenile justice system was falling short
of its goals and that the lack of procedural rotections resulted in chil-
dren being unjustly and arbitrarily punished. 0 "Without right to notice,
counsel, or any of the basic protections provided to an adult criminal
defendant, a delinquent child often was j owerless to contest whatever
judgment the court saw fit to pronounce."
The Supreme Court responded to the emerging shortcomings of the
juvenile justice system in two significant cases. In Kent v. United
States, 23 the Supreme Court held that juveniles are entitled to a hearing
before transfer to adult criminal court and to the right to confer with
24counsel throughout the hearing process. The Court emphasized that, in
its view, the original purpose of rehabilitation and treatment of juvenile
offenders was not being achieved.25
Then, in In re Gault,26 the court expanded the definition of juvenile
rights by granting juveniles the right to notice of charges, to counsel, to
confrontation, to cross-examination of witnesses, and to the privilege
against self-incrimination. 27 In Gault, the Court reviewed the inadequa-
18. Smallheer, supra note 1, at 265.
19. Id. at 266. As a result of the increase in juvenile offenders, the system began either giving
juveniles a "slap on the wrist, or . . . sent to large congregate institutions, which could not possible
treat each juvenile on an individualized basis" and as a result many dispositions of juvenile cases
resembled dispositions of adult criminal cases. Id.
20. Id. at 267. See also Bazelon, supra note 4, at 173.
21. Bazelon, supra note 4, at 173. "Juvenile court-mandated 'placements' sometimes resulted
in terms of imprisonment that far outlasted the harshest sentence the child could have received upon
conviction in criminal court." Id.
22. Kent. v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, discussed infra notes 23-
30.
23. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). Kent, age 14, was convicted of housebreaking and robbery, and
placed on probation. Kent, 383 U.S. at 543. Two years later, Kent was taken into custody by the
police for robbing and raping a women. Id. The police interrogated him without the benefit of
counsel or his parents. Id. at 534-544. Kent was then sent to a Receiving Home for a week with no
hearing or arraignment. Id. at 544-45. The juvenile court waived jurisdiction without hearing and
without ruling on any of the motions filed by Kent's attorney. Id. at 546.
24. Id. at 561.
25. Id. at 556. According to the Court, juveniles adjudicated in the juvenile courts "receive the
worst of both worlds.., he gets neither the protections afforded to adults nor the solicitous care and
regenerative treatment postulated for children." Id. See also Smallheer, supra note 1, at 268.
(discussing the shift of the juvenile justice system towards retributions and the constitutional
protections afforded to juveniles as a result of this shift).
26. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gault was fifteen years old when he was convicted of making obscene
phone calls. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 4-10. Gault was sent to the State Industrial School for a
maximum of six years by the juvenile court for being a "delinquent." Id. at 7-8.
27. Id. at 31-57.
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cies of the traditional juvenile court proceedings and in its critique the
majority said:
Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discre-
tion, however benevolently motivated, and is frequently a poor sub-
stitute for principle and procedure.. the absence of substantive stan-
dard has not necessarily meant that children receive careful, compas-
sionate, individualized treatment.
28
Both decisions emphasized the fact that the "juvenile courts had
failed to deliver on their promise of treatment, and instead were merely
providing punishment in the form of training schools or other types of
incarceration." 29 But, as constitutional rights were extended to juveniles,
the juvenile court system became more adversarial and more like the
adult criminal justice system.3 ° In fact, after the Gault era, fundamental
changes in sentencing of juveniles emerged as the focus shifted to con-
siderations of crime committed and retribution.31
Three years after Gault, in In re Winship,32 the court imposed a re-
quirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for the juvenile court con-
victions of delinquent acts.33 The court reasoned that when a juvenile's
liberty is at stake, due process requires that the standard of evidence nec-
essary for conviction be as exacting as that applied in adult proceed-
ings. The dissenters in Winshop expressed concern that by mandating to
juveniles similar procedural due process protections afforded to adult
criminals, the Court would destroy the philosophy that warranted main-
taining a separate justice system for juveniles.35 Then, in Breed v.
Jones,36 the Court decided that juvenile courts must adhere to the double
jeopardy clause.37 Yet, the Court refused to apply the rationale of Gault
and Winship in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,38 and held that juvenile delin-
quents do not have a constitutional right to a trial by jury.39
28. Id. at 18-19.
29. Florence B. Bumstein, Tenth Circuit Survey Juvenile Law, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 877, 880
(1999). Thus, Kent and Gault transformed the juvenile justice system from a social welfare agency,
to a "wholly-owned subsidiary of the criminal justice system." Smallheer, supra note 1, at 269.
30. Smalheer, supra note 1, at 269.
31. Id.
32. 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). In this case, a juvenile was found guilty of stealing money from
a women's purse based on a preponderance of evidence standard. Id. at 360.
33. 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) ("[Tlhe constitutional safeguards of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is as much required during the adjudicator stage of a delinquency proceeding as are those
constitutional safeguards applied in Gault").
34. Id.
35. Id. at 376. (Burger, J., dissenting).
36. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
37. Breed, 421 U.S. at 541.
38. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
39. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547.
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2. The Juvenile Justice Today: A Response to Juvenile Crime Rates
The social trend today is to treat juveniles as criminals because of the
atrocious crimes they commit.4 0 With the increase in violent crimes
committed by juveniles,4 ' legislators have shown a willingness to treat
juvenile offenders as adults.42 For example, new legislation allows for
the removal of juvenile offenders from the juvenile system and into the
adult criminal system through the process of transfer or direct filing. 4
Furthermore, many states have expanded the purpose clauses of their
juvenile codes to include the promotion of public safety, punishment, and
accountability. 44 "Few jurisdictions provide for an intermediary court
where juvenile sentencing may be more appropriate" .4  Juveniles in
"adult criminal court will be subject to the full range of adult punish-
ment, including life imprisonment and the death penalty.
46
"High profile cases and regular news reports of gang violence and
school shootings have solidified the public view that juvenile crime is
out of control., '47 "The period between 1985 to 1994 saw a 100% in-
crease in adolescent homicides, paralleled by a 100% increase in the
number of homicides by adolescents using guns." 48 Furthermore, juve-
nile violence has declined since the peak in 1994, although total arrests
40. Matthew Thomas Wagman,. Innocence Lost: In the Wake of Green: The Trend is Clear---
If You Are Old Enough To Do The Crime, Then You Are Old Enough To Do The Time. 49 CAT. U.
L. REV. 643,644 (2000).
41. According to the Uniform Crime Reports for 1995, over a five year period starting in 1991
juvenile arrests increased twenty percent, more than ten times that of adults. Federal Bureau of
Investigation, United States Department of Justice, 1995 Crime in the United States: Uniform Crime
Reports 207 (1996). These statistics also illustrated that the police arrested children between the ages
of thirteen and fourteen for forcible rape with greater frequency than most other age groups
considered juveniles. Id. at 218.
42. Loken and Rosettenstein supra note 7, at 355.
43. Id. "Transfer" of jurisdiction is the process of removal of juvenile offenders to the adult
judicial system. See Burnstein supra note 29, at 880. Transfer can occur if the juvenile court waives
jurisdiction or if a statute mandates immediate transfer depending on the type of crime. Id. The final
way a juvenile can be transferred is through direct filing by the prosecution. Id. Legislation may give
the prosecutor the discretion to file charges directly either in juvenile court or adult criminal court.
Id. "Today, most judicial transfer statutes include a list of criteria that a juvenile court judge is
allowed to consider or should consider in making a transfer determination." Lisa A. Cintron,
"Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limiting Juvenile Transfers to Adult Criminal Court", 90
NW. U. L. R.ev. 1254, 1265 (1996).
44. Mabel Artega, Juvenile Justice with a Future for Juveniles, 2 CARDOZA WOMEN'S L.J.
215, 219 (1995). As the states changes the purpose of their juvenile codes the rehabilitative goals of
the juvenile justice system is becoming overshadowed. Id.
45. Bumstein, supra note 29, at 880.
46. Id. at 881.
47. See Elizabeth Cauffman, Jennifer Woolard. and N. Dickon Reppucci, Justice for
Juveniles: New Perspectives on Adolescents Competence and Culpability, 18 QLR 403, 404 (1999)
(noting that regardless of the accuracy of this perception, the sentiment that the juvenile court was
too soft led to an introduction in many states of tougher policies for juvenile delinquents).
48. Cauffman supra note 18, at 403, citing Al Blumstein, Violence by Young People: Why the
Deadly Nexus?, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Aug. 1995, at 3.
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remain significantly higher than the rates in the 1980's and these trends
and media coverage of these trends have scared the public.49
Ironically, the public demand for adult treatment of adolescents did
not go beyond the area of retributive justice. 50 For instance, the Virginia
legislature "that lowered the age of transfer to fourteen years of age" also
prohibits children "under the age of eighteen from getting a tattoo with-
out permission from their parents because they are too immature to make
this type of decision on their own."'', These recent changes in the treat-
ment of juvenile delinquents raises concerns about the psychological and
developmental differences between adolescents and adults, specifically
in regards to adjudicative competence and culpability.52
3. The Eighth Amendment Gross Proportionality Test
The Eighth Amendment provides that "excessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted. In Weems v. U.S., the Court held that the Constitution re-
quires proportionality in sentencing. Thus, the Eighth Amendment be-
came a constitutional basis for "challenges to excessively harsh prison
sentences."
56
49. Id. at 403.
50. Id. at 404.
51. Id. See generally Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-371.3 (1999).
52. Cauffman supra note 48, at 405. Adjudicative competence refers to "the ability of a person
to consult with his or her lawyer and to have a rational and factual understanding of the court
proceeding." Id. "Culpability refers to the extent to which an individual can be held accountable for
his or her actions, and by extension, the degree to which retributive punishment is appropriate." Id.
For the purposes of this discussion on the Eighth Amendment proportionality, only culpability of
adolescents will be further explored.
53. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII.
54. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The issue in this case was a disbursing officer's 15 year sentence to
"cadena temporal" for falsifying a cashbook for the port of Manilla in the Philippines. See id. at 357-
358. "Cadena" is defined as "an afflictive penalty consisting of imprisonment at 'hard and laborious
work,' originally with a chain hanging from the waist to the ankle and carrying with it the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction, perpetual absolute disqualification from office, and in the case of
'cadena temporal,' surveillance by the authorities during life." Black Law's Dictionary.
55. Weems, 217 U.S. at 368. Proportionality is the proposition that a punishment should not
exceed the guilt incurred by the commission of a particular crime, gauged by the heinousness of the
crime and the culpability of the offender. Chris Baniszewski, Supreme Court Review of Excessive
Prison Sentences: The Eighth Amendment's Proportionality Requirement, 25 ARIz. S.T. L.J. 929,
942 (1993).
56. Benjamin L. Felcher, Kids Get the Darndest Sentences: State v. Mitchell and Why Age
Should Be A Factor in Sentencing for First Degree Murder, 18 LAW & INEQ. 323, 332 (2000).
Eighth Amendment issues arise in three main circumstances: challenges to the death penalty,
challenges to the treatment of prisoners, and challenges to the length of prison sentences. Id. at FN
69. See Mirah Horowitz. Kids Who Kill: A Critigue of How the American Legal System Deals with
Juveniles Who Commit Homicide, 63 SuM. LAW CONTEMP. PROB. 133 (2000) (discussing the history
of the death penalty and the juvenile death penalty). The application of the Eighth amendment differs
depending upon the issue involved, thus this paper will focus solely upon the Court's decisions
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Three cases in which the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the
meaning of the Eighth amendment are Gregg v. Georgia,57 Solem v.
Helm,58 and Harmelin v. Michigan.59 In Gregg, the court created a two-
prong test to determine whether a punishment is excessive within the
bounds of the Eighth Amendment.60 The first prong stated that, whatever
the punishment, it cannot involve unnecessary and unwarranted infliction
of pain.6' The second prong of the test outlined that the punishment in-
flicted must be in proportion to the crime committed.62
The Solem court expanded and clarified the second prong estab-
lished by the Gregg court.63 Relying on Gregg, the Solem court held that,
regardless of the crime, the sentence imposed must be in proportion to
the crime committed.64 The court stated that, if courts find it necessary to
conduct an Eighth Amendment analysis, they should be guided by an
objective analysis of the following factors: (1) the seriousness of the
crime as well as subsequent punishment, (2) how the state treats other
criminals, in order to determine whether or not criminals who commit
more serious crimes are subject to a less severe penalty, and (3) how
other jurisdictions adjudicate the crime.65 These factors should be viewed
"in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and
the culpability of the offender.
' 66
involving the duration of prison sentences and its application to juveniles specifically in the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 1999).
57. 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (holding that a death sentence for the crime of murder does not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
58. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). In Solem, the court overturned a life sentence imposed upon a
defendant who was found guilty of his seventh felony, the last of which was forging a check. Id. at
281-82. In so holding, the court stated that although the judiciary must show substantial deference to
legislatures enacting sentencing schemes, the sentence must be proportionate to the crime
committed. Id. at 290.
59. 501 U.S. 957 (1991). The Harmelin court modified the Eighth Amendment proportionality
principle and agreed that courts should use the Solem objective criteria analysis only in cases where
the defendant's sentence was "grossly disproportionate" to the offense. Id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
60. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See generally Solem, 463 U.S. 277. In Solem, the court reversed the imposition of a life
sentence without the possibility of parole for the cashing of a $100 check for which the defendant
did not have an account. Id. at 284. See also Felcher, supra note 56, at 331-338 (discussing the
history of the Supreme Court Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence).
64. Solem, 463 at 290.
65. Id. at 291-92. Based on those factors, the Court found the defendant's sentence
"significantly disproportionate his crime, and ... therefore prohibited by the Eighth Amendment."
Id. at 303.
66. Id. at 292. The majority supported the position that "as a matter of principle ... a criminal
sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted" with an
inquiry into the history of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 284-286. The Court stated
that the list of established principles was not exhaustive, but simply illustrative of generally accepted
criteria for comparing the severity of different crimes on a broad scale. Id. at 294.
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In Harmelin, the court rejected the Solem three-prong test for pro-
portionality. 67 The court modified the proportionality test and found that
it does exist in narrow circumstances. In sum, the law today states that
no defined proportionality between the crime and sentence mandated by
the Eighth Amendment exists, but rather the Eighth Amendment prohib-
its outrageous sentences, that are "grossly disproportionate.,
69
4. The Eighth Amendment Proportionality Test and Its Application
in the Sentencing of Juveniles in the Tenth Circuit: Hawkins v.
Hargett7°
a. Facts
Trent Hawkins, thirteen years and 11 months old, broke into a neigh-
bor's home, tied the neighbor up with ropes, blindfolded her, and then,
raped and sodomized her repeatedly.71 "Throughout the two and half-
hour episode, Mr. Hawkins threatened the victim with a knife and threat-
ened to kill her children if she told the police., 72 "After the sexual as-
sault, Mr. Hawkins took seven dollars from the victim's purse and
fled.",73 The court certified Mr. Hawkins to stand trial as an adult and the
Court of Appeals upheld that decision. 74 "A jury found Mr. Hawkins
guilty of first degree burglary, robber with a dangerous weapon, forci-
ble sodomy, and second degree rape.
b. Sentencing
"The jury sentenced Mr. Hawkins to maximum sentences of twenty
years for the burglary, twenty years for forcible sodomy, fifteen years for
rape, and up to forty-five years out of a possible life sentence for robbery
with a dangerous weapon., 76 "The trial judge ordered that Mr. Hawkins
serve the sentences consecutively, resulting in a total term of one hun-
67. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 986-91 (1991). Harmelin was convicted of
possession of cocaine. Id. at 961. Harmelin argued that the mandatory life sentence could only be the
harshest of a series of penalties available to a sentencing court, imposed only after a determination
that such a sentence would not be grossly disproportionate to the particular crime and defendant. Id.
at 994-95.
68. Id. at 996-1009 (Kennedy. J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
69. Id. at 1001. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
(emphasis added).
70. 200 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 1999).





76. Hawkins. 200 F.3d at 1280.
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dred years., 77 "The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Mr.
Hawkins' convictions and sentences. 78
Mr. Hawkins filed an application for post-conviction relief in state
court and argued that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.79 The
court denied relief, and the state court of criminal appeals affirmed.8 ° Mr.
Hawkins then filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court. 8'
The federal court referred the petition to a magistrate judge for a propor-
tionality review.82 "The Magistrate's report and recommendations in-
cluded a detailed proportionality review and recommended denying Mr.
Hawkins' petition. 83 The district court adopted the recommendation and
affirmed the lower court decision, and then Mr. Hawkins appealed.84 Mr.
Hawkins asked that the Tenth Circuit "examine whether the consecutive
sentences were constitutionally disproportionate in light of the fact that,
at the time he committed the crimes, he was only thirteen years old. 85
c. The Eighth Amendment Proportionality Test
First, the court held that the Eighth Amendment proportionality test
set forth in Harmelin was applicable. 86 After discussing Solem and Har-
melin, the court concluded that the Harmelin test was applicable because
"Justice Kennedy's opinion was the controlling position of the court
since his opinion both retains proportionality and narrows Solem."
87
Thus, the court proceeded to review Mr. Hawkins' sentence in relation to
his crimes for "gross disproportionality.,
88
Mr. Hawkins urged the court "to consider his youth at the time of
the crimes as a mitigating factor." 89 The court held that "[t]he chrono-
logical age of a defendant is a factor that can be considered in determin-
ing whether a punishment is grossly disproportionate in as much as it
relates to culpability." 90 Culpability is "weighed by examining factors
such as the defendant's motive and level of scienter, among other
77. Id.; Hawkins v. State, 742 P.2d 33 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987)
78. Hawkins, 200 F.3d at 1280.





84. Hawkins, 200 F.3d at 1280.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1282.; McCullough v. Singletary, 967 F.2d 530, 535 (11 th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir. 1992); McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir.
1992).





things."91 The court recognized the Supreme Court's indication "that the
age of a young defendant is relevant, in the Eighth Amendment sense, to
his culpability. 92 In Thompson v. Oklahoma,9 the Supreme Court con-
cluded that "less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a
juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult."
94
In State v. Green,95 the Supreme Court of North Carolina found that,
"while the chronological age of a defendant is a factor that can be con-
sidered in determining whether a punishment is grossly disproportionate
to the crime, the court's review is not limited to that factor., 96 In that
case, the court upheld a mandatory life sentence for a thirteen-year-old
convicted rapist. Similarly, the court held that "age is a relevant factor
to consider in a proportionality analysis. 98 However, the conclusion by
the court to consider Mr. Hawkins' age did not lead the court to find Mr.
Hawkins' sentence "grossly disproportionate" to his crimes.99 The court
emphasized the seriousness of Mr. Hawkins' crimes.1° The crimes in-
volved "a deadly weapon, a home invasion, threats of violence, and re-
peated sexual attacks."' '° "Although his culpability may be diminished
somewhat, due to his age at the time of his crimes," the court stated that
the sentence is more than "counterbalanced by the harm Mr. Hawkins
caused to his victim.
' 0 2
Furthermore, the court underscored the fact that the length of sen-
tence can change considerably by the availability of parole and "good
time" credits.10  The court had previously held that "the availability of
91. Id.; Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 293-294, 103 S.Ct. 3001 (1983).
92. Hawkins, 200 F.3d at 1283.
93. 487 U.S. 815, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 101 L. Ed.2d 702 (1988).
94. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 101 L. Ed.2d 702 (1988). A
15-year-old participated in the brutal murder of his brother in law who had been beating his sister.
Id. at 816. The court convicted the boy of first degree murder and sentenced him to death. Id. On
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated the sentence stating that the imposition of the
death penalty against the defendant would violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause in the
Eighth amendment because of the boys age at the time of the offense. Id.
95. 348 N.C. 588, 502 S.E.2d 819 (1998).
96. Green, 348 N.C. at 609-610. "North Carolina is among the minority states that allow for
juvenile offenders to be transferred to adult criminal court for adjudication." See Wagman, supra
note 40, at 654. In State v. Green, Andre Green was arrested and convicted for raping a twenty-
three-year-old woman. See Green, 348 N.C. at 593-96. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that
the sentence was not contrary to societal standards of decency, the sentence was not disproportionate
to the crime committed, and that a mandatory life sentence was not cruel and/or unusual punishment.
Id. at 602-03. The court held that crime transcended the realm of crimes usually committed by
children and that because the court considered Green unamendable to treatment that an adult
sentence was the only appropriate remedy for the victim and the state. Id. at 610.
97. Green, 348 N.C. at 609-612.
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parole is relevant to determining whether the length of a sentence vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment"1°4 Mr. Hawkins had already finished his
sentences for the rape and sodomy convictions. 0 5 The court pointed out
that Mr. Hawkins would "serve a total of thirty-five years for all four
convictions combined, and would be eligible for parole in approximately
fifteen years."' 1 6 Furthermore, the court noted that the sentences met the
"permissible statutory range for the offenses he committed."'
10 7
The court concluded that, "in the light of Mr. Hawkins' crimes, the
Supreme Court's benchmarks, and the legislature's proper role in setting
sentencing ranges," that Mr. Hawkins' one hundred year sentence with
the possibility of parole was not grossly disproportionate to the four vio-
lent acts that he committed, nor did it violate "evolving standards of de-
cency" simply because the defendant was thirteen years old at the time of
the offense. 0
B. Other Circuits
Other circuits also deal with the proportionality issue in the context
of youthful defendants given statutorily mandated sentences. 19 In Harris
v. Wright,"10 the defendant was fifteen years old when he committed ag-
gravated first-degree murder and received that state's mandatory sen-
tence of life without parole."' The defendant argued that his sentence
was "grossly disproportionate" to a fifteen-year-old's limited culpability
for any crime. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that it had no
power to reverse the state legislature's decision on the matter. 113
In Rice v. Cooper, 114 the Seventh Circuit decided that life without pa-
role was not a disproportionate punishment for a sixteen-year-old men-
tally retarded boy who killed four people."15 Although the court stated
104. Id.
105. Hawkins, 200 F.3d at 1284.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1285.
109. See infra, notes 110-119.
110. 93 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 1996).
111. Harris, 93 F.3d at 581. The court stated that the sentence was consistent with the evolving
standards of decency and that at least twenty-one other states allowed life without parole sentences
to be mandatory imposed on fifteen year olds. Id. at 583-586.
112. Harris, 93 F.3d at 584.
113. Id.
114. 148 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 1998).
115. Rice, 148 F.3d at 747. The boy, who was encouraged by two friends, tossed a bottle of
gasoline into an apartment building. Id. at 749. "The bottle exploded setting a fire that killed four
residents of the building." Id. The boy was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to a
natural life in prison. Id. In upholding the sentence, the court examined the fact that the United States
Supreme Court had rejected the argument that mandatory life sentences, including mandatory life
without the possibility of parole, are unconstitutionally just because they prevent the consideration of
mitigating factors such as age. Id. at 752.
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that the defendant's youth argued for a lighter sentence, it found that the
statutorily mandated sentence of life without parole was not dispropor-
tionate to the crime. 116
Some circuits determined that the availability of parole should fore-
close proportionality review altogether, reasoning that any sentence less
than life without parole can never be "grossly disproportionate." 7 How-
ever, the Tenth Circuit refused to go that far." 8 It recognized the avail-
ability of parole as a relevant consideration but refused to make it a dis-
positive factor.' 19
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Hawkins is consistent with the recent
trend to treat juvenile criminals as adults. 20 Juvenile justice, as it is cur-
rently practiced, "imposes two significant costs on American youth."'
12'
First, the juvenile court itself no longer fulfills its promise of rehabilita-
tion. 22 Second, courts, corrections, and other youth serving agencies are
allowed to ignore the inherent youthfulness of many defenders now de-
fined as adults. 23 Thousands of fourteen and fifteen-year-olds are "re-
moved to criminal courts every year to be treated just like any other
adult." 24 Furthermore, "[t]he use of structured sentencing fundamentally
contradicts the basic premise of juvenile justice by making sentence
length proportional to the severity of the offense rather than basing court- , ,,125
outcomes on the characteristics and life problems of the offenders.
"The public's widespread and angry sentiment toward young of-
fenders has fueled the most recent demands for reforming the juvenile
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Organek, 65 F.3d 60, 63 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that the court
will not "engage in a proportionality analysis except in cases where the penalty imposed is death or
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole"); United States v. Lockhart, 58 F.3d 86, 89 (4th
Cir. 1995) (holding that "It is well settled that proportionality review is not appropriate for any
sentence less than life imprisonment without the possibility of parole) ; United States v. Meirovitz,
918 F. 2d 1376, 1381-82 (8th Cir. 1990) (The defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute
cocaine and possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute and sentenced to life without parole.
After conducting the three factor Solem analysis, the court concluded that the defendant's life
sentence without parole, although harsh, did not violate the proportionality requirement of the Eighth
amendment.).
118. Hawkins, 200 F.3d at 1284.
119. Id.
120. See infra notes 109-119.





125. Id. at 55. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). The dissent in this case
noted that merely because a state permits juveniles to be prosecuted as adults it does not necessarily
follow that the legislature deliberately concluded that it would be appropriate to impose capital
punishment on juveniles.
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justice system.,, 12' However, contrary to popular belief, juvenile crime is
not rising out of control. 127 The Bureau of Justice Statistics' National
Crime Victimization Survey indicates that, between 1993 and 1997, seri-
ous violence by juveniles dropped by thirty-three percent. 2 8 Although
incidences of violent juvenile crime continue to capture headlines, the
majority of juvenile court cases involve nonviolent property offenses.
129
The Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven-
tion reported in 1996 that only a fraction of youth are arrested for violent
crimes each year.1
30
Juvenile justice policies are cyclical in nature with polices "shaped
directly by changing social responses to juvenile crimes and rhetoric
about iuvenile delinquency, rather than by actual increases in criminal-
ity." 3 This vicious cycle of constantly changing juvenile justice policy
begins when officials and the general public believe that juvenile crime
is high, and the result is a shift towards harsher punishment. 32 A more
balanced approach to fighting juvenile crime than just treating juvenile
offenders like adults is needed. A more sensible approach is to incorpo-
rate both offender and offense-focused factors in accountability, public
safety, and competency development, while delivering appropriate con-
sequences for delinquent conduct and maintaining a focus on long-term
objectives for offenders. 133 This balanced approach improves the current
system by including restorative principles and, at the same time, pre-
serving the original intent of those who created a separate system for
children. 3 4 A restorative system allows for recognition "that violations
126. Coupet, supra note 16, at 1330.
127. Id.
128. Statistical Briefing Book. Online. Available.
http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/qal35.html.30 September 1999. Furthermore, "[tihe rate at which
juveniles committed aggravated assaults declined 33% between 1994 and 1995 and remained
relatively stable thereafter." Id. "The number of robberies by juveniles rose in 1981 and 1993, but by
1997, had dropped below the rates seen in the 1970's." Id.
129. Carol S. Stevenson et al., The Juvenile Court. Analysis and Recommendations, Future of
Children, Winter 1996, at 7 ("Although violent juvenile crime grab headlines, the bulk of the court's
delinquency work is in the handling of a large volume of crimes against property such as larceny,
vandalism, and motor vehicle theft.").
130. Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Combating
Violence and Delinquency: The National Juvenile Justice Action Plan 1 (1996). "Juveniles are
responsible for a far greater share of all property crime arrests (33 percent) than either violent crime
arrests (18 percent) or drug arrests (8 percent)." Id. "In 1993, the highest percentage of juvenile
arrest, compared to adults, was for arson (49 percent), vandalism (45 percent), and motor vehicle
theft (44 percent). Id.
131. Coupet, supra note 16, at 1328.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1341.
134. Id.at 1342.
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create obligations and these obligations are bilateral-the offender must
acknowledge and take responsibility to both victims and offenders.' 35
In fact, statistics have shown the failure of harsher punishments to
deter juvenile crime.' 36 For instance, a 1986 New York study found that,
for juveniles transferred to adult court at the onset, the likelihood of con-
tinued involvement in criminal activity once they were back on the
streets increased. 137 Furthermore, a study in Idaho concerning the deter-
rent effect of their transfer statute reached the conclusion that waivers to
adult court neither deter juvenile crime nor lower the rate of violent ju-
venile crime.' 38 Other research indicates that juveniles incarcerated with
adults may actually become more violent as a reaction to the violence
they regularly experience in prison.' 39 The transfer of juveniles to the
adult system is incapacitating a system already overwhelmed with too
many adult offenders. 140 Also, juveniles in adult prisons are more likely
to be victims of sexual assault, beatings by staff, and attacks with weap-
ons than those in juvenile centers.
141
Transferring juveniles to adult court appears to lack consistent de-
terrent effects, and incarcerating them seems equally ineffective. 42 Even
though the United States permits the execution of individuals for murders
committed as juveniles, 4 3 "the United States continues to have one of the
135. Id. at 1341. Restorative justice focuses on relationships as well as individuals with the aim
of justice on promoting the healing of and the relationships of the victims, community, and
offenders. Id.
136. See infra notes 135-139.
137. Candace Zierdt, The Little Engine That Arrived At The Wrong Station: How To Get
Juvenile Justice Back On The Right Track, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 401,422 (1999).
138. Id. at 423.
139. Id. at 426.
140. Id.at 423. This results in the need to build more prisons which is a cost absorbed by
society. See id. at 425. "In 1994, taxpayers spent an average of $23,000 per year to keep a person in
prison and approximately $70,000 per year to keep a prisoner in maximum security." Id. Because of
this "get tough" policy, "the United States has the highest rate of incarceration in the world with a
prison population growth rate that is ten times more likely that that of the general population." Id. at
424.
141. Zierdt supra note 137, at 423.
142. Id. at 421. See also Smallheer, supra note 1, at Fnl06 (noting that according to Juvenile
Justice Reform Initiatives in the States, from 1994-1996, studies confirm that juveniles transferred to
adult criminal court have higher recidivism rates than juvenile offenders retained in juvenile court
and that juveniles prosecuted as adults are more likely to re-enter society as criminals rather than as
rehabilitated than their cournter-parts retained in juvenile court). See also, Cathi J. Hunt, Juvenile
Sentencing. Effects of Recent Punitive Sentencing Legislation on Juvenile Offenders and a Proposal
for Sentencing in the Juvenile Court, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 621, 656 (1999) (discussing
additional studies that support the assertion that punitive legislative responses to juvenile offender
does not meet its deterrence goals). See also Forst and Bloomquist, supra note 14, at 362 (stating
that "[e]ven long periods of confinement in juvenile facilities are of questionable utility. Although
on a lesser scale than prisons, violence and intimidation also occur in training schools. Moreover, all
too often juvenile institutions simply warehouse youths.).
143. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding that the imposition of capital
punishment on any person who murders at 16 or 17 years of age does not violate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.).
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highest rates of adolescent homicides," which serves as "further proof
that even the most severe deterrence based reforms have failed to signifi-
cantly reduce juvenile criminal activity." 44 Although "transferring juve-
niles to the adult court system is the mostly widely used method of in-
creasing severity of sanctions for youth offenders," a more balanced ap-
proach is the use of blended sentencing.145 "Instead of choosing between
sentencing a juvenile in adult or juvenile court, a judge may draw upon
both systems."'
146
Typical sentence blending allows "a juvenile court judge to impose
both a juvenile disposition and a stayed adult criminal sentence upon a
conviction of a juvenile offender."' 47 "If the juvenile offender fails to
conform to the requirements of the juvenile disposition, the stay of the
adult criminal sentence may be revoked and the juvenile may be trans-
ferred to an adult correctional facility." 48 Sentence blending extends
juvenile court jurisdiction into criminal court and is designed to give the
juvenile a wake-up call and one last chance to change his criminal be-
havior. 149 Currently, in the juvenile justice system, the judge can either
retain the juvenile and in his discretion impose a mandatory minimum
sentence or even a more severe sentence, or he can transfer the juvenile
to adult court where the juvenile will be susceptible to adult sentencing
procedures.150 While the present choice offers judges an all-or-nothing
approach (juvenile court or adult court), sentence blending is an effort at
integrating rehabilitation with accountability.''"'
Eighth Amendment proportionality challenges brought by juveniles
against sentences, such as life without parole, have met "limited success
in state courts and no success in the federal system."' 152 Juveniles, who
144. Id.
145. Butts, supra note 121, at 54.
146. Id.
147. Smallheer, supra note 1 at 275.
148. Id.
149. David Holmstrom, Punishment Alone Fails to Contain Juvenile Crime, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Apr. 9, 1998. at 13.
150. See generally, Hunt, supra note 143.
151. Smallheer supra note 1, at 276.
152. Wayne A. Logan, Article. Proportionality and Punishment: Proposing Life Without
Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 684 (1998). See Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding a life without parole sentence of a 15-year-old convicted of aggravated first
degree murder); See also State v. Foley, 456 So. 2d 979 (La. 1984) (upholding a sentence of life
without parole at hard labor for a 15-year-old convicted of aggravated rape); State v. Moore, 906
P.2d 150, 153-54 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996) (noting that consideration must be given to the youth and
immaturity of the offender, but concluding that a term of 25 years to life imposed on a 14-year-old
for first degree murder of a police officer was not disproportionate); State v. Pilcher, 655 So. 2d 636,
642-43 (denying the challenge brought by a 15-year-old against a mandatory life without parole
sentence for two counts of murder, noting the age of the victim); Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546,
568 (7th Cir. 1995) (refusing to consider the age of the 15-year-old defendant in challenge to life
without parole sentence); State v. Spence, 367 A.2d 983, 989 (Del. 1976) (affirming sentence of life
without parole and stating that the defendant's youth is irrelevant); State v. Douglas, 216 Wis. 2d
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are at least sixteen years of age at the time of their crimes, can be sen-
tenced to the death penalty, and just short of that, juvenile offenders may
receive society's "penultimate punishment of life without parole."'
53
Traditionally, the justice system accorded special treatment to juve-
niles. 1 54 Thus, the judiciary should be sensitive to their youth, back-
ground and culpability when sentencing them as adults.15 A sentence
that is not "grossly disproportionate" for an adult may be so for a juve-
nile.1 56 It is a basic reality that juveniles differ from adults in fundamen-
tal ways. 157 Many young offenders have intellectual deficits, learning
problems or psychopathology.1 58 Juveniles are simply not as able to
make sound judgments concerning many decisions. 59 The National
Mental Health Association states that up to seventy percent of children in
the juvenile justice system suffer from mental or emotional disorders.'
6
0
Arguably, youth may commit crimes due to deficiencies in psychosocial
factors that adversely affect judgment which weakens the presumption of
autonomy, free will, and rational choice-all attributes which criminal
adult responsibility is based.16 1 Psychological and scientific data support
the idea that young children process information markedly differently
from adults.162 Furthermore, research indicates that children from under-
privileged backgrounds "have underdeveloped cognitive skills and are
more likely to adopt the inappropriate norms that they experience every-
day."' 163 Often mental health experts testify "that preadolescent children
114, 1997 WL 757701, at 4* (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)(denying proportionality claim of a 15-year-old
against a sentence that extended beyond his natural life, the court was not persuaded that based on
the petitioner's age alone, the parole eligibility date is excessive or constitutes cruel of unusual
punishment).
153. Logan, supra note 153, at 689.
154. See e.g. Smallheer, supra note 1: Oddo, supra note 2.
155. Logan, supra note 153, at 709.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 398 (1998) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing and
discussing studies done on juvenile death row inmates indicating high rates of psychological,
intellectual, and emotional disabilities). See generally Thomas Grisso, The Competence of
Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL"Y & LAW 3 (1997)(providing extensive
overview of relevant studies regarding a child's capacity). See, e.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S.
49, 54 (1962) (A 14 year old boy, no matter how sophisticated is unlikely to have any conception of
what will confront him).
159. Logan, supra note 152, at 709.
160. Holmstrom, supra note 149, at 12.
161. Cauffman, supra note 47, at 416.
162. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 157 (1997). A
recent study on the ability of juveniles to understand their privilege against self-incrimination found
that children aged 10 to 12 understood their rights no better than mentally retarded adults and
significantly less well than their 13 to 15 year old counterparts. See Grisso, supra note 158, at 12.
163. Bazelon, supra note 4, at 189. "[W]hile most preadolescents struggle to learn the
reasoning and analytical skills necessary to make moral choices meaningful.. children from
disadvantaged backgrounds tend to struggle harder, and with less success." Id. For instance, "in a
20001
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have a limited capacity to appreciate the irreversibility of their actions or
pinpoint why their behavior is criminal."'
' 64
Even the Supreme Court noted that "less culpability should attach to
a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed
by an adult."' 165 The Supreme Court also indicated that, because of the
special qualitative characteristics of juveniles, this justifies legislatures to
treat them differently from adults, which is relevant to Eighth Amend-
ment proportionality analysis. 1
66
The decision to commit a crime involves the consideration of po-
tential consequences, and most states enforce laws, such as the legal
drinking age, legal driving age, voting rights, and curfews "based on the
recognition that children do not possess the same decision-making ca-
pacity as adults."'' 67 "This legal recognition of a child's limited ability to
make informed decisions should apply with equal force to the way soci-
ety responds to children who have exercised that limited choice-making
faculty to commit a crime.' '168 Age, per se, should not be determinative
of proportionality because some juveniles are capable of moral culpabil-
ity.69 But age should be a trigger for heightened proportionality analysis,
"requiring a special vigilance" among courts with "respect to the back-
ground and traits of the young offender to ensure the presence of the
culpability prerequisite to the sentence of life without parole."'
170
study of fourteen juveniles on death row, twelve had been brutally abused physically and five had
been sodomized by older family members." Horowitz, supra note 56. at 157.
164. Bazelon, supra note 4, at 189.
165. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 854 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
167. Felcher, supra note 56, at 347-348. No state allows minors under age Eighteen to vote or
to sit on a jury. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 394 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Only
four states allow minors under Eighteen to marry without parental consent; only fourteen states
allow minors to consent to medical treatment; and forty-two states prevent minors from purchasing
pornographic material. See id. According to Justice Brennan, these restrictions placed on minors
reflect "the simple truth derived from communal experience that juveniles as a class have not the
level of maturation and responsibility that we presume in adults and consider desirable for full
participation in the rights and duties of modem." Id. at 395. See also, Horowitz, supra note 56
(discussing the failure of the criminal justice system to recognize the fundamental differences
distinguishing juveniles from adults and how that difference reduces culpability of juvenile
offenders).
168. Felcher, supra note 56, at 347-348.
169. Logan. supra note 152, at 723.
170. Id. See also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 853 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("Proportionality requires a nexus between the punishment imposed and the defendant's
blameworthiness."); see also Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 946 (Nev. 1989)("In deciding
whether the sentence [LWOP imposed on a 13-year-old] exceeds constitutional bounds it is
necessary to look at both age of the convict and at his probable mental state at the time of the
offense."). See also, Forst and Bloomquist, supra note 14, at 367 (stating that "age per se should be a
legally relevant variable in any consideration of capacity to violate the criminal law as well as
responsibility for criminal activity.").
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II. SENTENCING AND REDUCED CONFIDENTIALITY OF JUVENILE COURT
PROCEEDINGS AND RECORDS
A. Background
1. Right to Confidentiality
Based on the theory that juvenile court proceedings are not criminal
in nature, the courts established only basic procedural rights for juve-
niles.'17 Some decisions have broadened juveniles' due process rights, but
the Supreme Court has failed to grant juveniles constitutional protections
equivalent to those granted to adults. For instance, in In re Gault,
173
the court stated that the Constitution requires that fourteenth amendment
due process guarantees apply to juvenile proceedings. 174 Yet, the court
still maintained discretion in some other areas such as sentencing. 175
Judges could consider the juvenile's race, sex, home environment, and
other factors not considered in adult cases.
176
Although the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to an impartial
jury in all criminal prosecutions, 177 the Supreme Court also failed to
grant juveniles the constitutional right to jury trials. 78 In McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 79 the Court, in a plurality opinion, refused to extend the
juvenile due process rights established in Gault to include the right to a
171. Coupet, supra note 16, at 1314. The atmosphere and organization of the juvenile justice
system was intended to give an impression of concern. See Smallheer, supra note 1, at 265. The
focus was on acting in the best interest of the child-not obtaining convictions or adjudicating the
child guilty or innocent. See id. Because the court operated more like a social agency than a criminal
court and sought to rehabilitate the juvenile, constitutional protections were not deemed necessary.
See id.
172. Hunt, supra note 143, at 678. In Lanes v. State, 767 S.W.2d 789. 794 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989), the court summarized the Eighth main cases that explained juvenile ights: (1) protection
against coerced confessions, Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); (2) procedural requirements for
certification hearings, Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1966); (3) the fights of notice, counsel,
confrontation, cross-examination, and protection against self-incrimination, In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967); (4) proof beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winshop, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); (5) that a jury trial
is not required, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); (6) double jeopardy protections,
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); (7) the validity of pre-trial detention, Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253 (1984); and (8) a diminished Fourth Amendment standard applicable to school searches,
New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
173. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
174. Gault, 387 U.S. at 27-30.
175. David Dormont, For the Good of the Adult: An examination of the Constitutionality of
Using Prior Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1769, 1779-81
(1991).
176. Id. at 1780.
177. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). In Duncan, the Court held that the fight to
a jury trial in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice. Id.
178. Dormant, supra note 175, at 1780-1786 (discussing the right to jury trial as it applies to
adults and juveniles).
179. 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Sixteen-year-old McKiever was charged with robbery, larceny, and
receiving stolen goods. Id. at 534. The court denied his request for a jury trial at his adjudication
hearing. Id. at 535.
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jury trial. 80 Although the court recognized serious shortcomings in the
juvenile justice system, the Court emphasized that a jury is not necessary
for accurate fact-finding in the context of a juvenile proceeding and that
other procedural rights adequately protected the accused juvenile.' 8'
"Almost all juvenile court proceedings and records remained confi-
dential as recently as the 1960's.,,182 Confidentiality comprised a critical
part of the juvenile justice system based on the idea that labeling a "ju-
venile as a law violator would stigmatize a young person."'' 83 But during
the 1980's and 1990's, "support for confidentiality protections began to
erode." 184 Nearly all states now allow juvenile fingerprints to be included
in criminal history records and authorization of juveniles to be photo-
graphed for later identification. 85 "In addition, many states enacted laws
that required juvenile records to remain open longer or prevent the seal-
ing or destruction of juvenile records altogether, typically those involv-
ing violent or serious offenses."'
186
2. Use of Juvenile Records in Sentencing
"Some states have even passed laws enabling juvenile court records
to affect criminal court sentences." 87 At least twenty states allow for the
use of juvenile adjudications to enhance adult criminal sentences.
88
Thus, "adjudication in juvenile court begins to entail potentially serious
jeopardy for youth."'' 89 Laws or statutes that permit such practices allow
juvenile offense histories to serve as sufficient grounds for increasing
180. McKiever, 403 U.S. at 545.
181. Id. at 547.




186. Id. Since 1992, "several states have passed legislation that gives the general public and/or
media access to the name and address of a minor adjudicated delinquent for specified serious or
violent crimes." OJJDP Research Report: State Response to Serious and Violent Juvenile Crime,
p.75 (1996) " In all, 39 states permit the release of a juvenile's name and/or picture to the media or
general public under certain conditions." Id. "From 1992 through 1995, several states enacted or
modified their statutes with respect to notice to schools." Id. at 79. "As of 1995, 25 states had
statutes or court rules that either increase the number of years for which a serious and violent
offender's records must remain open or prohibit sealing or expungement of the record." Id. at 85.
See Oddo, supra note 2, at 115.
187. Butts, supra note 121, at 55.
188. Sara E. Kropf, Note: Overturning McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: The Unconstitutionality of
Using Prior Convictions to Enhance Adult Sentencing Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 87 GEO.
L.J. 2149, 2175 (1999).
189. Butts, supra note 121, at 55. For instance, Illinois and Indiana allow past juvenile offenses
to serve as sufficient grounds for increasing the lengths of sentences or imposing consecutive
sentences. Id. Furthermore, California, Louisiana, and Texas allow the use of juvenile adjudications
to serve as the first and second strikes against an adult offender. Id. Thus, in these states, a juvenile
offender with two prior juvenile court adjudications could face life in prison for a first appearance in
adult criminal court. Id.
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sentence length or imposing first and second "strikes" against an adult
offender.'90 Thus, an offender with two prior juvenile adjudications could
face life in prison for a first appearance in adult criminal court.
191
Despite the case law prohibiting the use of prior uncounseled con-
victions, federal courts must include prior juvenile adjudications in adult
sentencing calculations. 92 Federal courts generate their sentencing de-
terminations with guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission.' 9 The core of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(Guidelines) 194 is a sentencing table, consisting of forty-three base of-
fense levels and six criminal history categories, identifying the applicable
sentencing range for offenders. 95 According to the Guidelines, assign-
ment to the highest criminal history category, level VI, includes those
classified as career offenders. 96 Juvenile defendants, those Eighteen
years of age at the time of offense, who commit crimes of violence or
controlled substance offenses and have at least two similar prior felony
convictions, are then career offenders.197 The Guidelines treat prior sen-
tences, imposed in related cases, as one sentence for purposes of calcu-
lating the criminal history category. 198 Points are based on the length of
the sentence imposed for the prior sentence rather than on the severity or
nature of the offense. 199 The reason for enhancing sentences through this
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Robert E. Shepard, Trying Juveniles in Federal Court, 9 CRIM. JUST. 45, 47 (1994).
193. Paul M Winters, et al., Project: Twenty-Jburth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:
United States Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 1993-1994 Sentencing Guidelines, 83 GEO. L.J.
1229, 1229 (1995).
194. United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual section
Ch.l, Pt.A(4)(h) (1999) [hereinafter U.S.S.G]. The Guidelines are applicable to all offenses
committed on or after November 1, 1987. U.S.S.G. Ch.l, Pt.A(l). When a defendant is convicted in
federal court, the judge must impose a sentence based on the Guidelines in effect at defendant's
sentencing date. ld.at Section lB 1.11.
195. The vertical axis of the Sentencing Table is the base offense level. Id. at Ch.5, Pt. A. The
criminal history category constitutes the borizontal axis of the table. U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A. The judge
determines the appropriate category by totaling the number of criminal history points calculated in
the pre-sentencing report. Id. section 4A 1.1. The points start at zero and have no upper limit. Id. See
Sentencing Table. A defendant with 13 or more points have a criminal category of VI, regardless if
their point total is 14 or 43. Id. at Ch.3, Pt.A.
196. U.S.S.G. section 4BI.I.
197. Winters et al., supra note 192, at 1244.
198. U.S.S.G. section 4AI.2. In regards to offenses committed prior to age eighteen section
4A1.2(d) of the Guidelines reads: (1) If the defendant was convicted as an adult and received a
sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, add 3 points under section 4AI. l(b)
for each such sentence. (2) In any other case, (A) add 2 points under section 4A 1.1(b) for each adult
or juvenile sentence to confinement of at least sixty days of the defendant was released from such
confinement within five years of his commencement of the instant offense; (B) add I point under
section 4A1.l(c) for each adult or juvenile sentence imposed within five years of the defendant's
commencement of the instant offense not covered in (A). Id.
199. Id. at Sec. 4A 1.1. Three points are added for each prior sentence exceeding one year and a
month in length regardless of whether the prior offense was forgery, drug dealing, or murder. Id.
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method is because the Sentencing Commission "sought to punish recidi-
vism and to protect the public from future criminal behavior.
200
3. Use of Juvenile Records in Sentencing in the Tenth Circuit:
United States v. McKissick2 °1
a. Facts
On December 7, 1997, a shooting took place in the parking lot of a
nightclub in Oklahoma City.202 The police arrested Mr. McKissick and
Mr. Ziegler, the suspects, for discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle
shortly after the shooting.20 3 The police also found cocaine in Mr.
McKissick's car and cocaine on Mr. Ziegler.204 The trial court convicted
Mr. McKissick of being a felon in possession of firearm, possession of
crack cocaine with intent to distribute, and use of a firearm during, and in
relation to, a drug offense.20 5 The court convicted Mr. Ziegler of crack
cocaine possession.20 6 Both defendants appealed.20 7 In relation to the
sentencing of Mr. Ziegler, the court of appeals held that "prior state court
convictions of the defendant, tried as an adult for offenses occurring
when he was a juvenile, could be counted in determining applicability of
federal mandatory life sentence. 20 8
b. Sentencing
Mr. Ziegler contended that "the district court violated his rights to
equal protection under the law when it used Oklahoma drug convictions
both as predicates for the 21 U.S.C. Section 841(b)209 enhancement and
as convictions resulting in three criminal history points, each under
U.S.S.G. Section 4A1.2(d). 21 ° Mr. Ziegler argues that "he was treated
200. "A defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior is more culpable than a first
offender and thus deserving of greater punishment." Id. sec. 4A introductory commentary.
201. 204 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2000).
202. McKissick, 204 F.3d at 1287.





208. Id. at 1282.
209. Id. at 1300. See also 21 U.S.C. Section 841(b). 21 U.S.C. Section 841(b)(1)(A) requires a
mandatory life sentence if the defendant committed the instant offense "after two or more prior
convictions for a felony drug offense have become final." 21 U.S.C. Section 841(b)(l)(A).
210. McKissick, 204 F.3d at 1300; See also U.S.S.G. Section 4AI.2(d). For offenses committed
prior to the age of eighteen, if the defendant was convicted as an adult and received a sentence of
imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, add 3 points under Section 4Al.1(a) for each such
sentence. 4A1.2(d)(1). For any other case, (A) add 2 points under section 4A1.l(b) for each adult or
juvenile sentence to confinement of at least sixty days if the defendant was released from such
confinement within the five years of his commencement of the instant offense; (B) add I point under
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differently than similarly situated persons because some states do not
allow the unsealing of juvenile records, and the states differ on the ages
and crimes for which persons under eighteen can be prosecuted as
adults."21'
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the equal protection claim "under the
rational basis standard to determine whether the challenged sentence was
based on arbitrary distinction or upon a rational sentencing scheme. 21 2
In drug trafficking cases involving fifty grams or more of cocaine base,
21 U.S.C. Section 841(b)(1)(A) 2  requires a mandatory life sentence if
the defendant committed the instant offense after two or more prior con-
214victions for a felony drug offense have become final. Although
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(2) provides that juvenile status offenses are never
counted as a prior sentence, the statute requires three points to be added
if the defendant committed the prior offense to the age of eighteen and if
the defendant was convicted as an adult and received a sentence of im-
prisonment exceeding one year and one month.21 5
The Tenth Circuit concluded that "the use of Mr. Ziegler's felonies
as predicate offenses for the section 841 enhancement did not deprive
him of equal protection under the law. 216 The court looked at congres-
sional intent and concluded that Congress "left certain aspects of sen-
tence enhancement to the laws of the states and that the language of the
statute tied" the definition of the term felony to the state's clarification of
the crime as a felony."
217
The court looked at Mr. Ziegler's conviction as an adult for the two
Oklahoma felonies. 218 "Although states have different criteria for deter-
mining when a juvenile can be charged as an adult," the court stated that
the different criteria did not "render the sentencing scheme irrational any
more than relying on the state's various definitions of felonies., 21 9 The
court held that "Mr. Ziegler's assertion that similarly situated juveniles
might be treated differently because some states allow the unsealing of
section 4A1.1(c) for each adult or juvenile sentence imposed within five years of the defendant's
commencement of the instant offense not covered in (A). 4A1.2(d)(2).
211. McKissick, 204 F.3d. at 1301.
212. Id. at 1300; Chapman v. U.S., 500 U.S. 453, 465, III S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991).
213. See 21 U.S.C. Section 841 (b)(1)(A).
214. Id. at Section 841(b)(1)(A)(viii).
215. U.S.S.G. Section 4AI.2(c) and (d)(l).
216. McKissick, 204 F.3d at 1301.
217. Id. Congress requested the creation of the Sentencing Guidelines to prohibit the abuses and
biases occurring under the system of discretionary sentencing. Dormont, supra note 175. at 1771-
1772. Congress intended for the Guidelines to ensure that courts treat similarly situated defendants
the same. Id.
218. McKissick, 204 F.3d at 1301.
219. Id.
20001
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Like several other circuits, the Tenth Circuit accepted the constitu-
221
tionality of the sentence enhancement provisions without question.
Certain types of prior sentences are generally part of the defendant's
criminal history calculations, however, the circuit courts do not always
agree as to what constitutes an includable prior sentence. 222 In United
States v. Unger,223 the First Circuit ruled that uncounseled juvenile pro-
224ceedings count towards the criminal history scoring. In United States
v. Matthews, 225 the Second Circuit held that, because the state statute did
not eliminate all trace of the prior adjudication and allows consideration
of youthful offender adjudication in later proceedings, a youthful of-
fender adjudication in the state is not an "expunged" conviction for pur-
poses of sentencing under the Guidelines. Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the district court properly included the defendant's youthful
offender adjudication in calculating his criminal history category.
In United States v. Asburn,228 the Fifth Circuit held that a juvenile
conviction, automatically set aside under a state statute, properly re-
ceived the prior sentence designation. 229 Finally, in United States v. Bar-
220. Id.
221. See United States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282.
222. U.S.S.G. section 4A1.2(c). According to the Guidelines, sentences for offenses such as
hitchhiking, juvenile status offenses and truancy, loitering, minor traffic violations, public
intoxication, and vagrancy do not count towards criminal history scoring. Id. To work around these
constraints the Guidelines "place no caps on the number of points an adult may acquire from his
juvenile record." Dormont, supra note 171, at 1774.
223. 915 F.2d 759 (1st Cir. 1990). cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1104 (1991).
224. Unger, 915 F.2d at 761-62. Unger allegedly engaged in a variety of criminal conduct as a
juvenile, including breaking and entering, receiving stolen goods, and assault and battery. Id. at 763.
In failing to prove this conduct, the state could not convict Unger of these offenses, but instead
found him guilty of being wayward. Id. Two years later, an adult court judge used this wayward
finding to increase his criminal history score, imposing the maximum sentence. Id. at 760.
225. 205 F.3d 544 (2nd Cir. 2000).
226. Matthews, 205 F.3d at 548. The defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a
felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. Section 922(g)(1)(1994). Id. at 545. In calculating his sentence, the
lower court used the defendant's youthful criminal adjudications to magnify his sentence under the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Section 4A1., 4A1.2. Id.
227. Id. at 548-549.
228. 20 F.3d 1336 (5th Cir.), opinion reinstated in part on reh'g en bane, 38 F.3d 804 (1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1965 (1996).
229. Asburn, 20 F.3d at 1343. The defendant appealed the sentence given to him after he
pleaded guilty to 2 counts of bank robbery. Id. at 1337. The court held that the "set aside" provision
"should not be interpreted to be an expungement under 4A1.20j) in calculating the defendant's
criminal history category". Id. at 1343. The court reasoned that because the youth convictions had
been "set aside for reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of law" that they were properly used to
calculate the defendant's criminal history category. Id.
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ber,23° the Sixth Circuit upheld a sentence enhancement based on the
defendant's extensive criminal history dating back to the age of
twelve.23' The court accepted the government's contention that the de-
fendant's current criminal history category did not reflect the seriousness
of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that he would
commit other crimes, and thus the court granted the government's mo-
tion for upward departure in sentencing. 232
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit held, in United States v. Kozinski,
233
that a sentence of supervision not based on a finding of guilt received
improper consideration as a prior sentence. 34 Yet, in Nicholas v. United
235States, the Supreme Court allowed the use of a prior uncounseled mis-
demeanor conviction to enhance the sentence for a subsequent conviction
that did not, by itself, justify imprisonment. 236
These failed challenges to the constitutionality of the use of prior ju-
venile adjudications to enhance adult sentences illustrates that the courts
are resistant to limiting the harsh effects of punitive sentencing on young
offenders and unwilling to consider how the lack of procedural safe-
guards available to juveniles in juvenile courts harm convicted adult of-
237fenders with juvenile records.
5. Analysis
Although juveniles do not have the same due process rights that
adults receive," ' juvenile offense records are regularly used to lengthen
subsequent adult criminal sentences. 239 This trend appears to demand a
higher standard of due process rights, such as the right to a trial by
jury. 40 The McKiever court's decision to deny juveniles the right to a
230. 200 F.3d 908 (6th Cir. 2000).
231. Barber. 200 F.3d at 914. In addition to his adult record, the defendant had nine juvenile
convictions for which he was assessed no criminal history points. Id. at 909. The court held that the
offenses were properly considered as part of a recidivism inquiry and the sentence increase was
affirmed. Id. at 912.
232. Id. at 910.
233. 16 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 1994).
234. Kozinski, 16 F.3d at 812. The court held that the Sentencing Guidelines made clear that "a
prior sentence is any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt whether by guilty plea,
trial, or plea of nolo contendere." Id. at 911. (citing U.S.S.G. Section 4A1.2(a)(1).
235. 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
236. Nicholas, 114 S. Ct. at 1928. The court emphasized that "sentencing courts have not only
taken into consideration prior convictions, but also considered a defendant's past criminal behavior,
even if no conviction resulted from that conduct." Id.
237. See Hunt, supra note 142, at 658-669 (discussing implications for the future of the juvenile
justice system and the effects of recent punitive sentencing).
238. Butts, supra note 121, at 51.
239. Kay Redeker. Comment. Solidifing the Use of Juvenile Proceedings as Sentence
Enhancement and Clarifing Second-Degree Murder, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 483. 486 (1998).
240. Hunt, supra note 142, at 645. "The right to a jury trial allows gives offenders bargaining
power to discuss a plea agreement with prosecutors." furthermore "It may also be more difficult to
obtain the unanimous guilty verdict necessary for a jury to convict an offender that to convince a
200]
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jury trial was based on two assumptions: (1) "juvenile proceedings result
in treatment, not punishment," and (2) "juvenile proceedings will not
detrimentally affect the juvenile when she reaches the age of
majority., 24 ' These assumptions are not accounted for in the United
States Sentencing Guidelines.242 Thus, courts upholding the use of sec-
tion 4A1.2(d) base their decision on an erroneous understanding of the
"constitutional underpinnings that allow juveniles dispositions absent a
jury trial. '243 "If a sentence was imposed under the guise of therapy, it
should remain a therapeutic sentence; it should not be allowed to meta-
morphosize into a criminal conviction at the prosecution's
convenience." 24
Because juveniles do not have the same constitutional protections as
adults, arguably, juveniles convicted without a jury or represented by
counsel-unless the jury trial is validly waived-are unconstitutionally
245convicted. Therefore, using such juvenile convictions to enhance later
adult sentences under the Guidelines is called into question.246 The
Guidelines allow courts to use prior juvenile adjudications to enhance
adult sentences by adding points to a defendant's criminal history
score-treating juvenile confinements like adult sentences to the detri-
ment of the adult defendant.247 When juveniles may face additional con-
finement as an adult because of juvenile delinquency, then juveniles are
entitled to the same protection that juries provide to adults.-4 8 However,
commentary in the Guidelines and Supreme Court case law prohibit
courts from using prior unconstitutional adjudications to enhance later
sentences.249 So, if a prior juvenile adjudication is unconstitutional be-
single judge of an offender's guilt" which increases the likelihood that a juvenile will be found
guilty. id.
241. Dormont, supra note 175, at 1790. The McKiever court based its decision on the fact that a
finding of delinquency being significantly different from than a finding of criminal guilt. McKiever,
403 U.S. at 540. The court assumed that the juvenile delinquency proceeding would not stigmatize
the child a criminal. McKiever, 403 U.S. at 552. (White, J., concurring). See also Dormont. supra
note 175, at footnote 105.
242. Id. at 1791. See also U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d).
243. Dormont, supra note 175, at 1791.
244. Id. at 1794.
245. Kropf, supra note 188, at 2179. To deny juveniles due process rights, that ensures that
criminal trials are conducted fairly and that similarly situated defendants are afforded the same
constitutional protections, ignores the purpose and intent of the Due Process Clause and the Sixth
Amendment. Id. at 2180. "Failure to apply constitutional protections such as due process rights to
juvenile proceedings was justified under the 'legal fiction' of protective confinement and
rehabilitation instead of criminal punishment." Coupet supra note 16, at 1314.
246. Kropf, supra note 188, at 2179.
247. Dormont, supra note 175, at 1792.
248. Id. at 1795.
249. Kropf, supra note 188, at 2179.
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cause the juvenile did not receive fundamental due process rihts, then
under the Guidelines the court cannot 
use the prior conviction.
On the other hand, one could argue that "sentencing adults who
have a significant criminal history as first offenders is tantamount to of-
fering a double discount., 25  "[T]he offender received a discount at the
juvenile level (first juvenile offense) and should not be accorded a sec-
252ond completely fresh start. However, "juvenile priors should not carry
the same weight as adult previous convictions. '253 Perhaps a compromise
would be to use the juvenile record to disentitle an adult of first-offender
status-but not to extend its influence much more than that. 254 In fact,
many sentencing guideline systems do just that, namely, counting juve-
nile adjudications, but with strict limiting standards.
CONCLUSION
"The current juvenile justice system lacks a coherent and consistent
policy on how to deal with juveniles. 256 Although the Due Process
Clause attempts to ensure that criminal trials are fair and that similarly
situated defendants have the same constitutional rights, juveniles do not
257have the equivalent due process rights as adults. But due process issues
258in juvenile adjudications extend beyond the individual juvenile's trial.
When courts use the Sentencing Guidelines to enhance adult sentences,
the courts "unconstitutionally ignores the different protections afforded
the juveniles and the different policies that underpin the juvenile justice
system. 259
Historically, the law protected juveniles, but with a perceived in-
crease in juvenile crime rates and violent juvenile crimes, the prospect of
250. Id.
251. Julian V. Roberts, Article: The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process, 22
CRIME & JUST. 303, 326 (1997). "The importance of targeting repetitive violent offenders is clear
from the juvenile record provisions in many states." Id. at 330. According to a Bureau of Justice
Statistics study the presence of juvenile offenses was one of the most significant predictors of adult




255. Id. "The guidelines in Florida count all prior convictions but only if they occurred within a
three year period proceeding the commission of the primary offense." Id. "In Kansas, the age of the
offender is a determining factor" with juvenile adjudications extinguishing "once the adult reaches
twenty-five years of age." Id.
256. Leta R. Holden, Tenth Circuit Survey: Juvenile Law, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 843, 856
(1996).
257. Kropf, supra note 188, at 2180.
258. Id.
259. Dormont, supra note 175, at 1770. But see Mills, supra note 14 (arguing that (1) juveniles
have almost all of the constitutional protections given to adult criminals, (2) the Guidelines reinforce
the important goal of recidivism, and (3) by using juvenile crimes to enhance adult sentences, the
Guidelines realistically address the nature and increase of juvenile crime).
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260a uniform standard by which to treat juveniles seems unpromising.
However, the "get tough on crime" rhetoric has prompted reformers to
enact legislation that threatens to replace the juvenile justice system as a
forum for dealing with juvenile delinquents as adult criminals.26' Sen-
tencing policies, such as Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis in
juvenile cases and the expungement of juvenile records, "threaten to con-
structively dismantle the system that has protected juveniles" and valued
262rehabilitation over punishment. Perhaps in the future new efforts will
begin to reflect the original intent of the juvenile justice system-reha-
bilitation and reform, which are more effective than punishment.
263
Audrey Dupont
260. Bumstein, supra note 29, at 902.
261. Coupet, supra note 16, at 1346.
262. Id. Children are vulnerable to the effects of long sentences in adult prisons and will not





THE MISSING VOICE HERRING V. KEENAN: THE
NARROWING OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
In Herring v. Keenan,' the Tenth Circuit granted a probation officer
qualified immunity after the officer divulged a probationer's HIV posi-
tive status to both his employer and to his family.2 The court held that
although a probationer enjoys certain constitutional rights, including a
constitutional right to privacy, a probationer's right to privacy regarding
his HIV status was not a "clearly established" constitutional right at the
time of the disclosure.3
Throughout the 1990's, the Tenth Circuit's definition of "clearly
established" rights has been controversial. In Eastwood v. Department of
Corrections of the State of Oklahoma,4 the Tenth Circuit admitted that its
"definitions of what constitutes a clearly established right have been
hazy." 5 Specifically, in 1992, the Tenth Circuit drastically changed the
nature of its qualified immunity requirements in Medina v. City &
County of Denver.6 With suspect justification, the Medina court drasti-
cally narrowed the definition of what constitutes a "clearly established"
right by limiting the range of sources from which a "reasonable official"
would be expected to be acquainted with for the purpose of knowing
whether a certain right exists. According to Medina, for a right to be
"clearly established" such that a "reasonable official" would be expected
to know of its existence, there must be a United States "Supreme Court
decision or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established
weight of authority from other courts.",
7
From this very narrow conception of what defines a "clearly estab-
lished" right, the Tenth Circuit slowly broadened its scope to include the
holdings in other circuits. In 1997, the Tenth Circuit stated in Lawmaster
v. Ward 8 that a government official is not free from judgment simply
1. 218 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2000).
2. See id. at 1171-72.
3. See id. at 1173.
4. 846 F.2d 627 (10th Cir. 1988).
5. Id. at 630.
6. 960 F.2d 1493 (10th Cir. 1992).
7. Id. at 1498.
8. 125 F.3d 1341, 1350-51 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Supreme Court need not have
ruled the exact conduct at issue unlawful in order for a law to be "clearly established" and that rights
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because the Supreme Court has not ruled on a particular form of
conduct. 9
Further, in Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Systems, Inc.,"° the
Tenth Circuit qualified its Medina holding by stating that the purpose of
showing that a law is "clearly established" is to assure that an official
understands that his conduct violates a right. 1 Thus, the Anaya court
affirmed Lawmaster's broadening of the definition of "clearly estab-
lished" by redefining and expanding the scope of what a reasonable gov-
ernment official would and should know. 12 The court in Anaya held that
"the shield of qualified immunity is pierced if in light of pre-existing
law, the unlawfulness of the conduct is apparent to the officer."'
13
In a considerable regression in Herring, the Tenth Circuit took a
stricter stance on what constitutes a "clearly established" right than even
Medina.14 By granting the probation officer qualified immunity, the Her-
ring court stepped away from Lawmaster and Anaya's broadening of the
definition of what constitutes a "clearly established" right, and required
strict analogies between the government officer's conduct and conduct
previously deemed unlawful by the Supreme Court or by the Tenth Cir-
cuit.15
More importantly, the Herring court's narrow view did not account
for pertinent Supreme Court precedent that clearly established that both
prisoners' and probationers' constitutional rights cannot be violated
cannot be defined too narrowly or else qualified immunity will wrongfully become an
"insurmountable obstacle to plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their constitutional rights.").
9. Id. at 1350.
10. 195 F.3d 584 (10th Cir. 1999).
11. Id. at 594.
12. Id. at 594-95 (looking to other circuit precedent, Colorado Supreme Court precedent, and
the laws of civil forfeiture to determine whether a right was "clearly established" at the time the
official undertook the act in question).
13. Id. at 594 (quoting Lawmnaster, 125 F. 3d at 1350).
14. By holding that a right is "clearly established" when the Supreme Court, Tenth Circuit, or
the weight of authority from other courts have previously held the law to be as the plaintiff maintain,
the Herring court ignored the Anaya court's specific emphasis on the "weight of authority from other
courts" portion of the test and effectively focused only on the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit.
See Herring, 218 F.3d at 1176. Furthermore, the Herring court decided to define the right of privacy
in a probationer's HIV status very narrowly, thus requiring precise factual correspondence between
the case at bar and a case previously ruled upon in the Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit. See id. at
1179.
15. Id. at 1178 ("none of the cases discuss the question whether the right to privacy protects a
probationer who may be HIV positive from a limited disclosure by his or her probation officer to
persons whom the probation officer believed might be affected by their contact with the probationer.
The cases, therefore, did not clearly establish such a right in 1993.").
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without some justification relating to a legitimate penological or proba-
tionary objective. 16
The first section of Part I of this survey discusses the Supreme
Court's treatment of qualified immunity. The second section of Part I
analyzes the Tenth Circuit's treatment of the "clearly established" prong
of the qualified immunity determination. Part II reviews the Tenth Cir-
cuit's apparent backtrack in Herring and discusses how the Tenth Cir-
cuit's narrow treatment of qualified immunity overlooked Supreme Court
and circuit precedent that recognizes the existence of a probationer's
constitutional rights,' 7 an individual's right to privacy in his or her per-
sonal information, 18 and more specifically, an individual's right to pri-
vacy concerning his or her medical information.' 9 Part III examines the
Supreme Court cases that clearly establish the balancing test a court must
conduct to determine the constitutionality of a restriction on a proba-
tioner's constitutional rights. Part IV comments upon the Supreme Court
and circuit cases that "clearly establish" that Keenan's disclosure of Her-
ring's HIV status violated his constitutional right to privacy.20 Finally,
Part V explores the social ramifications of the Tenth Circuit's decision to
grant qualified immunity in the highly sensitive right to privacy area.
Further, Part V questions the implication of the Tenth Circuit's analysis
regarding the creation of new rights in the Tenth Circuit.
16. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that a court must determine the "rational
connection" between the infringement of a prisoner's constitutional rights and the existence of a
legitimate penological goal); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (holding that the
infringement of a probationer's rights is not "unlimited" and is justified only by a showing of the
"special needs" of the probation system).
17. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74 (holding that a probationer's retains constitutional rights, but
that these rights are limited as compared to an average citizen and that they may be infringed if
justified by the "special needs" of the probation system).
18. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1977) (recognizing that an individual has a right to
privacy concerning his or her interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and an individuals
interest in independently making personal decisions).
19. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3rd Cir. 1980)
(interpreting Whalen's dual privacy rights to include an individual's right to privacy in medical
records and medical information).
20. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-99 (recognizing that an individual has a right to privacy
concerning his or her interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and an individuals interest in
independently making personal decisions); Eastwood, 846 F.2d at 631 (holding that an individual
has a right to privacy that protects him or her from forced disclosure of his or her sexual history);
Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Eastwood, 846 F.2d at 631
and reiterating that the right to privacy in one's medical information was established in 1990); Harris
v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1513-14 (11 th Cir. 1991) (recognizing the existence of a constitutional
right to privacy and the "significant privacy interest" triggered by an individual's HIV information);
Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577 (interpreting Whalen's dual privacy rights to include an individual's
right to privacy in medical records and medical information).
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I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
A. Causes of Action Against Government Officials-§ 1983 and Bivens
Qualified immunity arises in situations where a government official
violates an individual's constitutional rights. In this situation, the quali-
fied immunity doctrine was developed to strike a balance between an
individual's interest in redress and society's interest in efficient govern-
ment. Individuals injured at the hands of the government have available
two avenues of redress. For violations by state or local government offi-
cials, the injured party may seek damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983.21 If a federal official violates an individual's rights directly under
the Constitution, the injured party may seek redress under the Supreme
Court's holding in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
22Bureau of Narcotics. In Bivens, the Court allowed an individual to state
23a cause of action directly under the Fourth Amendment. The Bivens
Court stated that "where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal
statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal
courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.,
24
As a result, Bivens stands for the right of an individual to sue a federal
officer for a constitutional violation directly under that portion of the
constitution that is alleged to be violated.25
B. Qualified Immunity in the Supreme Court-The Harlow Objective
Reasonableness Test
Through § 1983 and Bivens, an individual is entitled to state a cause
of action for virtually any infringement at the hand of a local, state, or
federal government actor.26 Because of qualified immunity, however, the
right to state a cause of action by no means guarantees vindication for the
27
vioaltion. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court defined the justi-
21. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an
act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
22. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
23. Id. at 397 ("Having concluded that the petitioner's complaint states a cause of action
under the Fourth Amendment, we hold that petitioner is entitled to recover money damages for any
injuries he has suffered as a result of the agents' violation of the Amendment.").
24. Id. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
25. Id. at 397.
26. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
27. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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fications for qualified immunity as a defense against government official
liability. According to Harlow, qualified immunity for government offi-
cials is necessary to strike the proper balance between the need to protect
the rights of individual citizens and the "need to protect officials who are
required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in en-
couraging the vigorous exercise of official authority. '28 According to
Harlow, the unfettered ability to sue the government carries with it
enormous social costs. 29 The Court believed that qualified immunity
would be a viable mechanism to reduce the burden on society caused by
insubstantial lawsuits.
30
Prior to Harlow, the Court refused to grant qualified immunity where
it could be shown that the official "knew or reasonably should have
known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility
would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiffl, or if he took the
action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitu-
tional rights or other injury .... In Harlow, the Court decided that the
subjective portion of the Wood qualified immunity standard was "incom-
patible" with the stated goal of qualified immunity-to terminate insub-
32stantial lawsuits prior to trial. Whether a government official acted with
malicious intent is typically a question of fact to be determined at trial
after time-consuming discovery and depositions.33 As a result, the Court
chose to eliminate the subjective element from the qualified immunity
standard and stated a new standard, "that government officials perform-
ing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known. 34 The Court stated:
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct, as
measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid exces-
sive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many in-
substantial claims on summary judgment. On summary judgment,
the judge may appropriately determine, not only the currently appli-
cable law, but whether the law was clearly established at the time an
action occurred. If the law at that time was not clearly established, an
official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent le-
28. id. at 807.
29. Id. at 814 (discussing such social costs to include the "expenses of litigation, the diversion
of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of
public office.").
30. Id.
31. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). Prior to Harlow, there was a subjective
element involved in determining whether an official knew that his conduct violated a "clearly
established" ight. Id.
32. Harlow. 457 U.S. at 815-16.
33. Id. at 816-17.
34. Id. at 818.
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gal developments, nor could be fairly be said to 'know' that the law
forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful.
35
C. Defining Harlow's Objective Reasonableness-Anderson v. Creigh-
ton
In Anderson v. Creighton,36 the Supreme Court shed light upon the
question of what a reasonable official is to be expected to know. A gov-
ernment official's ability to invoke qualified immunity turns on whether
that official's conduct was objectively reasonable "in light of the legal
rules that were 'clearly established' at the time it was taken. 37 The Court
stated that in order for the goals of qualified immunity to be met, the
"clearly established" rule must be defined "in a ... particularized, and
hence more relevant, sense ...... 38 The Court stated that if the legal rule
was defined generally, "[p]laintiffs would be able to convert the rule of
qualified immunity that our cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually
unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract
",39rights. Most importantly, the Anderson Court seemed to address an
issue that the Harlow Court left silent-how the circumstances under
which the current state of the law are to be determined. 40 Instead of de-
lineating a static list of courts upon whose decisions a reasonable gov-
ernment official should be knowledgeable, the Anderson Court held:
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This
is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity
unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but
it is to say that in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be ap-
parent.41
By the Anderson court holding that the very act in question need not
be deemed previously unlawful broadens the potential sources of legal
rights that a reasonable official must be aware. The Court simply re-
quired that the right be "apparent" from "pre-existing law," without an
further definition of the sources from which a law becomes "apparent.
The Anderson Court left only the negative assumption that even conduct
not previously deemed unlawful can be "clearly established" if "pre-
35. Id.
36. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
37. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639.
38. Id. at 640.
39. Id. at 639.
40. Id. at 640.




existing law" makes it sufficiently "apparent" that the conduct is unlaw-
ful.
43
D. Qualified Immunity in the Tenth Circuit
In order to show that a government official does not deserve quali-
fied immunity, the plaintiff must prove that (1) a constitutional right ex-
ists and was in fact violated, and (2) that the defendant's conduct vio-
lated a right that was "clearly established such that a reasonable person in
the defendant's position would have known the conduct violated the
right." 44 Unlike Anderson, the Tenth Circuit in Medina and again in Her-
ring severely limited the available sources of legal rights that a reason-
able official is expected to know.45 According to Medina and Herring, to
prove that a right was clearly established at the time of the alleged viola-
tion, "there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point,
or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have
found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.' 46
Between Medina and Herring, the Tenth Circuit modified its ap-
proach to be more in line with Anderson.47 In Lawmaster, the Tenth Cir-
cuit held, "[q]ualified immunity does not protect official conduct simply
because the Supreme Court has never held the exact conduct at issue
unlawful.' 48 Rather, the shield of qualified immunity is pierced if in light
of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness of the conduct is apparent to the
officer.' 49 Citing Franz v. Lytle,5° the Anaya court held that, "[i]n light of
this rationale underlying the qualified immunity doctrine, this court has
held, for example, that police did not enjoy qualified immunity where
there was not a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case directly on point,
43. Id.
44. Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Sys., Inc., 195 F.3d 584, 594 (10th Cir. 1999).
45. In Medina, the court held that in order for a fight to be clearly established, "there must be
a Supreme Court of Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority
from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains." Medina v. City &
County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992). Between 1992-2000, the Tenth Circuit
broadened the scope of their inquiry to recognize the existence of rights in the absence of a Supreme
Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point. See Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1350 (10th Cir.
1997). In Herring, the Tenth Circuit reverted back to Medina in their application of qualified
immunity by not recognizing the existence of a fight because neither the Supreme Court nor the
Tenth Circuit had previously ruled on the specific matter that was the subject of the case. See
Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir. 2000).
46. Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498; see also Herring, 195 F.3d at 1176 (holding that in order to
show that a fight is "clearly established," there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case on
point).
47. See e.g., Lawmaster, 125 F.3d at 1351 (holding that rights need to be defined with a
degree of generality to facilitate a plaintiff's attempt to show that the fight was "clearly
established"); Anaya, 195 F.3d at 594-95 (expanding the range of sources of the "clearly
established" inquiry beyond just the Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit).
48. Lawmaster, 125 F.3d at 1350.
49. Id.
50. 997 F.2d 784, 787-91 (10th Cir. 1993).
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and where, in fact, there was some contrary authority... from other cir-
cuits.'51 (emphasis added)
Likewise, in Franz, the Tenth Circuit denied a police officer's claim
of qualified immunity based on a search alleged to be in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 52 Despite the fact that no Supreme Court or Tenth
Circuit cases existed on point, the court denied qualified immunity
"based on the longstanding Fourth Amendment probable cause require-
ments and the officer's presumed familiarity therewith."53
When a government official seeks qualified immunity for an alleged
violation of an individual's constitutional rights,54 a court is typically
charged with the duty to employ a balancing test to weigh a government
official's need for freedom of action and an individual's constitutionally
protected rights; this is especially true when dealing with the rights of
prisoners and probationers. 55 The Tenth Circuit has previously ruled on
the determination of a "clearly established" right when a constitutional
balancing test is required. 56 On one hand, Medina stated that when a con-
stitutional deprivation must be determined by a balancing test, a court is
less likely to find the law clearly established.57 Since Medina, however,
the Tenth Circuit has uniformly held that qualified immunity can be
pierced if the officer should have known that the conduct at issue and the
purported governmental interest the official sought to further would not
survive a constitutional balancing test.
58
E. Tenth Circuit decisions
From 1992 through 2000, the Tenth Circuit has taken a circuitous
route to define the requirements of qualified immunity. 59 From Medina to
51. Lawmaster, 125 F.3d at 594.
52. Franz, 997 F.2d at 784.
53. Id. at 787-91.
54. As opposed to an individual's civil fights protected by 14 U.S.C. § 1983.
55. See e.g. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987) (holding that a court must determine the
"rational connection" between the infringement of a prisoner's constitutional rights and the existence
of a legitimate penological goal); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987) (holding that
the infringement of a probationer's fights is not "unlimited" and is justified only by a showing of the
"special needs" of the probation system).
56. See Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1249 (10th Cir. 1992) (claiming that qualified
immunity will be abrogated if it was sufficiently clear that Defendants should have known the
[governmental] interest would not survive a balancing inquiry.); see also Prager v. LaFaver, 180
F.3d 1185, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing that the balance in favor of plaintiff should have
been anticipated by officials and thus their qualified immunity was abrogated); see also Medina, 960
F.2d at 1498 (stating that "[c]onduct may be so egregious that a reasonable person would know it to
be unconstitutional even though it is judged by a balancing test.").
57. See Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498.
58. See infra note 56.
59. The Tenth Circuit has gone full circle in defining the scope of sources applicable to the
determination of a "clearly established" right. See discussion infra pp. 13-29.
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Herring, consistency has eluded the Tenth Circuit in its attempt to
"clearly establish" what constitutes a "clearly established" right. Before
analyzinz Medina, however, it is first important to discuss Stewart v.
Donges, the unsuspecting root of the Tenth Circuit's chaotic qualified
immunity jurisprudence.
1. Stewart v. Donges
In Stewart, the plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a
police officer for allegedly violating his rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments during the defendant's arrest of the plaintiff for
larceny.6' The plaintiff, Stewart, accused the officer of making "material
misrepresentations and omissions" on the affidavit that supported a war-
rant for the plaintiff's arrest.62 In response, the defendant officer claimed
that he was entitled to qualified immunity from suit because it was not
"clearly established" at the time of the alleged conduct that making such
omissions would violate that plaintiffs rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments.63
The Stewart court noted that the Supreme Court had previously found
that a police officer violates an individual's Fourth Amendment rights
when, in submitting an affidavit, knowingly makes a false statement or
makes a false statement in "reckless disregard of the truth."64 The Stew-
art court stated, however, that the Supreme Court failed to mention
whether this right extended to showings that a solice officer deliberately
or recklessly omitted material information. Despite the Supreme
Court's silence on the issue, the Stewart court looked to the rulings of the
other circuits in coming to the determination that the right did extend to
omissions, thereby holding that the right was "clearly established" at the
66time of the conduct at bar. In a side note, the court made the following
statement:
Our conclusion that the law was 'clearly established' does not neces-
sarily imply that it was frivolous for defendant to argue otherwise in
his interlocutory appeal. As long as there was no controlling Su-
preme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent at the time and it required an
extension of the holding in Franks to establish a duty of the defendant
not to withhold material information from the search warrant affida-
vit, we cannot necessarily say that an appeal arguing that the law was
60. 915 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1990).
61. Id. at 573.
62. Id.
63. ld. at 573,581.
64. Id. at 582 (referring to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 582-83.
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therefore not clearly established was 'frivolous," a 'sham,' or 'wholly
without merit.
67
In this statement, the Stewart court is simply noting situations where it
might be deemed "frivolous" for a defendant to claim that a law is not
"clearly established." If there is "controlling Supreme Court or Tenth
Circuit precedent at the time' 68 (emphasis added), then it might be
"frivolous" for a defendant to attempt to claim that the law is not "clearly
established." As discussed below, the court in Medina v. City and County
of Denver,69 extended this limited statement beyond its intended bounda-
ries b0 turning it into the determinative test of "clearly established"
rights.
2. Medina v. City and County of Denver
In Medina, the Tenth Circuit announced a rule that drastically al-
tered the way the court handled qualified immunity cases. 7' In Medina,
the plaintiff was hit while riding his bicycle by a stolen Cadillac engaged
72in a high-speed chase with the Denver Police Department. The district
court found that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
198373 because he could not produce enough evidence to show that the
Denver police "maintained a policy or course of conduct authorizing or
condoning reckless, high speed chases that was deliberately indifferent to
the rights of innocent bystanders. 74 The Tenth Circuit rejected the dis-
trict court's dismissal of the claim on these grounds and instead found
that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.75 In its review, the
Tenth Circuit court stated that the police officers were entitled to quali-
fied immunity because it was not "clearly established" at the time of the
accident that reckless behavior could trigger § 1983 liability, nor was it
apparent that police officers could be liable for injuries caused
indirectly.76
The Medina court held that in order for a right to be clearly estab-
lished, "there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on
point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts
67. Id. at 583 n.14.
68. Id.
69. 960 F.2d 1493 (10th Cir. 1992).
70. See id. at 1498 (stating that "[o]rdinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established,
there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight
of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.").
71. See Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498 (turning a single criterion from Stewart v. Donges for
determining whether a right is "clearly established" into the single determinative test).
72. Id. at 1494.
73. See infra note 21.





must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains., 77 In stating this
new proposition, the Medina court cited Stewart v. Donges,78 to justify
stepping into new qualified immunity territory. The court, however,
failed to explain how it made the leap from the holding in Stewart to its
unprecedented holding in Medina." Commentators believe that the
Medina court overstepped its bounds by turning Stewart's statement in-
tended to show when a defendant's claim is "frivolous" 80 into the af-
firmative "clearly established" requirement.81 One commentator wrote:
Citing Stewart for the proposition that a United States Supreme Court
or Tenth Circuit opinion is necessary, rather than sufficient, for clear
establishment is a classic example of fallacious converse logic in
Medina. Stewart states that such authority is a sufficient condition to
clearly establish a duty-not that it is a necessary condition. [citation
omitted] Moreover, Stewart discussed not what constituted clearly
established law, but what constituted a frivolous argument regarding
clearly established law.
82
Literally speaking, the Medina court placed a very strict limitation
on the qualified immunity analysis; a limitation which effectively stood
for the proposition that a law is not clearly established unless there is
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case, or the weight of authority of other
circuits on point. The Medina court merely paid lip service to the prior
standard, that the "alleged unlawfulness must be apparent in light of pre-
existing law ... [the] contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that
a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right., 83 Medina redefined the "reasonable official" aspect of the analysis
by drastically narrowing the scope of what a "reasonable official" is ex-
84pected to know. In a sweeping manner, Medina held that that if there is
no Supreme Court of Tenth Circuit case on point, a "reasonable official"
is not expected to possess knowledge of the contours of the right.85 There
are many scenarios where a government official knows that certain con-
77. Id. at 1498.
78. 915 F.2d at 582-83 (stating that "[o]ur conclusion that the law was 'clearly established'
does not necessarily imply that it was frivolous for the defendant to argue otherwise in his
interlocutory appeal. As long as there was not controlling Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent
at the time and it required an extension of the holding in Franks to establish a duty on behalf of the
defendant ... we cannot necessarily say that an appeal arguing that the law was therefore not clearly
established was 'frivolous."').
79. In relying on Stewart to support its holding, the Medina court takes Stewart totally out of
context and transforms a single factor in determining whether a law is "clearly established" into the
definitive test for the Tenth Circuit. Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498.
80. Stewart, 915 F.2d at 583; see also discussion infra Part I.E. I.
81. Heather Meeker, Article: "Clearly Established" Law in Qualified Immunity Analysis for
Civil Rights Actions in the Tenth Circuit, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 79 (1995).
82. Id. at 113; see also Stewart, 915 F.2d at 583 (citation omitted).
83. Medina, 960 F.2d at 1497.
84. Id. at 1498.
85. Id.
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duct would violate another's constitutional rights where that particular
conduct has not been the subject of a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit
case. In the face of the new Medina standard, however, these scenarios
are kept out of the court's view.
3. Lawmaster v. Ward
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Lawmaster v. Ward86 is a prime
example of the court's disapproval of the narrow qualified immunity
requirements set forth in Medina. While many of the post-Medina quali-
fied immunity decisions mention Medina's main holding, they seem to
treat it not as the end-all-be-all requirement, but as one of the many fac-
tors of consideration.
87
In Lawmaster, the plaintiff sued several agents from the United
States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for their conduct during
a search of his home.88 After a confidential informant advised the agents
that the plaintiff owned an illegal automatic machine gun, the agents
submitted an affidavit and received a warrant to search the plaintiff's
home.89 The plaintiff alleged that the agents ransacked his home, and
conducted their search in an unreasonable manner in violation of his
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.90 Specifically, the plaintiff claimed
that he came home to find one of his pistols "submerged in the dog's
water bowl" and cigarette ashes "mixed in with the bedding which had
been stripped from the bed and left in a pile on the floor."9 1 The District
Court granted the agents qualified immunity from suit and consequently
92granted them summary judgment. The Lawmaster court reversed the
district court's decision to grant qualified immunity on the Fourth
Amendment claim of unreasonable conduct during the search of the
plaintiff's home.93 The court first discussed the rationale behind qualified
immunity:
86. 125 F.3d 1341
87. The post-Medina decisions seem to lend credence to the claim that Medina misconstrued
the holding in Stewart v. Donges by turning a single factor of consideration into the circuit's
determinative test. Lawmnaster emphasizes that a law may be "clearly established" even if neither
the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit had previously ruled on the particular action. See
Lawmaster, 125 F.3d at 1350. Further, in Anava, the Tenth Circuit analyzes several sources besides
Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit cases in their determination of whether a right is "clearly
established." See Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Sys., Inc., 195 F.3d 584, 594-95 (10th Cir.
1999).
88. Lawnaster, 125 F.3d at 1344.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1345-46.
91. Id. at 1346.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1351.
[Vol. 78:2
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Qualified immunity serves the public by striking a balance between
compensating those who have been injured by official conduct and
protecting government's ability to perform its traditional functions.
Qualified immunity mitigates costs that society as a whole otherwise
bear such as the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy
from important public issues, and the deterrence of talented citizens
from accepting public office.
9 4
In defining a "clearly established" right, the Lawmaster court stated a
new and broader way to look at the "clearly established" requirement.
95
The new guideline did not necessarily broaden Medina's "Supreme
Court and Tenth Circuit" limitation, 96 but it did expand upon the range of
Supreme Court, Tenth Circuit and other circuit cases the Tenth Circuit
was willing to consider in its determination of whether the right was
"clearly established." 97 The court stated:
However, where the reasonableness inquiry necessarily turns on the
cases' particular facts such that the reasonableness determination
must be made on an ad hoc basis, we must allow some degree of gen-
erality in the contours of the constitutional right at issue. We would
be placing an impracticable burden on the plaintiff if we required
them to cite to a factually identical case before determining they
showed the law was 'clearly established' and cleared the qualified
immunity hurdle ... [w]hile qualified immunity was meant to protect
officials performing discretionary duties, it should not present an in-
surmountable obstacle to plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their consti-
tutional rights.
98
In line with this rationale, the Lawmaster court did not grant the
agents qualified immunity even though there were no decisions expressly
prohibiting the conduct at issue. 99 The court ruled that the general princi-
ples of the Fourth Amendment; the preservation of the sanctity of the
home and that while conducting searches, officers may only engage in
conduct that reasonably furthers the purpose of the search, were in fact
clearly established. 0 0 Unlike Medina, Lawmaster stood for the principal
that "[q]ualified immunity does not protect official conduct simply be-
cause the Supreme Court has never held the exact conduct at issue un-
94. id. at 1347.
95. Id. at 1351 (discussing that in order for a plaintiff to have any chance to overcome the
officer's qualified immunity defense, the right in question must be defined with "some degree of
generality," so that the plaintiff does not face an "insurmountable burden" proving the fight to be
"clearly established").
96. Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498.
97. Lawmaster, 125 F.3d at 1351.
98. Id. at 1351.
99. Id.
100. Id. Generally, the Fourth Amendment grants individuals the right to be "free from
unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 1347.
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lawful."'' Rather, the court retreated from Medina's narrow survey of
Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit cases in favor of a broader test of what
constitutes "clearly established."' 10 2 The court stated, "the test here is
whether the law is sufficiently well-defined such that a 'reasonable offi-
cial would understand that what he is doing violates that right."" 3
4. Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Systems, Inc.l°4
In 1999, the Tenth Circuit in Anaya reiterated the holding of
Medina, but did so with new emphasis on the second prong of Medina's
analysis. 0 5 The court held: "Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly
established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on
point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts"~~ • • ,106
must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains." The Anaya
court's analysis of the qualified immunity issue at bar clearly demon-
strated its rationale behind adding italics to the Medina test. 0 7 As op-
posed to Medina, the Anaya court sought to re-formulate the definition of
the "clearly established" right requirement to encompass rights beyond
the limits of the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit. First, the Anaya
court mentioned that the Tenth Circuit had, on prior occasion, ruled that
a right was "clearly established" where the Supreme Court and the Tenth
Circuit had never before ruled on the issue.'°9 Second, the court surveyed
the decisions of six circuit courts that had ruled on the issue."0 Third, the
court noted that the Colorado Supreme Court had specifically ruled on
the issue at hand."' Finally, the court thought it was also instructive to
look to the law of civil forfeitures in determining whether the right was
"clearly established" at the time of the conduct at issue."l 2 In coming to
101. Id. at 1350.
102. Id. at 1351.
103. Id. at 1351.
104. 195 F.3d 584 (10th Cir. 1999).
105. Id. at 594 (quoting Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498).
106. Id. (citing the exact holding of Medina. but adding italics to the entire second half of the
"clearly established" lam requirement).
107. After specifically adding emphasis to the second half of the Medina test, the Anaya court
found that the right to be free from civil seizures without probable cause "to believe that a person
was a danger to himself or others" was "clearly established" by the combination of other circuit
precedent, Colorado Supreme Court precedent, and the law of civil forfeitures. Id. at 594-95.
Looking at the Anaya court's analysis, it is clear that they intended to broaden the range of sources
from which a court may find a right to be "clearly established."
108. Id. at 594-95.
109. Id. at 594 (discussing the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Franz v. LVtle that Supreme Court or
Tenth Circuit precedent are not absolute preconditions to a finding that a right is "clearly
established).
110. Id.




the decision that the right at issue was "clearly established," the Anaya
court held:
In light of the clear authority that existed prior to 1995, and in light of
the laws of seizure the police officers should be expected to know, we
hold it was clearly established in 1995 that civil seizures without
probable cause to believe a person was a danger to himself or others
violated the Fourth Amendment. The defendants in their individual
capacities are not protected by qualified immunity.
113
The court's analysis clearly displays their intention to broaden the
scope of what a "reasonable official" must know in order to properly
claim the protection of qualified immunity. 14 In contrast, under a
Medina analysis, if a particular right was not specifically delineated by a
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case, whether or not a reasonable official
knew or should have known that his conduct violated a particular right
was immaterial.' 15 Despite Medina's assertion that "the clearly estab-
lished weight of authority from other courts"" 6 can be determinative of a
law's "clearly established" status, commentators disagree with the reality
of this contention.' 7 The clear intent of the Anaya court was to redefine
and broaden the scope of the Tenth Circuit's "clearly established" in-
quiry.1 18 By italicizing the second portion of the Medina requirement, 119
and by reasserting a broader sense of the "reasonable official" test,'20 the
Anaya court followed Lawmaster and continued to broaden what consti-
tutes a "reasonable official" in the Tenth Circuit's qualified immunity
jurisprudence.
5. Prager v. LaFaver 12
In 1999, the Tenth Circuit supported a somewhat different "clearly
established" standard for rights found under a constitutional balancing
test. 22 For example, if a plaintiff makes a claim that a government offi-cial violated his First Amendment right of free speech, a court will en-
113. Id. at 595 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 594-95.
115. Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498.
116. Id.
117. See e.g. Meeker, supra note 24, at 116 (stating "[flinally, there is the law of other circuits.
The pivotal question is what type and what amount of extra-circuit authority, under the rubric of
Medina, comprise clearly established law. The answer to this question is at best complex and at
worst nonexistent. The Tenth Circuit has been quite inconsistent in its treatment of extra-judicial
authority to clearly establish rights.").
118. Anaya, 195 F.3d 594-95.
119. Id. at 594.
120. Id. at 594-95.
121. 180 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1999).
122. Id. at 1191-92.
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gage in a Pickering123 balancing test to determine whether his right was
abridged.124 Likewise, if a prisoner alleges that a government official
deprived him of his constitutional rights while incarcerated, the court
will engage in "rational connection" balancing test to determine whether
the deprivation was justified by a legitimate and neutral penological ob-
jective.125 Because rights that find their definition in constitutional bal-
ancing inquiries are, by their nature, more difficult to clearly foresee,
Prager recognized a need to allow more leeway to government officials
in this setting.126 The court stated, "[n]evertheless, 'to the extent that
courts in analogous (but not necessarily factually identical) cases have
struck the necessary balance, government officials will be deemed 'on
notice. '"1 27 The Tenth Circuit produced similar holdings in several other
cases throughout the 1990,s.128
II. HERRING V. KEENAN: BACK TO MEDINA AND BEYOND
In September 2000, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Herring v.
Keenan129 ignored the recent trend of Lawmaster and Anaya and reinvig-
orated the narrowness of Medina.'30 The decision arguably went a step
beyond Medina in its narrow approach to the "clearly established" right
inquiry and turned its back on the qualified immunity doctrine created by
the circuit since Medina.
131
123. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High School Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968)
(creating a balancing test for the determination of a public employee's First Amendment rights).
124. In Pickering, in determining whether the state had violated the teacher's First Amendment
right to free speech, the Court balanced the interests of the state as an employer promoting the
efficiency of "the public services that it performs through its employees" and the interests of the
teacher as a citizen commenting upon matters of public concern. See id. at 568.
125. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987) (holding that a court must determine the
"reasonable relation" between the infringement of a prisoner's constitutional ights and the existence
of a legitimate penological goal).
126. Prager, 180 F.3d at 1191 (stating the qualified immunity test, where there is a balancing
test involved, requires that a government official know where courts have "struck the necessary
balance" in cases that are factually analogous, but not requiring strict factual adherence).
127. Id. at 1191-92.
128. Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498 (holding that "[c]onduct may be so egregious that a reasonable
person would know it to be unconstitutional even though it is judged by a balancing test."); see also
See Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that qualified immunity
will be abrogated if it was "sufficiently clear that Defendants should have known the [governmental]
interest would not survive a balancing inquiry.").
129. 218 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2000).
130. By defining the right in question with utter particularity, Herring ignored Lawmaster's
notion that rights need to be defined with a degree of generality. Id. at 1179. Furthermore, by
focusing only upon Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit cases, Herring disregarded Anaya's analysis
that included sources outside the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit. See id. at 1176.
131. See infra note 119.
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
A. Facts
In September of 1993, Mr. Herring began serving probation under
the supervision of probation officer Ms. Keenan following his conviction
for driving while intoxicated on federal property.'32 In December, in ac-
cordance with the terms of his probation, Herring met with Keenan.
During the meeting, Herring voluntarily told Keenan that he had been
tested for HIV and that he suspected that he would test positive., 31 It is
undisputed that Herring had not received the results of the test prior to
this meeting nor did he at any time after the meeting inform Keenan of
the final results of the test. 134 Additionally, Herring did not authorize
Keenan to disclose this information.
35
Without knowledge of the results of the test and without any authori-
zation to disclose any such information, Keenan immediately informed
Herring's employer, the manager of the 50's Caf6 at the Lowry Air Force
Base Recreation Center, that Herring was in fact HIV positive.136 (em-
phasis added) Further, Keenan advised the manager to fire Herring from
his position as a waiter. 137 Directly thereafter, Keenan telephoned Her-
ring's sister and informed her that her brother in fact tested positive for
HIV. 138 On January 10, 1994, Keenan informed the acting director of the
50's Caf6 that Herring was HIV positive.139 She further told the acting
director that Herring should be fired "because she believed that Colorado
law prohibited a person who has tested as HIV positive from working in
a food preparation position." 4° Herring's complaint, amongst other alle-
gations, charged that Keenan's unauthorized disclosure of his HIV status
was in direct violation of her own internal probation department guide-
lines.' 4' The Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures provides:
Officers should not disclose HIV infection or illness information to
the offender's family members, parents, or sexual/drug partners with-
out the offender's informed, written consent. If the offender will not
consent to disclosure and State law permits non-consensual disclosure
to public health officials, the officer should notify such officials ...
Officers should seek written, informed consent of the offender before
132. Id. at 1173.






139. Herring, 218 F.3dat 1173.
140. Id.
141. Id ("The complaint also alleges that: Defendants' conduct was in blatant violation of
Volume X, Sec. 16 D and F of the Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures which provides that
probation officers 'should not disclose HIV infection or illness information to the offender's family
members, parents, or sexual/drug partners without the offender's informed, written consent' and that
'notification of other third parties is the responsibility of the exposed person."').
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making further disclosure when information concerning a individual's
HIV antibody test ... is disclosed to the officer by a third party or by
the offender. 142
B. Disposition
Herring brought suit in the district court alleging that Keenan vio-
lated his federal constitutional right to privacy and his statutory right to
non-disclosure of a record pursuant to the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §
552(b), 143 by divulging to his employer and sister his alleged HIV posi-
tive status. 44 Herring died seven months after filing the initial
complaint. 4 5 Herring's sister took the role of her brother's personal rep-
resentative and subsequently filed a second amended complaint alleging
that Keenan's disclosures "violated Herring's constitutional right to pri-
vacy, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, and deprived Herring of his liberty without due process of
law in violation of the Fifth Amendment."' 146 Keenan filed a motion to
dismiss the second amended complaint alleging that she was entitled to
qualified immunity. 47 The District Court submitted Keenan's motion to
a magistrate judge for an opinion whether Keenan's conduct had violated
"clearly established" law. 148 The magistrate judge recommended that
Keenan's motion to dismiss be granted. 49 The magistrate judge based his
decision on the opinion that the "contours of the right of privacy" of a
probationer's HIV status were not "sufficiently clear" because "[n]o de-
cision of the United States Supreme Court or the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ha[d] specifically considered the parame-
ters of the constitutional right to privacy in the context of the limited
governmental disclosure of one's HIV status."1 50 Despite the magistrate
judge's recormnendation, the District Court rejected Keenan's motion to
dismiss. 5 1 The District Court ruled that Keenan's actions were clearly
not supported by a compelling governmental interest due to the fact that
her actions directly violated the written guidelines for probation
142. UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROBATION
ADMINISTRATION, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, vol. X, ch. IV, § 16, D, F
(requiring that probation officers receive written consent prior to any disclosure of a probationer's
HIV status).
143. Section 552(b)(6) disallows the disclosure of "personnel and medical files and similar
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,"
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000).
144. Herring, 218 F.3dat 1173.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1173-74.
147. Id. at 1174.
148. Id.
149. Id.




officers. 152 Moreover, relying on two prior Tenth Circuit opinions, the
District Court held that "the contours of the constitutional right to pri-
vacy as it relates to dissemination of one's actual or potential HIV status
,0153were clearly established in late 1993. The Tenth Circuit agreed with
the District Court that there is a constitutional right to privacy that pro-
tects an individual from the nonconsensual disclosure of information
pertaining to a person's health. 154 The court, however, reversed the Dis-
trict Court's denial of Keenan's qualified immunity claim. 155 The court
claimed that the right to privacy of a probationer regarding information
concerning his or her medical condition was not "clearly established" at
the time of Keenan's disclosure in 1993.156
The court started its inquiry by recognizing that the Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that there exists a constitutional right to privacy re-
garding the non-disclosure of personal information.' The court also
cited Eastwood, the decision relied upon by the District Court in its de-
termination that the probationer's right to privacy in his HIV status was
"clearly established," for the more limited proposition that a constitu-
tional right to privacy in the non-disclosure of personal information ex-
ists. 58 After determining that a constitutional right to privacy exists,
159
the court then turned its attention to the "clearly established" requirement
of the qualified immunity claim. 160
The court proceeded to state that the "plaintiff need not demonstrate
that the specific conduct in this case had been previously held unlawful,
so long as the unlawfulness was 'apparent.,' 6' This statement, however,
152. Id.
153. Id. The District Court held that the Tenth Circuit had, prior to 1993. established that an
individual's constitutional right to privacy is "implicated when an individual is forced to disclose
information regarding personal sexual matters." Eastwood v. Dep't of Corrections of the State of
Oklahoma. 846 F.2d 627, 631 (10th Cir. 1988). The District court further found that that Tenth
Circuit had recognized that employee medical records, which may contain intimate facts are entitled
to privacy protection. Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1994).
154. Herring, 218F.3dat 1175.
155. Id. at 1180-81.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1175 (citing the Supreme Court's decision in Whalen v. Roe. 429 U.S. 589 (1977),
as establishing two rights of privacy. First, an individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and second, the interest in being independent when making certain kinds of
personal decisions).
158. Id. (limiting the holding in Eastwood to a general right to privacy in the non-disclosure of
personal information).
159. Id. (stating that "[tihis circuit, however, has repeatedly interpreted the Supreme Court's
decision in Whalen v. Roe as creating a'right to privacy in the non-disclosure of personal
information.").
160. Id. at 1175-76.
161. Id. at 1176.
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was not in accordance with the standard the court applied. 62 In the very
next sentence, the Herring court cited the holding in Anaya, without any
reference to the special emphasis the Anaya court placed on the "propo-
sition is supported by the weight of authority from other courts seg-
ment of the test. 164 In effect, the Herring court disregarded the intention
of the Anaya holding and reverted back to Medina. Furthermore, the
Herring court ignored its own statement in which they purported that
factual adherence to a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision was not a
necessary precondition to qualified immunity. 165 While stating that
"some but not precise factual correspondence" is required for a right to
be clearly established, the court went on to require strict factual adher-
ence. The court stated:
Thus, while Eastwood, Lankford, and Mangels indicate that under
some circumstances, a release of information regarding a person by a
government officer may violate a constitutionally protected right to
privacy, none of the cases discuss the question whether the right to
privacy protects a probationer who may be HIV positive from a lim-
ited disclosure by his or her probation officer to persons whom the
probation officer believed might be affected by their contact with the
probationer. The cases, therefore, did not clearly establish such a
right in 1993.166
In Anderson v. Creighton,'67 the Supreme Court required that the
right being questioned be defined with some degree of particularity so
that its' contours are clear enough that a "reasonable official would un-
derstand that what he is doing violates that right."'1 68 In Lawmaster v.
Ward,169 however, the Tenth Circuit limited necessary the degree of par-
ticularity. 170 The court in Lawmaster held:
However, where the reasonableness inquiry necessarily turns on the
cases' particular facts such that the reasonableness determination
must be made on an ad hoc basis, we must allow some degree of gen-
erality in the contours of the constitutional right at issue. We would
be placing an impracticable burden on plaintiffs if we required them
to cite to a factually identical case before determining they showed
the law was 'clearly established' and cleared the qualified immunity
162. See infra, note 157. The Anaya court mentioned that the specific conduct at issue need
not be previously deemed unlawful but proceeded to search amongst the Supreme Court and the
Tenth Circuit for cases factually identical to the case at bar.
163. Anava, 195 F.3d at 594.
164. Herring, 218 F.3d at 1176 (placing the second half of the qualified immunity in italics to
emphasize that the inquiry needs to extend beyond just the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit).
165. Id. at 1176.
166. Id. at 1178-9 (emphasis added).
167. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
168. Id. at 639.
169. 125 F.3d 1341 (10th Cir. 1997).
170. Id. at 1351.
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hurdle ... While qualified immunity was meant to protect officials
performing discretionary duties, it should not present an insurmount-
able obstacle to plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their constitutional
rights.1 7 '
If a plaintiff were required to show that the exact factual scenario
had previously been held unlawful to defeat the defendant's qualified
immunity defense, Harlow's balance 172 would be summarily defeated.
For example, Anderson required a plaintiff to state the right with more
particularity than "the defendant violated my 14 h Amendment Due Proc-
ess rights,"' 173 while Harlow and Lawmaster emphasize a plaintiff's need
to vindicate constitutional violations and a plaintiffs inability to do so if
rights are defined too narrowly. 174 In Herring, the Tenth Circuit required
precise factual correspondence between the right alleged to be violated
and a right that had previously been judicially vindicated. 75 In the proc-
ess, Herring violated its own precedent in Lawmaster176 and severely
disregarded Harlow's balancing strictures. 77 In essence, the court held
that because the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have not specifi-
cally ruled on this precise factual scenario, the right was not clearly es-
tablished. 178 Even though the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit, and the
weight of authority from other courts clearly indicated that a government
official's public release of personal information regarding a person may
violate a constitutionally protected right to privacy, the court failed to
classify the right as "clearly established" because the cases did not in-
clude the specific factual combination of probationer, probation officer,
and HIV positive status.'
79
III. TURNER V. SAFLEY 180 AND GRIFFIN V. WISCONSIN:' 8' THE RIGHT
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED
The United States Supreme Court, in Turner v. Safley established
the rule that the charged government official must show that the in-
fringement of a prisoner's constitutional right is "reasonably related" to a
171. Id.
172. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1981) (holding that thc rationale behind the
qualified immunity doctrine is striking a balance between a citizen's interest in vindicating
violations of his or her constitutional rights and the government's interest in effective and efficient
governance).
173. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639.
174. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814; see also Lawmaster, 125 F.3d at 1351.
175. Herring, 218 F.3d at 1178-79.
176. Lawmaster v. Ward. 125 F.3d 1341, 1350-51 (10th Cir. 1997).
177. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
178. See infra, note 157.
179. Id.
180. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
181. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
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legitimate governmental objective.18 2 In Turner, the Supreme Court
identified several factors applied in the balancing test to determine the
relatedness of the infringement and the government's objective. 8 3 The
factors in the penal system are:
(a) whether there is a 'valid, rational connection' between the regula-
tion and a legitimate government interest put forward to justify it; (b)
whether there are alternative means to exercising the asserted consti-
tutional rights that remain open to the inmates; (c) whether and the
extent to which accommodation of the asserted right will have an im-
pact on prison staff, inmates and the allocation of prison resources
generally; and (d) whether the regulation represents an 'exaggerated
response' to prison concerns.184
Before turning to the Supreme Court's treatment of the probation
system in Griffin v. Wisconsin,' 85 it is important to note the ramifications
of its cetermination of a prisoner's constitutional rights in Turner. In
Griffin, the Supreme Court stated that "probation is simply one point (or,
more accurately, one set of points) on a continuum of possible punish-
ments ranging from solitary confinement ... to mandatory community
service."' 86 While Griffin does not explicitly delineate a balancing test
for the deprivation of a probationer's constitutional rights akin to the test
set forth in Turner,' 7 it is only logical to assume that a probationer's
constitutional rights are less restricted than a prisoner's. If Turner holds
that a prisoner's constitutional rights cannot be infringed without a
showing that the infringement is "reasonably related" to a legitimate pe-
nological goal,' 88 it is safe to assume that an infringement of a proba-
tioner's constitutional rights must at least be justified by a showing that
the infringement "reasonably related" to a legitimate probationary goal.
On Griffin's continuum,' 9 probation is one step removed from prison,
thus it is logically necessary that a probationer's constitutional rights are
less restricted than a prisoner's. Supporting this rationale, in her dissent-
ing opinion in Herring, Judge Seymour took it as "clearly established"
that Griffin stands for the proposition that "probationers retain a right to
182. Turner, 482 U.S. at 78-9 (requiring that an infringement of a prisoner's constitutional
rights be "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.").
183. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91.
184. Id.
185. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
186. Id. at 874.
187. Id. ("We have recently held that prison regulations allegedly infringing constitutional
rights are themselves constitutional as long as they are 'reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.' We have no occasion in this case to decide whether, as a general matter, that test applies
to probation regulations as well.").
188. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91.
189. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874.
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privacy under the Constitution which is violated where the State im-
pinges upon that right without a legitimate, governmental purpose.
' ' 90
Herring, nevertheless, failed to make a single mention of Turner's
"reasonable relation" requirement.' 9' Moreover, Herring failed to ana-
lyze the logical and necessary connection between Turner and Griffin-
if prisoners are protected by "X" (requiring that an infringement be "rea-
sonably related" to a legitimate penological goal 192) then probationers are
logically protected by "X+I" because probation is a less restrictive step
in the criminal justice process. While Griffin refrained from delineating
a standard of review for infringements in the probation system,' 93 it did
hold that restrictions must bear a relationship to the "special needs" of
the probation system. 194 It is only natural to assume that the Supreme
Court would determine the level of review in the probation system to at
least require a reasonable relation, if not more. Instead, Herring cited
Griffin as standing solely for the proposition that a probationer's right to
privacy is limited,195 and that Herring's expectation of privacy was justi-
fiably infringed by the probation officer.' 96 The court stated:
In view of the fact that it was clearly established in Griffin that a pro-
bationer's right to privacy is limited, without further guidance from
the Supreme Court or this circuit, a reasonable probation officer in
late 1993 could not be presumed to know whether a limited disclosure
of a probationer's HIV status to his sister and restaurant employer
would violate a probationer's constitutional rights.1
97
As noted by Chief Judge Seymour in her dissenting opinion, the
Herring majority completely misconstrued the Griffin holding.' 98 There
is no support for the Herring majority's claim that Griffin stands for the
bare holding that probationers have limited constitutional rights to pri-
vacy and that the Supreme Court gave no further guidance.199 Chief
Judge Seymour stated:
The majority here simply relies upon the court's approval of the
regulation in Griffin to conclude that Mr. Herring's privacy right was
not clearly established in this case. In so doing, the majority extrapo-
lates from the Court's naked holding without ever acknowledging the
underlying analysis and reasoning, and fails entirely to apply that
analysis and reasoning to the facts of this case. The majority thus ig-
190. Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000).
191. Turner, 482 U.S. at 78-9.
192. Id.
193. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874.
194. Id. at 873-74.
195. Herring, 218 F.3d at 1176.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1182.
199. Id. at 1176.
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nores the clear holding in Griffin that a probationer has a constitu-
tional right to privacy, which is limited insofar as the limitation is
justified by the 'special needs' of the probation system.
200
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit previously established a standard for
determining whether a right is "clearly established" when a constitutional
201balancing test is required. In three prior opinions, the Tenth Circuit
established that when a balancing test is at issue, if it is "sufficiently
clear" that the defendant should be aware that the governmental interest
would not survive a balancing inquiry, then the defendant is deemed to
202be on notice. In Medina, the Tenth Circuit held that "[c]onduct may be
so egregious that a reasonable person would know it to be unconstitu-
tional even though it is judged by a balancing test. 2 °3 Keenan's conduct
was unsupported and inimical to any recognizable governmental interest.
In fact, it ran contrary to U.S. probation system policy, Colorado state
criminal law, and was undertaken prior to her even securing knowledge
20that Herring in fact was HIV positive. ° Peculiarly, the Herring court
failed to analyze Keenan's conduct in light of an officer's reasonable
expectation of whether his or her conduct would survive a balancing test.
It seems rather clear that Keenan reasonably should have been aware of
her own internal probation system guidelines and would have known that
a direct violation of its stated guidelines would tip the balance out of her
favor.
The Herring decision ignored Tenth Circuit precedent by requiring
that there be strict factual analogy between the case at bar and a case
previously decided by either the Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit.
205
Further, the narrowness of the court's inquiry caused it to turn a blind
eye to the balancing tests established by both Turner and Griffin.20 6 As
200. Id.; see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding that prison guidelines
infringing prisoner's constitutional rights are lawful only when reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests); Doe v. Attorney Gen., 941 F.2d 780, 796 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that the law
was clearly established in 1988 that the government may disclose private information only upon a
showing that the disclosure of such information advances a legitimate governmental objective).
201. See discussion infra Part I.E.4.
202. Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that qualified
immunity will be abrogated if it was "sufficiently clear that Defendants should have known the
[governmental] interest would not survive a balancing inquiry."); see also Prager v. LaFaver, 180
F.3d 1185, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that a balance in favor of plaintiff should have been
anticipated by officials and thus their qualified immunity was abrogated); see also Medina, 960 F.2d
at 1498 ("Conduct may be so egregious that a reasonable person would know it to be
unconstitutional even though it is judged by a balancing test.").
203. Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498.
204. Herring, 281 F.3d at 1182.
205. Id. at 1178-79.
206. Turner establishes that a prisoner's rights cannot be infringed absent a "reasonable
relation" to a legitimate penological goal. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Griffin does not speak to a
level of judicial scrutiny for the probation system, but does state that infringements must bear a
relationship to the "special needs" of the probation system. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74,
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noted by Chief Judge Seymour, Griffin clearly held that the "legitimacy
of the governmental interest" is the key ingredient to the "legitimate
government purpose" balancing test.207 The majority swept Turner and
Griffin under the rug and refused to recognize that Keenan's conduct was
actually contrary to a legitimate governmental interest. To highlight this
fact, the probation system maintained an internal policy of non-
disclosure of a probationer's HIV status.20 8 If the court had applied the
proper qualified immunity requirements and recognized that Turner and
Griffin both require a variation of a balancing test, it would be impossi-
ble for Keenan to attain qualified immunity. Conduct that not only failed
to state a legitimate governmental purpose but also explicitly violated the
policy of the governmental entity should fail a balancing inquiry per se.
Moreover, had Keenan followed its own precedent set in Anaya, 209 its
"clearly established" analysis would have included such sources as other
circuit authority, the probation system's internal guidelines (which Her-
ring was required to abide by), the Colorado state criminal statute which
she violated. If Keenan had been properly aware of the law "clearly es-
tablished" in 1993, she would have known that her conduct would fail
even the most deferential balancing test and constitute a violation of Her-
ring's constitutional right to privacy.
IV. THE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED RIGHT To PRIVACY PROTECTING
FROM DISCLOSURE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION FROM SUPREME COURT
AND CIRCUIT CASES
210In Whalen v. Roe , the Supreme Court dealt with a challenge to a
New York law seeking to create a database of names and addresses of
individuals on prescription drugs.2 1 The plaintiffs in the action claimed
that the compilation of personal medical information and the possibility
of its release to the public undermined their constitutional right to pri-
vacy. 212 The Whalen court stated that the Constitution supported a pri-
vacy interest grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of per-
sonal liberty. 2 From this foundation, the court outlined two distinct pri-
vacy interests; an individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters, and an individual's interest in independently making personal
207. Herring, 218 F.3d at 1182.
208. Id. The internal policy statement mandates that "[o]fficers should not disclose HIV
infection or illness information without the offender's informed written consent." See id. at 1182.
209. In Anaya, the Tenth Circuit broadened its definition of the scope of the sources from
which "clearly established" law may arise. For example, the Anaya court looked to other circuit
cases, cases decided by the Colorado Supreme Court, and the civil forfeitures laws in determining
the applicable "authority" in determining whether a right in actually "clearly established." Anaya v.
Crossroads Managed Care Sys. Inc., 195 F.3d 584, 594-95 (10th Cir. 1999).
210. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
211. Id. at 591.
212. Id. at 599-600
213. Id. at 600.
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214decisions. The Tenth Circuit has repeatedly interpreted the Supreme
Court's decision in Whalen as effectively "creating a right to privacy in
the non-disclosure of personal information. 2'5 The following cases show
that both the Tenth Circuit and several other circuits have interpreted
Whalen's two privacy interests to include an individual's right to privacy
in the non-disclosure of one's sexual and medical information.
216
A. Eastwood v. Department of Corrections of the State of Okla-
homa2 1-Whalen Interpreted in the Tenth Circuit
In Eastwood, the plaintiff, a former employee of the Oklahoma De-
partment of Corrections brought a § 1983 suit against a departmental
investigator for violating her constitutional right to privacy.21 After be-
ing sexually assaulted by a fellow employee, the Department of Correc-
tions assigned an investigator to question her version of the incident.219
The plaintiff alleges that this investigator, Mr. Lovelace, harassed her
with explicit questions regarding her sexual history which he subse-
quently shared with others at the Department of Corrections. 220 As a re-
sult, the plaintiff alleges that the Department of Corrections became an
"offensive work environment" where she was continually harassed with
further sexually explicit questions and "offensive and insulting drawings
within the DOC facility. 221
In response to the defendant's claim of qualified immunity, the
Eastwood court first stated that in determining whether a law is "clearly
established," they do not require there to be "strict factual correspon-
dence between the cases establishing the law and the case at hand. 222
Even further, the court held that it is "incumbent upon government offi-
cials 'to relate established law to analogous factual settings.
' ' 23
Regarding the constitutional right to privacy question, the Eastwood
court noted that the Supreme Court had established two distinct privacy
214. ' Id. at 599-600.
215. Herring, 218 F.3d at 1175; see also Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986)
(recognizing a constitutional privacy interest that is especially significant where the information is
"intimate or otherwise personal in nature"); Eastwood v. Dep't of Corrections of Okla., 846 F.2d
627, 630-31 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that an individual has a right to privacy that protects him or
her from forced disclosure of his or her sexual history); Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477
(10th Cir. 1994) (holding that the right to privacy in one's medical information was established in
1990).
216. See discussion infra Part IV.A-D.
217. 846 F.2d 627 (1Oth Cir. 1988).
218. Id. at 628-29.
219. Id. at 629.
220. Id.
221. Id.




interests in Whalen v. Roe.2 24 The Eastwood court interpreted Whalen to
encompass the privacy interest implicated in this case.225 The court held:
"[t]his constitutionally protected right is implicated when an individual is
forced to disclose information regarding personal sexual matters. ,226
B. Lankford v. City of Hobart227 -Right to Privacy of Medical Records
in the Tenth Circuit
In Lankford, the plaintiff alleged that after rebuking her employer's
sexual advances, he "used his authority as chief of police to obtain [her]
private medical records without her consent from a local hospital in an
attempt to discredit her and to prove his statements that she was a les-
bian." In holding that the defendant was not entitled to qualified im-
munity because the privacy violations of this sort were "clearly estab-
lished in 1990,, ' 229 the court stated, "there is 'no question that an em-
ployee's medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal
nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protec-
tion.'"
23 0
C. Harris v. Thigpen: 231 Eleventh Circuit Applies the Turner Factors
In Harris v. Thigpen, the Eleventh Circuit discussed a prisoner's
specific right regarding the non-disclosure of his or her HIV positive
232status. In Harris, the appellant challenged the Alabama Department of
Corrections' policies of mandatory HIV testing and segregation of pris-
oners testing HIV positive as a violation of those prisoners' constitu-
tional right to privacy.233 First, the court explained that as a general prin-
ciple, "convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by
reason of their conviction and confinement in prison. 234 The court cited
224. 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977); see also discussion infra Part IV.
225. Eastwood, 846 F.2d at 631.
226. Id.
227. 27 F.3d 477 (10th Cir. 1994).
228. Id. at 478.
229. Id.
230. ld.; see also Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (holding that
"[c]asual, unjustified dissemination of confidential medical information to non-medical staff and
other prisoners can scarcely be said to belong to the sphere of defendants' discretionary functions.
Therefore, the defense of qualified immunity is not available to defendants); U.S. v. Westinghouse,
638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (interpreting Whalen's dual privacy ights to include an
individual's right to privacy in medical records and medical information).: Mangels v. Pena, 789
F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986) (recognizing a constitutional privacy interest that is especially
significant where the information is "intimate or otherwise personal in nature").
231. 941 F.2d 1495 (lth Cir. 1991).
232. Id. at 1498.
233. Id. at 1512.
234. Id.; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (holding that -convicted prisoners
do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison").
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Turner v. Safley235 when it stated, "[p]rison walls do not separate inmates
from their constitutional rights.,,236 Thus, prior to their determination of
whether the prisoner's constitutional rights to privacy regarding the non-
disclosure of his HIV positive status was violated, the Eleventh Circuit
237affirmatively proclaimed that prisoners maintain constitutional protec-
238tion despite their position within the penological system.
The Harris court went on to state the limitations upon the constitu-
tional rights of prisoners. 239 "It is also axiomatic, however, that 'lawful
incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of
many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the consideration
underlying our penal system., 240 The court added that prisoners retain the
constitutional rights that do not run contrary to the "legitimate penologi-
cal objectives of the corrective system. 241
Upon this foundation, the Harris court used the "rational connec-
tion" factors set forth in Turner2 4 2 and found that the Alabama Depart-
ment of Corrections' policies did not violate the prisoners' constitutional
right to privacy in light of the countervailing interests of the penological
243system. The court recognized the legitimacy of the penological sys-
244tem's interest in reducing HIV transmission and violence .
More importantly, however, the Harris court recognized and fol-
lowed two "clearly established" trends that the Tenth Circuit ignored in
Herring. First, Harris acknowledged a prisoner's residual constitutional
rights, and followed Turner by balancing those residual rights with the
235. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
236. Harris, 941 F.2d at 1512; see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,84(1987).
237. The Supreme Court in Griffin v. Wisconsin also held that probationers maintain
constitutional protections despite their involvement with the probation system. See infra pp. 16-17;
see also Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000) (discussing in dissent, Judge
Seymore claimed, "Griffin, therefore, clearly established six years prior to the incidents here that
probationers retain a right to privacy under the Constitution which is violated where the State
impinges upon that right without a legitimate, governmental purpose.").
238. Harris, 941 F.2d at 1515-16; see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)
(holding that "[t]he constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary the requirement
that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek
redress for violations of their constitutional rights."); Thornbaugh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989)
(reiterating Turner's holding that "[pirison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates
from the protections of the Constitution."); Sheley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420, 1423 (11 th Cir. 1987)
(holding that "[a] prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned
for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.").
239. Id. at 1512-13
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See infra p. 15.
243. Harris, 941 F.2d at 1521.
244. ld. at 1517.
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legitimate objectives of the penological system 45 To the contrary, Her-
ring misconstrued the holding in Griffin and failed to recognize the need
to justify an infringement of a probationer's constitutional rights by the
special needs" of the probation system. 46 Second, the Harris court was
careful to point out the existence of a constitutional right to privacy and
the "significant privacy interest" triggered by the disclosure of a pris-
oner's HIV status.247 As previously discussed, because the probation
system is situated on a less restrictive point on the criminal justice con-
tinuum than the penological system, it naturally follows that proba-
248tioner's maintain a greater constitutional rights than prisoners .
D. United States v. Westinghouse:24 9 The Right to Privacy in Medical
Information
In United States v. Westinghouse, the Third Circuit interpreted the
dual privacy rights created by the Supreme Court in Whalen; an individ-
ual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and an individ-
ual's interest in independently making personal decisions, 25 to encom-
pass an individual's right to privacy in medical records and medical in-
formation. 251 The Westinghouse court stated:
There can be no question that an employee's medical records, which
may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the
ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection. Information about
one's body and state of health is a matter which the individual is or-
dinarily entitled to retain within the 'private enclave where he may
lead a private life.' 
252
In Westinghouse, the Third Circuit stated that governmental intru-
sion into medical records is allowed only after the government can show
that the public interest in disclosure outweighs the individual's privacy
245. Id. at 1515 ("The [Turner] Court determined that the standard of review for evaluating
prisoners' constitutional claims should be one of reasonableness: when a prison regulation or policy
'impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests."').
246. Griffin holds that a probationer maintains residual constitutional rights that are less than
what is afforded to an average citizen but nevertheless cannot be stripped without being justified by
the "special needs" of the probation system.
247. Id. at 1514 ("The threat to family life and the 'emotional enrichment [gained] from close
ties with others' ... is quite real when an AIDS victim's diagnosis is revealed. Ignorance and
prejudice concerning the disease are widespread; the decision of whether, or how, or when to risk
familial and communal opprobrium and even ostracism is one of fundamental importance.").
248. See infra Part III.
249. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
250. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
251. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 57 1.
252. Id.
20001
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
.253 cgvrmnainrsointerest. In determining whether the specific governmental intrusionwas constitutional, the court listed the factors relevant to the inquiry:
the type of record requested, the information it does or might contain,
the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure,
the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was
generated, the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclo-
sures, the degree and need of access, and whether there is an express
statutory mandate,. articulated public policy, or other recognizable
public interest militating toward access. 
54
The first four Westinghouse factors question the nature of the in-
formation requested and the potential injury caused by the nonconsensual
disclosure of that information.255 The purpose for these factors is to de-
termine which medical information disclosures are more harmful than
others. These factors serve the purpose of drawing a line between non-
consensual disclosure of a trivial matter, such as an employee's allergic
tendencies, and disclosure of information that has the ability to harm the
employee.
In terms of potential injury and discrimination against the employee,
an individual's HIV status is arguably the most sensitive form of medical
information.256 Several federal courts, prior to 1993, commented on the
heightened risk of disclosure of HIV information.257 The Ninth Circuit
held that a forced and mandatory AIDS test might violate an inmate's
258 259constitutional rights. In Doe v. Borrough of Barrington,  the federaldistrict court of New Jersey stated:
The sensitive nature of medical information about AIDS makes a
compelling argument for keeping this information confidential. Soci-
ety's moral judgments about the high-risk activities associated with
the disease, including sexual relations and drug use, make the infor-
mation of the most personal kind. Also, the privacy interest in one's
exposure to the AIDS virus is even greater than one's privacy interest
in ordinary medical records because the stigma that attaches with the
253. Id. at 577.
254. Id. at 578.
255. Id.
256. See infra note 229.
257. See e.g., Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp 376, 384 (D.N.J. 1990) (stating that
an individual's privacy interest in HIV information outweighs that of regular medical information
because of the stigma that attaches to the HIV virus); Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D.N.Y.
1988) (noting that disclosure of HIV information threatens family life and triggers prejudice and
ignorance).
258. Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that "[prison] authorities cannot
rely on general or conclusory assertions to support their policies. Rather, they must first identify the
specific penological interests involved and then demonstrate both that those specific interests are the
actual bases for their policies and that the policies are reasonably related to the furtherance of the
identified interests.").
259. 729 F. Supp. 376, 384 (D.N.J. 1990)
[Vol. 78:2
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
disease. The potential for harm in the event of a nonconsensual dis-
closure is substantial.
260
Further, in Doe v. Coughlin,26' the federal district court for the Northern
District of New York stated:
Each [seropositive prisoner] is fully aware that he is infected with a
disease which at the present time has inevitably proven fatal. In the
court's view there are few matters of a more personal nature, and
there are few decisions over which a person could have a greater de-
sire to exercise control, than the manner in which he reveals that di-
agnosis to others ... [t]he threat to family life and the 'emotional en-
richment [gained] from close ties to others' ... is quite real when an
AIDS victim's diagnosis is revealed. Ignorance and prejudice con-
cerning the disease are widespread; the decision of whether, or how,
or when to risk familial and communal opprobrium and even ostra-
cism is one of fundamental importance.
262
E. Herring's Two Flaws
It was clearly established in 1993 that a government official could
not impinge upon the constitutional rights of a probationer without the
263justification of a legitimate governmental purpose. Moreover, it was
also clearly established in 1993 that courts only allow government in-
fringement of an individual's medical information where there is a find-
ing "that the societal interest in disclosure outweighs the privacy interest
on the specific facts of the case. ' '264 Thus, the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Herring is flawed in two key respects. First, to grant the defendant quali-
fied immunity, the Tenth Circuit applied a narrow construction of
"clearly established" rights-a construction that was antithetical to Tenth
Circuit precedent since Medina.265
Second, because of the consequent narrow qualified immunity analy-
sis, the Tenth Circuit effectively removed from consideration Supreme
Court and circuit authorities that sufficiently establish that (a) a proba-
tioner's constitutional rights cannot be impinged unless "justified by the
'special needs' of the probation system,26 and (b) there exists a privacy
260. Id.
261. 697 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
262. Id. at 1237-38.
263. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
264. U.S. v. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980).
265. In Lawinaster, the circuit held that the right in question needs to be defined with some
degree of generality in order to give plaintiffs the ability to rebut a defendant's qualified immunity
defense. Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1351 (10th Cir. 1997) Further, in Anaya, the circuit
expanded the range of sources it was willing to consider in determining whether a law was "clearly
established" at the time of the conduct in question. Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Sys., Inc.,
195 F.3d 584, 594-95 (10th Cir. 1999).
266. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987); see also Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d
1171, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000) (Seymour, J. dissenting).
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interest in one's medical records and medical information, especially so
when the information pertains to one's HIV status.
267
More specifically, the Tenth Circuit ignored the Supreme Court's
decisions in Turner and Griffin, which both stand for the proposition that
prisoners and probationers retain their constitutional rights desvite their
status within either the penological or probationary system. Turner
established a "rational connection" balancing test that forces the gov-
ernment to justify any impingement upon the constitutional rights of
prisoners by proving that the restriction is "rationally connected" to a
penological or objective. 269 Likewise, Griffin affirmatively holds that a
probationer has a constitutional right to privacy that can be impinged
only upon a showing of a "special need of the probation system. ,70 The
Herring court failed to even mention the existence of either constitu-
tional balancing test.
Second, the Herring court made no mention of the Third Circuit's
decision in Westinghouse,271 which recognized a constitutional right to
privacy regarding one's medical records and medical information, or the
Eleventh Circuit's determination in Harris v. Thigpen, which emphasized
the "significant privacy interest" triggered by an individual's HIV
status. 2  Westinghouse outlined a seven-factor balancing test to help
determine the types of medical records and information that require pro-
273tection from divulgence without consent. As stated above, the Herring
court's narrow qualified immunity standard caused it to sweep these
other circuit decisions under the rug.
IV. ANALYSIS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF MEDINA WITH TEETH
Like the flaws, the implications of the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Herring v. Keenan274 are two-fold. First, the decision may cause negative
social ramifications due to its treatment of the constitutional right to pri-
vacy regarding a person's HIV positive status. The decision, to the con-
267. The Third Circuit, in U.S. v. Westinghouse interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in
Whalen to encompass an individual's right to privacy in medical record and medical information, see
Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 571. Moreover, in Harris v. Thigpen, the Eleventh Circuit stated that one
HIV status triggers a "significant privacy interest" that is "of fundamental importance," see Harris v.
Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1514 (11th Cir. 1991).
268. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
269. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84.
270. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875.
271. Id. at 570.
272. Harris, 941 F.2d at 1514.
273. Hence, if these medical records/information are such that require protection, a person's
divulgence of the records/information without the patient's consent would be deemed a
constitutional violation. See generally id. at 578-579 (applying the seven-factor test to the conduct
at bar with the underlying inference that if the balance tips in favor of protection, the non-consensual
divulgence of the records/information would be a constitutional violation).
274. 218 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2000).
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trary, does not stand for the proposition that a constitutional right to pri-
vacy in an individual's HIV status has not been judicially recognized.
Rather, it purports that the right was not "clearly established" circa
1993.275
In coming to the decision that the right to privacy in a probationer's
HIV status was not "clearly established" in 1993, the Herring court went
directly against Tenth Circuit qualified immunity analysis precedent. In
Lawmaster and again in Anaya, the Tenth Circuit consistently broadened
the scope of sources they were willing to consider in the determination
whether a right was "clearly established" for qualified immunity pur-
276poses. Moreover, in Lawmaster, the Tenth Circuit also recognized the
need to define the right in question with a lesser degree of particularity to
facilitate a plaintiff's attempt to defeat a government official's qualified
immunity defense.277 The Herring court had a choice. It could follow
precedent and define the right with a lesser degree of particularity so that
the precise factual scenario would not have to have been previously ruled
upon. Or it could do what it did and turn the precedent on its head and
define the right narrowly, requiring that the precise factual scenario be
specifically ruled upon in either the Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit.
Even though the Herring court refrains from elucidating any policy
based views or rationale regarding an individual's right to privacy in his
or her HIV status, its decision to defy precedent speaks volumes. In the
final analysis, the public policy message sent by the Tenth Circuit is
clear-action certainly speaks louder than words. The Herring court
changed its qualified immunity analysis in order to protect a government
official who, in direct violation of internal policy, informed an HIV
positive probationer's employer and family of his HIV status. In chang-
ing the analysis, the Herring court looked at the case through a micro-
scope and eliminated from view numerous sources that would have
served as the "clearly established" authority that a "reasonable official"
would be expected to know about. Despite the fact that in 1994 the Tenth
Circuit recognized that there is a constitutional right to privacy regarding
disclosure by a peace officer of an arrestee's HIV test results,278 Herring
275. Id. at 1176. Herring states that an individual's fight to privacy in his or her HIV
information was established in 1994.
276. In Lawmaster, the Tenth Circuit held that "the shield of qualified immunity is pierced if in
light of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness of the conduct is apparent to the officer." Lawmaster v.
Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1350 (10th Cir. 1997). In Anaya, the Tenth Circuit broadened its definition of
the scope of the sources from which "clearly established" law may arise. For example, the Anaya
court looked to other circuit cases, cases decided by the Colorado Supreme Court, and the civil
forfeitures laws in determining the applicable "authority" in determining whether a right in actually
"clearly established." See Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Sys. Inc., 195 F.3d 584, 594-95 (10th
Cir. 1999).
277. Lawmaster, 125 F.3d at 1351.
278. A.L.A. v. West Valley City, 26 F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 1994) (establishing in the Tenth
Circuit in 1994, that an arrestee has a constitutional right to privacy in the nondisclosure of his HIV
information).
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strikes a blow to the public's confidence that the court stands behind the
policy that underlies its 1994 decision.
Besides Herring's public policy implications, this analysis seeks to
discuss the long-term effects of the court's narrow qualified immunity
analysis and its potential to halt the creation of new civil or constitutional
rights in the Tenth Circuit. In Herring, the Tenth Circuit unleashed a new
breed of qualified immunity analysis: Medina with sharper teeth. Not
only did the court require that a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision
exist that was 'n point,279 but, contrary to Tenth Circuit precedent, 280 it
also required a strict factual similarity between the case at bar and a pre-
viously decided case. 281 Looking for precedent under a microscope, the
court granted the defendant qualified immunity because it was unable to
find a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case that specifically held that a
probationer has a constitutional right to privacy regarding the limited
disclosure of his or her HIV positive status by his or her probationer to
282family members and employers.
The decision in Herring, however, took the qualified immunity
analysis in the Tenth Circuit to a level unimaginable even by Medina
standards. Under a strict Medina analysis, the Tenth Circuit would likely
take notice of the Supreme Court precedent in Turner and Griffin and at
least acknowledge the need to conduct a "rational connection" balancing
test to determine whether the impingement was justified by a legitimate
goal of the probation system. Even under Medina, the Tenth Circuit
would recognize that in 1993, it was entirely inimical to a prisoner's or a
probationer's constitutional right to privacy to sanction an alleged right
to privacy violation without conducting the proper balancing test.
Additionally, Herring's strict factual setting requirement turned
Medina on its head. The gravity of the court's new standard is evident by
the fact that the nonconsensual disclosure of a probationer's HIV status
stood in direct violation of a probation system rule requiring consent
prior to any such disclosure.283 "In making the disclosures to Mr. Her-
ring's family and employer, Ms. Keenan acted contrary to every written
guideline addressing the disclosure of confidential medical information
contained in the U.S. Probation Manual, which serves as the 'authorita-
279. While the majority initially states that a right is clearly established when there is a
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit opinion on point, or that the plaintiffs proposition is supported by
the weight of authority from other courts, the decision later only mentions the need for the first two
and drops the latter from consideration. See Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir.
2000).
280. See discussion infra Part I, I.A.2, I.A.3, I.A.4.
281. Herring, 218 F.3d at 1179 (stating that "[nione of the cases identified by the plaintiff
involved a limited disclosure by a probation officer to a probationer's sister and restaurant employer
of voluntarily exposed information... .
282. Id.
283. Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 2000).
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tive standard for community supervision of federal offenders." 284 (em-
phasis added) In her dissenting opinion in Herring, Judge Seymour dis-
cussed the Supreme Court's decision in Griffin that upheld as proper a
search conducted within the residence of a probationer.28 Judge
Seymour concluded that Griffin held that the search was "reasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted
pursuant to a valid regulation governing probationers, which was itself
,,216justified by the special needs of the probation system... Judge
Seymour made the point that under a properly construed Griffin analysis,
there is no way Keenan would have been granted qualified immunity.
Judge Seymour stated:
[H]ere, however, we are asked to review the independent action of a
probation officer which was directly contrary to the published guide-
lines of the U.S. Probation Office. Ms. Keenan cannot plausibly ar-
gue that her random, unauthorized and illegal conduct provides a ba-
sis for a legitimate or reasonable governmental interest sufficient to
warrant the intrusion on Mr. Herring's privacy which occurred
here."
,287
Griffin required that the restriction be justified by a special need of the
probation system. Likewise, Turner required that a "'valid, rational con-
nection' between the regulation and a legitimate government interest put
forward to justify it"'288 must exist.
The Herring court's narrow analysis caused it to miss the seven-part
balancing test set forth in Westinghouse289 as well. Westinghouse's first
four factors are dedicated to determining the nature of the medical in-
formation and the potential injury to an individual if that information is
290disclosed. Undoubtedly, one's HIV positive information is the most
sensitive type of medical information and its disclosure without consent
poses a potential harm that can devastate the life and emotional well be-
ing of the individual.
The Herring court's decision to grant the probation officer qualified
immunity leads one to question the modem court's stance on the rights of
those afflicted with the HIV virus. While the social ramifications of this
decision on the rights of HIV victims is muted by the court's decision
291one year after the conduct at issue in Herring, it is peculiar that the
court would turn its recent qualified immunity doctrine on its head to
284. Herring, 218 F.3d at 1182 (J. Seymour, dissenting).
285. Id. at 1183-84.
286. Id.
287. Herring, 218 F.3d at 1184 (J. Seymour, dissenting).
288. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987).
289. U.S. v. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980).
290. Id.
291. A.L.A. v. West Valley City, 26 F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that an individual
holds a constitutional right to privacy regarding his or her HIV status).
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protect a probation officer who clearly and blatantly violated the consti-
tutional privacy rights of her probationer.
CONCLUSION: THE MISSING VOICE
After Herring, the possibility of the Tenth Circuit independently
recognizing the existence of a new constitutional right may be nonexist-
ent. Under its Herring qualified immunity standard, the Tenth Circuit has
effectively decided to relinquish all circuit authority to establish new
laws in response to novel social problems. One commentator feared that
Medina had developed a narrow qualified immunity analysis that effec-
tively removed the Tenth Circuit's ability to create new civil and consti-
tutional rights. The commentator wrote:
In conclusion, Medina changed the Tenth Circuit's handling of the
qualified immunity issue. Those cases that actually cite the Medina
rule uniformly hold there is no clearly established duty. Most of the
clearly established rights from cases prior to Medina would probably
not survive a post-Medina analysis ... [w]hen there is clearly estab-
lished weight of authority in other circuits, the Tenth Circuit will
follow suit. This not only cedes Tenth Circuit decision-making to
other circuits, but, in a sense, undermines the independence of the
circuit courts. This is particularly problematic because one of the
strongest predicates for United States Supreme Court review is the
resolution of circuit splits. Therefore, the Medina rule tends to belay
Supreme Court review ... [t]herefore, it is likely' the Medina rule...
will slow the development of civil rights law...
Similarly, requiring that the conduct and facts be strictly analogous
to conduct and facts previously deemed unlawful by the Supreme Court
or another Tenth Circuit decision really means that no fight or law will
ever be clearly established in the Tenth Circuit unless such a right or law
was previously established by the Supreme Court. One of the functions
of the circuit courts is to decide novel issues with the potential for circuit
disagreement. Likewise, one of the functions of the Supreme Court is to
survey the areas of circuit disagreement and grant certiorari to settle the
disputed questions of law. As a result of Herring, however, the Tenth
Circuit has effectively taken itself out of the mix. If the Tenth Circuit
chooses to follow Herring in future qualified immunity cases, not only
will the potential for legal development in this area of law be dormant,
but the overall legal discourse between the circuits and the Supreme
Court over pressing legal and social matters will be impaired by the
Tenth Circuit's missing voice. On the flip side, if the Tenth Circuit
chooses to revert back to its broader pre-Herring qualified immunity
analysis, its decision to look at Herring the way that it did begs the ques-
292 Meeker, supra note 24, at 133.
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A MERE SUPERFLUOUS NUANCE OR A VITAL CIVIL
PROCEDURE DOCTRINE? AN ANALYSIS OF THE TENTH
CIRCUIT' S DECISION IN JOHNSON V. RODRIGUES
INTRODUCTION
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine ("Rooker-Feldman") has been, and
continues to be, a tremendous source of confusion for courts and attor-
neys alike. Rooker-Feldman is often misapplied as an abstention or pre-
clusion doctrine and courts exacerbate the problem by continually using
the three doctrines interchangeably. One source of this confusion is that
the United States Supreme Court ("Supreme Court") has not provided the
Circuit Courts direction about how to apply the doctrine. In fact, the
"Supreme Court has not held a case barred by Rooker-Feldman since
1983. "1 Therefore, there is little guidance on how to properly apply the
doctrine and many federal courts have written confusing and contradic-
tory opinions as a result. Although the application of Rooker-Feldman
use has been problematic, courts us it frequently. In fact, the Tenth Cir-
cuit has already addressed four Rooker-Feldman cases in the year 2001.2
This alone makes Rooker-Feldman an important civil procedure tool and
one that must be clearly understood. In order to clarify the use of
Rooker-Feldman, this article focuses on the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Johnson v. Rodrigues.3 In this case, the Tenth Circuit not only properly
applied Rooker-Feldman, but signaled the likely manner in which many
courts will utilize the doctrine in the future.
Part I will explain the origin and foundation of Rooker-Feldman,
how Rooker-Feldman relates to abstention and preclusion theories, the
controversy surrounding the doctrine including why some commentators
think Rooker-Feldman should be overturned and abandoned, and how the
Tenth Circuit has applied Rooker-Feldman in past decisions. Part II will
discuss the scope of Rooker-Feldman in today's courts, focusing on the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Johnston v. Rodrigues and the positions taken
by other Circuit Courts. Finally, Part III will provide an analysis of what
1. Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the Trenches: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine in
Action, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1085 (1999).
2. See Mehdipour v. Chapel, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2680 (10th Cir. Feb. 22, 2001);
Continental Cas. Co. v. Hempel, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2757 (10th Cir. Feb. 22, 2001); Bisbee v.
McCarty, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1512 (10th Cir. Feb. 2, 2001); Read v. Klein, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 334 (10th Cir. Jan. 9, 2001).
3. 226 F.3d 1103 (10th Cir. 2000).
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place the doctrine has in civil procedure and how the Tenth Circuit used
the doctrine for its intended purpose in Johnston v. Rodrigues.4
I. BACKGROUND
There are three major legal doctrines or theories to keep a claim that
has previously been litigated from being re-litigated. Those doctrines are
abstention theories, preclusion theories, and Rooker-Feldman. While
abstention and preclusion theories are familiar to courts and to litigation
attorneys, Rooker-Feldman has been and continues to be confusing and
troublesome. Rooker-Feldman appears to be, on the one hand "superflu-
ous" 5 and on the other, "extremely significant., 6 In order to understand
the application of Rooker-Feldman and where the doctrine may have a
purpose in the legal system, one must understand the doctrine itself, and
more importantly, how it fits with abstention and preclusion theories.
A. Rooker-Feldman: A Doctrine Grounded in Jurisdiction Theories
Rooker-Feldman, in its most simple terms, limits lower federal
court's jurisdiction as an "appellate" court to cases that originated in the
state courts. 7 Rooker-Feldman is a doctrine grounded in jurisdiction theo-
ries.8 It is based on statutes passed by Congress that give appellate juris-
diction to the United States Supreme Court.9 The Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to hear "final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had. . . ."'0 This statute not
only gives the Supreme Court jurisdictional rights, but it also denies the
lower federal courts the ability to hear cases that arise in state courts."
Furthermore, Congress has enacted statutes that grant lower federal
12courts jurisdiction in other kinds of cases. Since Congress has specified
when the lower federal courts have jurisdiction, one may conclude that
lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction over cases originating in
4. Johnston, 226 F.3d 1103 (10th Cir. 2000).
5. See Barry Friedman & James E. Gaylord, Rooker-Feldman, From the Ground Up, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1129 (1999).
6. Id.
7. Edmonds v. Clarkson, 996 F. Supp. 541, 546 (E.D. Va. 1998).
8. See 18 C. WRIGHT, et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4469 (1981 &
Supp. 2000) [hereinafter WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER], David P. Currie, Res Judicata; The
Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 322 (1978); Gary Thompson, The Rooker-Feldman
Doctrine and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts, 42 RUTGERS L. REV.
859, 912 (1990).
9. Thompson, supra note 8, at 860.
10. 28 U.S.C. §1257 (2000).
11. Id.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
(2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in




state court.1 3 The Supreme Court noted in its 1988 term, "The Rooker-
Feldman doctrine interprets 28 U.S.C. § 1257 as ordinarily barring direct
review in the lower federal courts of a decision reached by the highest
state court, for such authority is vested solely in this Court.'14 If allowed,
".. . [t]he effect of such a jurisdiction would be to displace almost the
whole of state litigation into federal courts by making the final judgment
in the state court the cause of action that kicks off a suit to undo that
judgment in federal courts."' 5
This statutory construction leads to the most favored policy reason
for Rooker-Feldman-"facilitat[ing] a state appellate process free from
federal interference."' 16 Rooker-Feldman restricts a litigant from access-
ing the lower federal courts, therefore, allowing the state courts to rule
free from federal intervention. Therefore, "once the highest state court
has taken some form of action, only the Supreme Court may hear an ap-
peal. '
1. The Rooker Decision
Rooker-Feldman originated from two Supreme Court cases, decided
sixty years apart. In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co,'8 decided in 1923,
Rooker asked the Court to declare void a judgment by an Indiana Su-
preme Court because it was "rendered and affirmed in contravention of
the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States and the due
process of law and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 9 Rooker argued before the Federal District Court that the Indiana
Supreme Court applied their own state statute in conflict with the United
States Constitution. 20 The District Court ruled that "the suit was not
within its jurisdiction as defined by Congress" and they, therefore, dis-
missed the case. 21 Rooker appealed to the United States Supreme Court
where the issue was whether a federal plaintiff could bring an action
claiming constitutional error, in a state proceeding to which he was a
party.22 The Court affirmed the District Court's decree, holding that if the
constitutional questions actually arose in the state case, it was the duty of
the state court to decide them; and the state court's decision, whether
13. Williamson B.C. Chang, Rediscovering the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Section 1983, Res
Judicata and the Federal Courts, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1337, 1349 (1980).
14. ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 622 (1989).
15. Lynk v. LaPorte Superior Court No. 2, 789 F.2d 554, 563 (7th Cir. 1986).
16. Benjamin Smith, Texaco Inc., v. Pennzoil Co.: Beyond a Crude Analysis of the Rooker-
Feldman Doctrine's Preclusion of Federal Jurisdiction, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 627, 629 (1987).
17. Id.
18. 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
19. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. ld. at 414-15.
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constitutional or not, was an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 23 If the
decision was unconstitutional, this fact does not make the state court's
judgment void, but merely left the decision open for reversal or modifi-
cation in a hearing by the United States Supreme Court.24 The United
States Supreme Court is the only court that can hear an appeal from a
state's highest court, therefore, issues that arise in a state cause of action
cannot be the subject of subsequent litigation in an original federal ac-
tion, but may be heard only on direct appeal to the United States Su-
25preme Court. This holding became the Rooker Doctrine stating that,
"lower federal courts lack appellate jurisdiction to review the judgments
of state courts that have been affirmed by the highest court of the state."
26
The lower federal courts, following this decision, applied the Rooker
Doctrine infrequently, often using the Rooker Doctrine in the same wayS27
they used doctrines of preclusion.
2. The Feldman Decision
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court decided District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,28 which upheld the idea that
Rooker was a doctrine grounded in jurisdiction theories.29 Feldman was a
member of both the Virginia and Maryland bars.30 He tried to be admit-
ted into the District of Columbia Bar under a lighter admission require-
ment allowing for members of bars in other states to be accepted without
taking the bar exam. 31 The Bar Committee in District of Columbia de-
nied Feldman's admission, because Feldman had not graduated from an
32accredited law school. Feldman brought his claim in the District Court
of the District of Columbia,33 asking the Court to grant him admission or
alternatively, allow him to take the bar exam.34 After the District of Co-
lumbia District Court, and later, the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals, the highest "state" court, denied his request, Feldman filed in fed-
eral court in the United States District Court. Feldman requested an in-
23. Id. at 415.
24. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415.
25. Id at 416.
26. Thompson, supra note 8, 863.
27. For example, in Lavasek v. White, 339 F.2d 861 (1965), the Tenth Circuit found that
plaintiffs claims were barred from federal court because they had been fully litigated in the state
courts. Id. at 863. The Court upheld the District Court that found the claims barred by resjudicata.
Id. at 862. However, the Tenth Circuit found the claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, without explaining why they used the different doctrine. Id. at 863.
28. 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
29. Thompson, supra note 8, at 871.
30. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 465.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 466.
33. The District Court of the District of Columbia is the equivalent of a state court.
34. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 467.
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junction that required the Bar Committee to either to grant him immedi-
ate admission to the District of Columbia Bar or to allow him to take the
bar exam. 35 Therefore, the issue in Feldman was whether bar admission
decisions made by the highest state court could be challenged on consti-
tutional grounds in federal district court. 36 Feldman went beyond the
scope of Rooker because the issue was whether Feldman may bring his
constitutional questions in federal court, when these issues were inter-
twined with other issues raised in state court.
The Supreme Court held that lower federal courts have no jurisdic-
tion to hear "challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising
out of judicial proceedings . . ."37 or to decide questions "inextricably
intertwined" with state court judgments.38 In other words, Rooker-
Feldman will bar parties from re-litigating in federal court, not only fed-
eral issues actually raised in state court proceedings, but also those inex-
tricably intertwined issues that could have been raised there.39
This decision helped solve one of the unresolved questions left open
in Rooker-- "whether the issues actually must have been raised or liti-
gated in the state proceeding." 40 The Feldman court made it clear that a
plaintiff cannot fail to bring a federal claim in state court in hopes to later
bring that claim in federal court.4' This ruling lead to a new layer of
analysis to the Rooker test-one must decide if the claim is "inextricably
intertwined" with the state court judgment.42 By adding this additional
inquiry, the Feldman court extended the Rooker doctrine from issues that
were actually decided by the state court proceedings, to also include
claims that were not litigated in the state court, and are inextricably in-
tertwined with the merits of the state court. A claim that is inextricably
intertwined has been defined as a claim that is so closely tied to another
litigated claim, so that if a court were to rule on the second claim it
would "effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling.
43
Likewise, a claim is not inextricably intertwined with a state court ruling
"if the purpose of a federal action is 'separable from and collateral to' a
state court judgment . [T]he claim is not 'inextricably intertwined'
35. Id. at 468-69.
36. Id. at 463.
37. Id. at 486.
38. Id. at 483 n. 16.
39. Friedman, supra note 5, at 1135.
40. Friedman, supra note 5, at 1134.
41. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 484 n. 16 ("By failing to bring [his/her] claims in state court a
plaintiff may forfeit [his/her] right to obtain review of the state court decision in any federal court.").
42. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16.
43. Fielder v. Credit Accept. Corp., 188 F.3d 1031, 1035 (8th Cir. 1999). The Tenth Circuit
defines inextricably intertwined as, "[i]f adjudication of a claim in federal court would require the
court to determine that a state court judgment was erroneously entered or was void, the claim is
inextricably intertwined with the merits of the state court judgment." Lecates v. Barker, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 29306 at 6 (November 16. 2000).
20001
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
merely because the action necessitates some consideration of the merits
of the state court judgment. '" 44
The resulting doctrine, arising from these two cases, asks the ques-
tions (1) has the claim or issue been litigated in a state court proceeding,
and (2) is the claim or issue, although not raised in state court, "inextri-
cably intertwined" with a state court judgment. If either of these two
questions can be answered affirmatively, Rooker-Feldman will bar the
suit at the District or Circuit Court level.
B. A Comparison of Rooker-Feldman and Doctrines of Abstention and
Preclusion
The reason why many courts confuse Rooker-Feldman and absten-
tion and preclusion theories is because all three doctrines are very similar
45in substance and procedural uses. All three doctrines overlap one an-
other and may often be used interchangeably. For example, the same
policy reason for Rooker-Feldman, a state appellate process free from
federal interference, may also be a reason for the use of abstention and
preclusion theories. Abstention and preclusion doctrines keep claims and
issues arising out of state court proceedings from being litigated in fed-
46eral court. Thus, they too help facilitate a state court process free from
federal interference. However, there are a few fundamental differences
between Rooker-Feldman and abstention and preclusion doctrines.
1. Abstention Theories Defined
One of the doctrines that Rooker-Feldman may overlap is abstention
47theories. Abstention theories can be defined simply as a federal court's
relinquishment of jurisdiction when necessary to avoid needless conflict
with a state court's administration of its own affairs.48 The abstention
doctrine most closely related to Rooker-Feldman is Younger
abstention.49
44. Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Hoover, 150 f3d. 1163, 1170 (1998).
45. Wright, supra note 8, at 4469.1, "The "Rooker- Feldman" doctrine . . . establishes a
nearly redundant limit on federal subject-matter jurisdiction. This doctrine is nearly redundant
because most of the actions dismissed for want of jurisdiction also could be resolved by invoking the
claim- or issue-preclusion consequences of state judgments. All of the desirable results achieved by
the jurisdiction theory could be achieved by supplementing preclusion theory with familiar theories
of abstention, comity and equitable restraint."
46. Abstention theories stop federal courts from hearing a case that is still pending in state
court. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971). Preclusion theories prevent claims or issues
that have already been litigated from being relitigated in another judicial proceeding. See Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
47. See Thompson, supra, note 8, at 898.
48. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
49. This article will strictly address Younger abstention because it involves a federal court's
decision not to interfere with an ongoing state court proceeding. However there are several other
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The Younger abstention doctrine, arose out of the Supreme Court
case, Younger v. Harris.50 Younger involved a defendant who was in-
dicted in a California state court for allegedly violating provisions of the
California Criminal Syndicalism Act. 51 After he was indicted, Harris
filed suit in federal court to enjoin the state court district attorney from
proceeding with the prosecution because the California act violated his
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.52 The lower federal court found
that the California act violated his constitutional rights and enjoined the
state court proceeding.53 However, the Supreme Court reversed stating
that the injunction violated "the national policy forbidding federal courts
to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special
circumstances. 54 The Younger abstention doctrine, therefore, is a "fed-
eral court's decision not to interfere with an ongoing state criminal pro-
ceeding by issuing an injunction or granting declaratory relief.,
55
Although Younger abstention originally applied only in criminal
cases, it has been expanded to preclude all cases where a party in an ac-
tion may desire the federal court to interfere with an ongoing state pro-
ceeding. 6 Justice Powell described the scope of Younger abstention in
Pennzoil v. Texaco57 stating:
types of abstention theories such as: (1) Burford abstention is a federal court's refusal to review a
state court's decision in cases involving a complex regulatory scheme and sensitive areas of state
concern. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317-18 (1943); (2) Colorado River Abstention is
a federal court's decision to abstain while there are relevant and parallel state-court proceedings
under way. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-18
(1976); (3) Pullman abstention is a federal court's decision to abstain in order to give the state courts
an opportunity to settle an underlying state-law question whose resolution may avert the need to
decide a federal constitutional question. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-
500 (1941); and (4) Thibodaux abstention is a federal court's decision to abstain in order to allow
state courts to decide difficult issues of public importance that, if decided by the federal court, could
result in unnecessary friction between state and federal authorities. See Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. City of Thibodaux. 360 U.S. 25.30 (1959).
50. Younger, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
51. Id. at 38.
52. Id. at 39.
53. Id. at 40.
54. Id. at 4 1.
55. See Younger, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
56. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.. 420 U.S. 592 (1975), where the court expanded Younger to
apply to civil cases. Id. at 594. In this case, the court voided a federal injunction against
enforcement of a state judgment that closed a theater as a nuisance for showing obscene films, which
had not been adjudged obscene in prior hearings. Id. at 599. The court held that Younger principles
applied although the state proceeding was civil in nature and a party must use the state appellate
remedies before seeking a federal injunction unless one of the Younger exceptions applies. Id. at
609. The exceptions to Younger are (1) if the state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or
is conducted in bad faith; (2)if the challenged statute is flagrantly violative of express constitutional
prohibitions in every clause and paragraph thereof, or (3) if extraordinary circumstances exist.
Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1063-64 (10th Cir. 1995).
57. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
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'This concern mandates application of Younger abstention not only
when the pending state proceedings are criminal, but also when cer-
tain civil proceedings are pending, if the State's interests in the pro-
ceeding are so important that exercise of the federal judicial power
would disregard the comity between the States and the National Gov-
ernment.
58
The broadening of Younger abstention to civil cases makes Rooker-
Feldman's scope very similar to Younger abstention. This is because, in
many cases, Rooker-Feldman plaintiffs are seeking to enjoin the state
proceedings.59
2. Preclusion Theories Defined
Courts have used Rooker-Feldman interchangeably with two preclu-
sion theories. 60 The most common preclusion doctrine, claim preclusion
or res judicata, is defined as prohibiting the same parties from re-
litigating claims 61 that "were or could have been raised in a previous
S~t,,62suit.
'6
The second preclusion theory, issue preclusion or collateral estoppel,
requires a court to uphold an earlier decision by another court on issues
63
that were actually litigated. 64 There are two different types of issue pre-
clusion, (1) between the same parties, and (2) between different parties.
Issue preclusion between the same parties requires that the issue is the
same as in the prior action, actually litigated, essential to the final judg-
ment, and the party against whom the estoppel is enforced was fully rep-
65resented in the action. Issue preclusion between different parties may
be either defensive collateral estoppel or offensive collateral estoppel. In
defensive collateral estoppel, the plaintiff is estopped from litigating an
issue that has already been litigated and a final judgment has been
66reached. 6 In offensive collateral estoppel, the defendant is estopped from
58. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 10.
59. For example, in Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, the defendants argued that Rooker-
Feldman should bar the plaintiffs claims because he was seeking to enjoin a state court adoption
proceeding. Id. at 1390. However, the court found that Younger abstentions should apply. Id.
60. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985) ("We have read Rooker not as
a jurisdictional barrier but as an application of res judicata"); Ellentuck v. Klein, 570 F.2d 414, 425
(2d Cir. 1978) (due process claims that were fully litigated barred by res judicata; Rooker cited as
support).
61. Claims are defined as "all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with
respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of transactions, out of which the action arose."
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (2000).
62. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
63. Issue is defined as material points in dispute and essential to the judgment. Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 27 (2000).
64. Tuteur Ass. v. Taubensee Steel & Wire Co., 861 F. Supp. 693, 696 (N. D. I11. 1994).
65. Tutuer, 861 F. Supp. at 696.
66. Bernhard v. Bank of America. 122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1942).
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litigating an issue that it lost to another plaintiff, and the new plaintiff
wins the issue automatically. Offensive collateral estoppel requires all
the same elements as defensive and that the plaintiffs could have been
easily joined, the defendant had adequate incentive to defend the issue, it
was not a prior inconsistent judgment, and the defendant was not de-
67prived of a procedure advantage in the original action.
Rooker-Feldman's scope is, again, very similar to preclusion theo-
ries. This is because, in many cases, Rooker-Feldman plaintiffs are rais-
ing claims in federal court that are very similar to those raised in the
original state court proceeding. Therefore, courts could very easily apply
preclusion theories, rather than Rooker-Feldman to bar a case.
3. Substantive Comparison of Rooker-Feldman and Abstention and
Preclusion Theories
Many have confused Rooker-Feldman with abstention and preclu-
sion theories in civil procedure because Rooker-Feldman appears to
overlap the two theories. One commentator observes, "[lt]his doctrine is
nearly redundant because most of the actions dismissed for want of juris-
diction also could be resolved by invoking the claim- or issue- preclusion
consequences of the state judgment.",6 In order to understand how
Rooker-Feldman has been confused and may be redundant, a comparison
of these theories will be discussed.
a. Rooker-Feldman and Abstention Theories
Courts have confused and mingled together Rooker-Feldman and
abstention theories, because of their striking similarities. 69 Both doctrines
can bar claims arising in state court from being heard in federal courts.
Younger abstention bars claims in federal court that are pending in state
court.70 Rooker-Feldman bars claims that arose in state courts, or those
that are inextricably intertwined with such claims. 7t An overlap occurs
because all claims that are still pending in state court are inextricably
intertwined with claims brought in federal court if the federal claims ask
the federal court to make a decision regarding the pending state court
claims. If a federal court were to rule on a claim that is still pending in
67. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329 (1979).
68. Wright, supra note 8, at § 4469.1.
69. For example in Johnson v. De Grandy even the Supreme Court seemed to label Rooker-
Feldman as another type of abstention theory by stating, "the Federal Government's § 2 challenge
deserved dismissal under this Court's Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine .... " Johnson v. De
Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005 (1994). The Seventh Circuit recently stated their confusion of the
distinction by stating that rather than attempting "a problematic application of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine," the court applied abstention principles and refused to issue an injunction to enjoin a
pending state litigation on the grounds that principles of federalism and comity would be upset.
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Moran, 959 F.2d 634, 635 (7th Cir. 1992).
70. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
71. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16.
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state court, the court would make the lower state court's ruling void.
This is essentially the definition of inextricably intertwined.7 2
This similarity brings up the question, "If an injunction is permissi-
ble under Younger, should the Rooker doctrine cut in to prevent it? [Al-
ternatively,] if an interference is prohibited by Younger... what need is
there for Rooker?" 73 Rooker-Feldman, by barring a federal court's ap-
pellate review of a state court's proceeding, may be superfluous of
Younger abstention when the case is still pending in the state court.
However, there is one fundamental substantive difference between
Rooker-Feldman and abstention theories-Rooker-Feldman may con-
tinue to bar a suit when litigants are seeking relief from a final state court
judgment.74 In this respect, Rooker-Feldman has a purpose that goes be-
yond the scope of abstention. Abstention doctrines only stop a case when
it is pending in state court, while Rooker-Feldman can bar a case that has
reached its final judgment. 75 However, this clear distinction is substan-
tially blurred by similarities between Rooker-Feldman and preclusion
theories.
b. Rooker-Feldman and Preclusion Theories
The similarity between Rooker-Feldman and preclusion theories is,
simply stated, that both doctrines provide a way for the federal court to
refuse to hear a state claim that has reached a final judgment by a state
court. Furthermore, both doctrines require an analysis of whether the
state claims or issues were substantively similar to those bring brought in
federal court. Conversely, the differences between preclusion theories
and Rooker-Feldman are often very difficult to distinguish.
Essentially, the difference between Rooker-Feldman and issue pre-
clusion is simply, that issue preclusion bars only those claims that have
actually been litigated in another court proceeding, while Rooker-
Feldman may bar claims that have not been litigated, but are inextricably
72. The Tenth Circuit defines "inextricably intertwined" claims as "separate to and collateral
to" the merits of the state court judgment. Kiowa Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Hoover, 150 F.3d
1163,1170 (1998).
73. H. HART & H. WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1637 (3d
ed. 1988).
74. Sherry, supra note 1, at 1092-93.
75. For example, the Tenth Circuit in Marrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386 (1996) asked parties
to submit supplemental memoranda advising the court on two questions: "(1) if an adoption order
has been entered in that proceeding, what are the positions of the parties as to whether dismissal of
this federal suit should be ordered under the doctrine of [Rooker-Feldman]; and (2) if the state
adoption proceeding is still pending, whether we should vacate and remand, directing abstention by
the federal district court under the rationale of the [Younger doctrine]. Id. at 1389. This example




intertwined with claims litigated in a previous decision.76 Therefore,
Rooker-Feldman, by barring issues that have not actually been litigated
in a lower court proceeding but were intertwined with the issues litigated,
has a purpose that extends beyond the scope of issue preclusion.
However, many commentators feel that the substantive difference
between Rooker-Feldman and claim preclusion is more complex and
Rooker-Feldman does not bar anything that claim preclusion would not
also bar.7 7 Consequently, many argue that Rooker-Feldman has the exact
scope of claim preclusion.78
The Rooker-Feldman bar extends to claims that were not litigated
but are inextricably intertwined with claims that have been litigated.79
The claim is inextricably intertwined if, by ruling, the federal court
would make the lower state court's ruling void.80 However, claims barred
by claim preclusion arise in the same way. Claim preclusion bars claims
that have been litigated or are virtually identical to those claims that have
been litigated.8 1 This raises the question of whether there is ever a time
when an inextricably intertwined claim arises that can void a state court
judgment, and, at the same time, is not a claim that has risen out of the
same series of connected transactions which claim preclusion would bar.
Many feel that this would never occur.82 However, there are two limited
occasions that arise where Rooker-Feldman has a purpose that extends
beyond the scope of claim preclusion.
One occasions arises when a claim is inextricably intertwined with
another claim and therefore voids the lower state court's ruling, but the
inextricably intertwined claim is not virtually identical to a claim that
was raised in the lower state court proceeding. An example of this arises
in the Tenth Circuit case, Lecates v. Barker. Here the Court found that
the Plaintiffs fraud claim was inextricably intertwined with the lower
state court's default judgment. 84 Plaintiff's fraud claim was not virtually
identical to any of the claims raised in the state court, dealing with attor-
76. Wright, supra note 8. at § 4402.
77. Smith, supra note 16, at 655, stating "Inextricably intertwined claims will only result out
of the same series of connected transactions... [which is barred by claim preclusion].
78. Id.
79. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 484 n. 16.
80. Fielder, 188 F.3d at 1035.
81. Wright, supra note 8, at § 4402.
82. For example, one commentator states, "[IInextricably intertwined claims will only result
out of the same series of connected transactions ... [which is barred by claim preclusion.]" Smith,
supra note 16, at 655. The only way a claim is inextricably intertwined with another is if it is so
similar to the original claim that it would change the lower state court's ruling. However, since this
claim is virtually identical to the original claim, claim preclusion would also bar it and there is no
need for Rooker-Feldman. Id. Therefore, many argue Rooker-Feldman may never bar a claim that
claim preclusion would not also bar.
83. 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29306 (2000).
84. Lacates, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS at *6.
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ney misconduct. 85 Therefore, claim preclusion would not bar the claim.
However, the Court still found that if they ruled that the lower state
court's ruling was based on fraud, this would be voiding the state court's
decision. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit found that the suit was barred by
Rooker-Feldman.8 6 Because the two claims, fraud and attorney miscon-
duct, were not virtually identical, claim preclusion could not be used, and
only Rooker-Feldman could bar the fraud claim that was raised in the
federal court.
Another occasion that Rooker-Feldman may fill a gap in preclusion
doctrines involves the question of whether the Feldman court wanted to
preclude jurisdiction "over separate claims that a litigant did not raise in
state court and which are not inextricably intertwined with actually liti-
gated state court claims, where that party procedurally could have pre-
sented the separate claim to the state trial court, but simply chose not to
do so."'87 Therefore, if Rooker-Feldman forbids review of non-
inextricably intertwined claims and all claims or issues that could have
been raised in state court but were not, then Rooker-Feldman will extend
beyond the scope of claim preclusion, which only precludes unlitigated
issues if there is substantial connection between the original claim and
the unlitigated issue.
88
4. Procedural Differences Between Rooker-Feldman and Absten-
tion and Preclusion Theories
In addition to substantive differences, there are procedural differ-
ences in uses and incidents between the use of Rooker-Feldman and ab-
stention and preclusion theories. These procedural differences between
Rooker-Feldman and abstention theories are the same as the differences
between Rooker-Feldman and preclusion theories.
One difference arises because Rooker-Feldman is a doctrine
grounded in jurisdiction theories, and therefore it can be raised by the
federal court as a bar to jurisdiction, anytime during the litigation. Par-
ties cannot waive their right to bring Rooker-Feldman jurisdiction issues
into court by not raising it as an affirmative defense.90 Alternatively,
doctrines of preclusion and abstention can be waived if the defendant
does not plead it as an affirmative defense in the answer.9' Courts have
85. Id. at *4.
86. Id. at *6.
87. Smith, supra note 16, at 655.
88. Id.
89. Wright, supra note 8, at § 4469.1.
90. Id.
91. The Supreme Court has stated that abstention can be waived in Ohio Civil Rights
Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626 (1986). However, the Tenth Circuit
in Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386 (1996), stated, "we are convinced that we have properly raised
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used Rooker-Feldman to raise the issue of jurisdiction sua sponte in
92many cases.
Another difference is that "the preclusive effect a federal court will
give to a state court judgment will vary because under U.S.C. § 1738
preclusion is governed by state rules. 93 Therefore, some worry that
without Rooker-Feldman there will be no uniform application of preclu-
sion rules. While Rooker-Feldman "provides for a limited and uniform
federal law of preclusion in cases that varying state laws may not fore-
close.",
94
However, some scholars feel that these differences between preclu-
sion and abstention theories and Rooker-Feldman still do not provide
Rooker-Feldman with a place in our legal system. For example, Wright,
Miller, and Cooper, in Federal Practice and Procedure take the position
that using the jurisdictional doctrine for cases that involve a form of di-
rect attack on a state court judgment gives little reason for having a sec-
ond doctrine.95 The authors explain why:
[T]he application of federal jurisdiction law rather than state preclu-
sion law may weigh as much against Rooker-Feldman theory as for
it-if state preclusion law permits a second action, and there is fed-
eral subject-matter jurisdiction apart from the Rooker-Feldman the-
ory, it is not immediately clear that the Supreme Court's sole juris-
diction to review a state judgment impliedly defeats the explicit grant
of district court jurisdiction. In the same vein, reliance on a jurisdic-
tional theory may impede a desirable opportunity to decide an easy
merits question rather than a complex preclusion-jurisdiction ques-
tion.
96
Likewise, the second reason for upholding Rooker-Feldman, uni-
form application, has also been thought to be contrary to our legal sys-
tem. Some feel that applying Rooker-Feldman as a uniform rule without
the abstention issue sua sponte." Id. at 1392. Although there is a debate on the issue of whether a
court may raise abstention sua sponte, there is no debate that a court may raise Rooker-Feldman on
its own. Therefore, for the purposes of this article, this remains a procedural difference between
Rooker-Feldman and abstention theories.
92. Jurisdiction raised by the court:
"A challenge under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and may be raised at any time by either party or sue sponte by the court" Moccio v. N.Y.
State Office of Court Admin., 95 F. 3d 195, 198 (1996); "[Tlhis court on its own motion
may raise issue of subject matter jurisdiction." Ritter v. Ross, 992 f.2d 750, 752 (1993);
"At the motions hearing, the district court appropriately sua sponte raised the Rooker-
Feldman issue..." Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 197 n.5 (1997); "A
challenge to a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine 'may be raised at any time by either party or sua sponte by the court."' Doctor's
Assocs. V. Distajo. 107 F.3d 126, 137 (1997).
93. Thompson, supra. note 8, at 912.
94. Currie. supra note 8. at 324.
95. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at § 4469. 1.
96. Id. (citations omitted).
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taking into consideration the preclusion rules of individual states contra-
dicts the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 that "requires federal courts to give
the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments
would be given in the courts of the State from which the judgments
emerged."9 A commentator asks, "If the federal court cannot give less
deference to a state court judgment then the state rendering would give it,
why should Rooker-Feldman be used in a way that would require the
federal court to give it greater deference to a state court judgment than
the state rendering would give it?"'98 Applying Rooker-Feldman uni-
formly would deny states the opportunity to decide "the preclusive ef-
fects of their own judgments." 99
Finally, some scholars believe that Rooker-Feldman and claim pre-
clusion overlap completely and that instead of there being two doctrines,
claim preclusion and Rooker-Feldman, each having different "work,"
there is instead only one-a jurisdictional claim preclusion.' ° ° Professor
Chang states, "if the law of the state rendering the judgment would re-
quire the application of claim preclusion, the federal court must apply bar
and merger and dismiss the action even if the issue was not raised by the
parties. ' '
Whether one believes that Rooker-Feldman is a complete overlap of
abstention and preclusion theories or that Rooker-Feldman is adding an
important part to the idea of federalism, the bottom line is that Rooker-
Feldman is alive and well today and used extensively by the lower fed-
eral courts.
C. Application of Rooker-Feldman in Early Tenth Circuit Decisions
The Tenth Circuit has used Rooker-Feldman in many of its deci-
sions. An analysis of their past decisions shows how the Court initially
used the Rooker doctrine interchangeably with claim preclusion or res
judicata. The Court then introduced the concept of "inextricably inter-
twined" claims in Doe v. Pringle, ° 2 cited by the United States Supreme
Court in their Feldman decision. However, the Tenth Circuit has not
always followed its approach advocated in Doe, but has both broadened
and narrowed their definition of what claims that are "inextricably in-
tertwined" with the state court claims.
97. Thompson, supra, note 8, at 913, citing Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,
466 (1982).
98. Thompson, supra, note 8, at 913.
99. Id.
100. Chang, supra note 13, at 1354-55.
101. Thompson, supra, note 8, at 912, citing Chang, supra note 12, at 1355.
102. 550 F.2d 596 (1976).
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1. Lavasek v. White:'0 3 the Court's Application of the Rooker Doc-
trine
In Lavasek, the defendants were landowners that were sued in New
Mexico state courts for a condemnation proceeding.'°4 The State of New
Mexico was converting Highway 66 into a controlled access highway.
°5
The rights of the landowners were fully litigated in the New Mexico state
courts, ending with a final decision by the New Mexico Supreme
Court1 °6 The state supreme court found that the landowners had "suf-
fered no compensable injury for the loss of access or impaired visibility
occasioned by the construction changes under the facts of the case."' 0
7
The appellants filed in the United States District Court, claiming that
they had been deprived of their constitutional rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.'0 8 The District Court denied their claims find-
ing them barred by resjudicata.'0 9 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, however,
it based its decision on the Rooker doctrine and not on res judicata."0
The Court never explained why they did not use preclusion theories.
Rather, it appears that because the parties were trying to raise federal
constitutional issues in federal court that were based on a state court's
decision, the Tenth Circuit used the Rooker doctrine instead of preclu-
sion theories. However, the Court never stated that the District Court was
wrong for using res judicata, but instead seemed to imply that Rooker
and resjudicata can be used interchangeably.
2. Doe v. Pringle:"' the Introduction of Inextricably Intertwined
Claims
Doe brought his claim into federal court after the Colorado Supreme
Court dismissed his application to the Colorado Bar based on a prior
felony conviction. 2 The Colorado Supreme Court found that based on
Doe's prior record he could not be admitted even though he had passed
the bar exam and the state Bar Committee found he was suited to prac-
tice law." 3 Doe filed suit in federal court claiming that his rights ac-
corded by the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment had been violated.' 4 The United States District Court dis-
missed his claim finding that there was a "subtle but fundamental dis-
103. 339 F.2d 861 (1965).




108. Lavasek v. White, 339 F.2d 861, 862 (1965).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 863.
111. 550 P.2d 596 (1976).
112. Doe. 550 P.2d at 579.
113. ld. at 597.
114. Id. at 597.
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tinction between two types of claims which a... bar applicant.., might
bring to federal court: The first is a constitutional challenge to the state's
general rules and regulations governing admission; the second is a claim
based on constitutional or other grounds, that the state has unlawfully
denied a particular applicant admission."" 5 The District Court found that
federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear claims "where review of a
state court's adjudication of a particular application is sought."' 16 The
Tenth Circuit adopted this reasoning and found that the constitutional
challenges were "an attempt by Doe to seek review in inferior federal
courts of the entire state proceedings .. ,, 17 The United States Supreme
Court later adopted this language seven years later which gave birth to
the Feldman part of the Rooker analysis: whether a claim is inextricably
intertwined with a state court decision."
8
3. --acio v. Jones:"9 the Broadening of the Definition of Inextricably
Intertwined
Facio brought his action in federal court after the Utah State Court
had entered a default judgment against him.12 The Federal District Court
found for Facio finding that "the Utah procedural requirement that a
meritorious defense be presented before a default judgment could be set
aside was unconstitutional . . ..,,12, The Tenth Circuit overturned by
finding that Facio was seeking two types of relief: (1) he wants the de-
fault judgment set aside; and (2) he wants the federal court to declare the
122Utah Rules of Civil Procedure unconstitutional. The Court found that
the first relief would require the federal court to reverse the Utah state
court judgment, and therefore it was inextricably intertwined and barred
by Rooker-Feldman.' 23 The Court further found that the second relief
was also barred because it was inextricably intertwined with the first
relief.124 The Court did not look to see whether the second claim was
intertwined with a state claim, but rather found it was intertwined with
the first claim for relief. 25 Therefore, this holding broadened the defini-
tion of inextricably intertwined claims to include not only those relating
to state claims, but also claims inextricably intertwined with claims that
are barred in state courts.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Doe, 550 F.2d at 599.
118. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16.
119. 929 F.2d 541 (1991).
120. Facio. 921) F.2d at 542.
121. Id. at 543.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 541.543.
125. Facio, 929 F.2d at 543-44.
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4. Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Hoover:126 Narrowing the Defini-
tion of Inextricably Intertwined
In Kiowa, Hoover sued the Kiowa Tribe ("Tribe") and six other de-
fendants in state court for a breach of contract claim. 127 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that the state courts do have jurisdiction over a Na-
tive American tribe when the contract was entered into outside of the
"Indian Country."'' 2 8 Meanwhile, Aircraft Equipment Company (Aircraft
Equipment) sued the Tribe for a breach of an assumption agreement.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court also ruled that state court has jurisdiction
over the claim. The Tribe then filed a § 1983 action in federal court. The
Tribe claimed that Mr. Hoover and Aircraft Equipment, "by bringing
breach of contract actions against the [Tribe] in Oklahoma state court,
and the Judges, by exercising the action, deprived the Tribe of rights,
privileges and immunities secured to the Tribe by the Constitution of the
United States."' 129 The federal district court dismissed the Tribe's suit,
holding that Rooker-Feldman barred the claims. 30 The Tenth Circuit
overturned and held that it should apply a narrow meaning of the defini-
tion of "inextricably intertwined" by finding that a claim is not inextrica-
bly intertwined if it is "separable from and collateral to" a state court
judgment.' 3 ' The Court found that because a court could rule on the §
1983 claim without disturbing the original state action, the District Court
did have jurisdiction over the Tribe's claims.132
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Kiowa, reflects the Court's current
analysis of Rooker-Feldman. The court, although once adopting a broad
definition of "inextricably intertwined," has come to adopt a more nar-
row definition of the test-a claim is inextricably intertwined if it is not
separable from and collateral to a state court judgment. 33 This analysis
also reflects the United States Supreme Courts' interpretation of inextri-
cably intertwined.
134
II. THE PRESENT SCOPE OF ROOKER-FELDMAN
As mentioned previously, direct attacks to state court judgments
have given lower courts many occasions to use Rooker-Feldman to block
126. 150 F.3d 1163 (1998).
127. Kiowa, 150 F.3d at 1166.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1168.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1170.
132. Kiowa, 150 F.3d at 1171.
133. Id. at 1170.
134. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil. 481 U.S. 1
(1987), found that Texaco's federal action was "separate from and collateral to" the merits of the
state-court judgment, and therefore it was not barred by Rooker-Feldman. Id. at 21.
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cases. 135 "Since 1990 alone, lower federal courts have used Rooker-
Feldman to find jurisdiction lacking in more than five hundred cases."'
136
However, many of these rulings have been inconsistent. For example, the
Court wrote that the doctrine is merely a "jurisdictional recasting of pre-
clusion questions."' 137 The Fifth Circuit has merged the two doctrines, by
stating that Rooker-Feldman does not bar an action "when that same
action would be allowed in the state court of the rendering state.,
138
Many courts also go back and forth between the jurisdictional principles
of Rooker-Feldman, preclusion theories, and abstention theories, without
explaining how they are all related.
139
One issue that routinely troubles lower federal courts is whether
Rooker-Feldman bars a suit when it is brought by nonparties. State
judgments are sometimes collaterally attacked in federal court by some-
one who was not a party to the state suit. Under preclusion rules, the
nonparty would rarely be barred, because these preclusion rules only bar
those suits that involve the same parties or and the same issues. 40 How-
ever, the fact that the same issues that were brought in the state court
may now be brought into a federal court by a nonparty troubles some
lower federal courts, which further causes inconsistent decisions. The
lower courts struggle with the issue of how to apply Rooker-Feldman to
suits by nonparties.
A. An Analysis of the Tenth Circuit Case Johnson v. Rodrigues
14 1
The Tenth Circuit has recently struggled with whether to use
Rooker-Feldman to bar an action by a nonparty in federal court. In John-
son v. Rodrigues,142 plaintiff Johnson, the biological father of a baby
placed for adoption, sued the two defendants, Rodrigues, the mother, and
Adoption Center of Choice, in federal court after a Utah state court
granted the adoption of Johnson's daughter without allowing Johnson to
join the proceedings and contest the adoption. 1
43
135. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at § 4469.1 lists the many occasions that it has been used: "to
enjoin, to set aside and void, or to declare unlawful a state judgment. Jurisdiction also has been
denied in actions to compel specific acts by a state court, such as continuance, entry of judgment,
rehearing, or a new trial. A bankruptcy court order to release a prisoner also has run afoul by
Rooker-Feldman. An action to compel restitution of the amount paid on a state judgment, for injury
caused by the judgment, or for damages measured by the amount of the judgment, falls by the same
reasoning (citations omitted).
136. Sherry, supra note 1, at 1088.
137. Cross-Sound Ferry Servs. v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
138. Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 376 (5th Cir. 1995).
139. McKinnis v. Morgan, 972 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1992).
140. See Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996).
141. 226 F.3d 1103 (10th Cir. 2000).
142. Johnson, 226 F.3d at 1103.
143. Id. at 1105.
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Johnson and Rodrigues conceived a child in Arizona and Rodrigues
later informed the father (Johnson) that she had an abortion. 44 Johnson
later learned that Rodrigues did not have an abortion and that he may be
the father of the daughter that Rodrigues had placed for adoption.1 45 Us-
ing a Utah subpoena, Johnson obtained records that made him believe
that there was a pending adoption in Utah for a child that may be his
daughter.' 46 Johnson called the other defendant, Adoption Center of
Choice, and spoke with an employee about the adoption. The employ4ee
indicated that the father could do nothing about the pending adoption.
Johnson argued in Federal District Court that the Utah statutes ap-
plied in this case violated his due process rights by refusing to allow his
participation in the adoption proceeding and thus deprived him of his
fundamental right to have a parent-child relationship. Johnson argued
that the statute was unconstitutional because it did not require the mother
to give the name of the father. 48 Johnson wanted the defendants, to pro-
duce the baby for DNA testing and return the baby to Johnson, if he was
proven the biological father.'
49
The defendants moved for summary judgment. 150 The Federal Dis-
trict Court stated that it was going to dismiss the case because Johnson
did not have subject matter jurisdiction.15 ' The Court believed that John-
son may seek remedy only in the state court for his challenge to the Utah
statute and not in the federal courts where "the relief sought is in the na-
ture of appellate review [of the state court's decision].' 52 The federal
district court stated that Johnson's claims were essentially seeking to
undo the adoption decision of the Utah state court, and therefore his case
"fits squarely within the parameters of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
which prohibits me, a federal district court, from reviewing the state
court judgment."' 153 The lower federal court did not recognize that John-
son was a nonparty to the original proceeding and was not allowed to
bring his claim in the original suit.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the federal district
court's decision, finding that Rooker-Feldman did not bar the case in
federal court. 54 The Court accepted Johnson's argument that he was not
seeking appellate review of the state court's decision because he was not
144. Id. at 1106.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1106.
147. Johnson, 226 F.3d at 1106.
148. Id. at 1107.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1107.
152. Johnson, 226 F.3d at 1107.
153. Id.
154. ld. at 1108.
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a party to the adoption proceeding in Utah.1 55 The Court stated two main
reasons why the district court erred: (1) because Johnson did not have the
opportunity to litigate in federal court; and (2) Johnson was not asking
the Federal District Court to overturn the state court decision.
56
The Tenth Circuit held that if a plaintiff was not a party to the action
in the state court proceeding, then Rooker-Feldman does not apply.
57
The Court continued by stating that Rooker-Feldman does not bar a fed-
eral action when the plaintiff lacked a reasonable opportunity to litigate
claims in state court. 58 The Court did not apply a broad, general rule
providing that any nonparty to the suit would not be barred from federal
court by Rooker-Feldman; but rather the Court looked to the procedural
nature of the case and limited its holding to just those parties who
"lacked a reasonable opportunity to litigate" their claims in the state
courts. 1
59
The Tenth Circuit's second reason for overruling the Federal District
Court is that Johnson's "discrete general challenge to the validity of the
Utah adoption laws must be considered, thus distinguishing this case
from one challenging the merits of a particular state court ruling."'' 60 The
Court found that federal district courts have jurisdiction "over general
challenges .. .which do not require review of a final state court judg-
ment in a particular case.' 16 1 This principle gives the Federal District
Court jurisdiction because the court can decide Johnson's challenge to
the Utah's adoption laws without reviewing a final state court
judgment. 62 In other words, the two claims are not "inextricably inter-
twined." The Court finally relied on, Doe v. Pringle63 which held, "a
federal district court may exercise jurisdiction in relation to review of
alleged federal constitutional due process or equal protection depriva-
tions in the state's adoption and/or administration of general rules and
regulations governing admission."' 64 Thus, the Tenth Circuit found that it
was error to dismiss Johnson's complaint, because his claim did not ap-
peal a particular state court judgment.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Johnson, 226 F.3d at 1108.
158. Id. at 1109.
159. Id. atI 110.
160. Id. at 1108.
161. Feldman. 460 U.S. at 486.
162. Johnson, 226 F.3d at 1108-09.
163. Doe v. Pringle, 550 F.2d at 596 (10th Cir. 1976).
164. Id. at 599.
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B. Other Circuit Court Decisions Regarding Rooker-Feldman and Non-
Parties
Other Circuit Courts have also addressed the issue decided by the
Tenth Circuit: whether suits by nonparties are barred by Rooker-
Feldman. The other Circuit Courts have rarely used Rooker-Feldman to
bar a suit brought by a nonparty. However, the reasoning why a Circuit
Court decided not to dismiss a case based on Rooker-Feldman has varied
greatly. Reasoning has ranged from applying a broad, general rule, to a
more fact specific analysis that looks at the nature of the case and its
parties.
The Circuit Courts have so rarely applied Rooker-Feidman to bar
suits brought by nonparties, that some Circuit Courts have adopted a
broad, general rule that Rooker-Feldman does not apply to nonparties.
However, this broad rule does not reflect the purpose of Rooker-Feldman
and excludes the limited occasions when Rooker-Feldman has a use that
extends beyond abstention and preclusion theories. Rooker-Feldman, as
discussed above, may have a use beyond the other theories when a party
does not seek to enjoin an ongoing state proceeding, but instead wants to
"jump ship" and litigate in federal court. This purose of Rooker-
Feldman does not depend on the identity of the parties. 1 5 The purpose of
Rooker-Feldman, rather, depends on the nature of the federal suit, and
whether it is an "appellate" review of the state court judgment. There-
fore, it would be incongruous to create a broad, general rule that excludes
nonparty plaintiffs from the effects of Rooker-Feldman.'6 6 Furthermore,
it is not against due process to require a nonparty plaintiff to intervene in
a state court proceeding, as long as "that plaintiff had notice that the state
suit might affect [his or her] interest."'
167
The Tenth Circuit, as discussed above, did not apply Rooker-
Feldman to Johnson v. Rodrigues, involving nonparties.lts However, the
court did not base its decision on a broad rule against applying Rooker-
Feldman to nonparties. 169 The Court, rather, looked to the issues under-lying the federal claim to make the decision. 170
1. The Eleventh and Ninth Circuit Decisions
The Eleventh and Ninth Circuit Courts, like the Tenth Circuit, have
analyzed cases, where Rooker-Feldman's use was at issue, without
making a broad, general rule. For example, the Eleventh Circuit in Dale
165. Sherry, supra note 1, at 1114.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Johnson, 226 F.3d at 1108.
169. Id. at 1110.
170. Id.
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v. Moore,17 1 held that, "the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies as long as
the party had a reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claims in the
state court proceedings. If the party did not have a reasonable opportu-
nity to raise the claim, then the federal claim was not inextricably inter-
twined with the state court's judgment."'' 72 In Dale v. Moore, the Elev-
enth Circuit precluded the federal district court's exercise of subject
matter jurisdiction finding that the Plaintiff's "ADA claim is inextricably
intertwined with the state's judicial proceedings relating to his bar ad-
mission."' 73 The Court found that since the ADA claim would require the
federal district court to review the facts of the Plaintiffs case, the claim
is inextricably intertwined with the state court case. 174 Therefore, the
Eleventh Circuit looked at the nature of the suit and resisted making a
broad, over-encompassing rule.
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Marriott International, Inc.
v. Mitsui Trust & Banking Co' 75 also barred a nonparty from relitigating
a claim in federal court using Rooker-Feldman, without using an over-
broad rule. 176 A district court, within the Ninth Circuit, applied Rooker-
Feldman to bar a party who had been denied the right to intervene in a
state court suit, on the ground that the state court's denial, itself, was a
final judgment of the very claim the party was attempting to raise in fed-
eral court. 17 7 The district court, within the Ninth Circuit did not allow the
case to proceed in federal court simply because the federal plaintiff was a
nonparty to the state proceedings. Rather, the Court looked at the nature
of the federal case and applied Rooker-Feldman to bar the case.
2. The Seventh, Third, and Fourth Circuit Decisions
The Seventh, Third, and Fourth Circuit Courts have a general rule
barring the use of Rooker-Feldman to cases involving nonparties to the
original state proceeding. Unlike the Tenth, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuit
decisions, these three Circuit Courts do not look to see whether the
plaintiff was given a reasonable opportunity to intervene in the state
court's proceeding or at the nature of the federal suit, to determine if the
federal court is acting in an "appellate" capacity.
For example, the Seventh Circuit in Allen v. Allen 178 relied squarely
on a rule that prohibited applying Rooker-Feldman to nonparties. Allen
involves a woman who gave birth to a child by a man who was not her
171. Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624 (11 th Cir. 1997).
172. Id. at 626.
173. Id. at 627.
174. Id. at 628.
175. 13 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (D. Haw. 1998).
176. Marriott International, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1059.
177. Id. at 1062-63.
178. 48 F.3d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1995).
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husband. 7 9 She later divorced her husband and the Court gave her now
ex-husband, not the child's biological father, visitation rights.180 The
woman then married the biological father of her child.'18 The biological
father sought an injunction in federal court against the enforcement of
the state visitation order that allowed the woman's ex-husband to visit
the child. 82 The Court may have applied Rooker-Feldman to bar the
case, because the defendant, the biological father, had a reasonable op-
portunity to enjoin the state proceeding and the lower federal court
would have been acting as an appellate court of the state court's ruling. 183
However, the Court did not use Rooker-Feldman, because the Court had
a broad rule banning the use of Rooker-Feldman to cases involving non-
parties. Rather the Court had to rely on the domestic relation exception to
federal jurisdiction to bar the suit from federal court.184
The Third Circuit has also applied a broad, general rule banning the
use of Rooker-Feldman to suits with nonparties. In FOCUS v. Allegheny
County Court of Common Pleas,185 the plaintiffs, a citizen's advocacy
group, For Our Children's Ultimate Safety ("FOCUS") and two of
FOCUS' members, challenged a gag order the state judge entered in a
child custody case. The Plaintiffs wanted to talk to one of the parties in
the case and could not. Subsequently, the Plaintiffs tried to intervene and
challenge the gag order, claiming it violated their First Amendment
rights.' 86 The state court refused to hear FOCUS's motion to intervene.
87
The Plaintiffs then filed a U.S.C. § 1983 suit in a federal district court. 88
The Third Circuit ruled that the federal court had jurisdiction because
Rooker-Feldman did not apply to cases with nonparties.' 89 The Court did
not need to apply a broad rule, which might not always be appropriate for
suits by nonparties. Rather, the Court should have looked to whether the
parties had the opportunity to litigate in state court or whether they were
asking the federal district court to hold an "appellate" hearing of the state
court's decision.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit also has not applied Rooker-Feldman in
cases where the federal plaintiff was not a party to the original state ac-
tion. In Republic of Paraguay v. Allen,' 90 Paraguay and its ambassador to
the United States filed suit in federal court, alleging that the State of Vir-
179. Allen, 48 F.3d at 260.
180. Id. at 260.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 260.
183. Id. at 261-62.
184. Allen, 48 F.3d at 261.
185. FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. 75 F.3d 834 (3rd Cir. 1996).
186. Id. at 836.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 837.
189. Id. at 840.
190. 134 F.3d 622 (1998).
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ginia had violated various treaties when it tried and convicted a Para-
guayan national resident in the United States.191 Instead of looking at the
procedural posture of the case and deciding whether the Plaintiffs were
asking the Court to be an "appellate" court, the Fourth Circuit court
bared their action without regard to whether or not they had a reasonable
opportunity to litigate in state court.
19 2
III. ANALYSIS
Rooker-Feldman has caused substantial confusion and, as discussed
above, many commentators feel that it is mostly redundant of other legal
theories. 193 However, the Supreme Court has not abandoned the doctrine
and the lower courts continue to use it to bar cases from federal jurisdic-
tion. Consequently, it is vital for the lower courts to apply Rooker-
Feldman correctly. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Johnson v.
Rodrigues194 reflects a movement by Circuit Courts towards establishing
case law that will help guide legal scholars in understanding the correct
purpose of the doctrine-one that looks at the nature of the federal suit
and not the parties.
Courts should not adopt and apply a broad, over-encompassing rule
that Rooker-Feldman should not be applied to nonparties, because this
rule does not reflect the original intent of the doctrine. Courts using an
all-encompassing rule confuse the already muddled purpose of Rooker-
Feldman. The analysis for Rooker-Feldman only requires courts to look
at whether the parties are asking the federal court to change or alter a
final state court judgment. "A court that strays from this common sense
conclusion will end up hopelessly confused-and will often find some
other reason to avoid jurisdiction."
For example, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Allen v. Allen ap-
peared to confuse the application of its general rule that Rooker-Feldman
is inapplicable to nonparties by not looking at the federal suit itself. In
Allen, the suit is the type of case where most courts have applied Rooker-
Feldman, because the federal plaintiff appears to be trying to undo the
state court's decision. 196 The Court found that the father could have been
a party to the state proceeding if he had followed the correct procedures
for establishing paternity. 97 The Court further found that it would not be
fair to let the father's failing to follow the correct procedures allow him
to litigate in federal court, while someone who followed correct proce-
191. Republic of Paraguay, 134 F.3d at 624.
192. Id. at 627 n.4.
193. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at § 4469.1.
194. Johnson v. Rodrigues, 226 F.3d 1103 (10th Cir. 2000).
195. Sherry, supra note 1, at 1120.
196. Allen, 48 F.3d at 261.
197. Id.
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dures could not. 98 Rather than find that the father was barred from fed-
eral court by Rooker-Feldman, the Court found instead that it was barred
by the domestic relations exception. 99 Instead of looking at the nature of
the federal case and using Rooker-Feldman to bar the case, the Court
further muddled Rooker-Feldman by writing a attenuated decision that
attempts only to justify its own reasoning.
Although some courts still apply an over-encompassing rule, most
courts look at the nature of the suit and apply Rooker-Feldman accord-
ingly. As discussed above, many courts first decide whether a plaintiff
had the opportunity to litigate in state court or if the plaintiff is trying to
change a state court's decision. The Tenth Circuit followed the original
intent of Rooker-Feldman in Johnson v. Rodrigues. The Court looked at
the nature of the federal case, and in doing so, the Court used Rooker-
Feldman as to reach the result originally sought by the Supreme Court-
to extend beyond the scope of abstention and preclusion theories. If all
the Circuit Courts would follow the lead by the Tenth Circuit, Rooker-
Feldman will likely become less confusing. Instead, Rooker-Feldman
would become a worthwhile tool for litigators and court, to use to help
preserve comity and the appropriate amount of federalism of our courts.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Whether Rooker-Feldman is an overlap of claim preclusion or a vital
civil procedure doctrine, the Supreme Court has to date neither nullified
it or abandoned it and the fact remains that Rooker-Feldman is alive and
well today and used extensively by the .lower federal courts. Although,
Rooker-Feldnian has a very limited purpose in our judicial system, it
does have a purpose that extends beyond the scope of abstention and
preclusion theories. Therefore, it is important that it Rooker-Feldman is
clearly understood and properly used.
The Tenth Circuit's decision is a reflection of an analysis that shows
the place that Rooker-Feldman may have in our federal jurisdiction. By
focusing on the nature of the federal suit and not on the parties, the Tenth
Circuit's analysis may help many to understand the real purpose of
Rooker-Feldman. Many of the Circuit Courts are moving in the direction
of the Tenth Circuit. If courts continue to do the proper analysis, and no
longer blend principles of preclusion theories with Rooker-Feldman
principles, Rooker-Feldman may no longer be a confusing doctrine, but
one that is a useful tool in civil procedure.
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